'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎43r] (85/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN. 83
E. Responsibility of Secretary of State, Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
curred. Secondly, Sir Beauchamp Duff argued that he met whatever demands came from
Mesopotamia. This is not quite true, but if it had been, more than this was required of him
and his advisers, the Directors of Medical Services, who successively held office under him.
Their passive attitude was really negligent. To receive demands, to discuss them by
correspondence, to do little or nothing except slowly under the propulsion of Mesopotamian
requests, were not the right methods for meeting a deficiency which was inherent in the
scale of preparation and ought to have been vividly present to the minds of the Commander-
in-Chief and his advisers. From the moment the Mesopotamian Expedition started, and
more and more as it grew in size, the Military and Medical Authorities should have been
not merely responding to demands, but making enquiries, offering suggestions, improving
organisation, and enlarging equipment. But these things they did not do. To distribute
the responsibility exactly between the Commander-in-Chief and the Directors of Medical
services is not easy. The direct responsibility is with Surgeon-General Babtie and Surgeon
General MacNeece, but however heavy it may be, the responsibility of the Commander-in-
Chief cannot be light. He was their superior, and authority was in his hands. It is true
that in regard to Surgeon-General MacNeece, he states :—
I had personally warned him in July, in the presence of my Staff at Conference, to go thoroughly into the
question of the adequacy of the Medical arrangements in Mesopotamia. He should have brought to my notice
the demands which had been received, and the impossibility of meeting them.
But such instructions, though good, were not enough. It was the Commander-in-Chief’s
duty in dealing with a matter of such great and continuing importance to satisfy himself
by an active supervision that his subordinates were not neglecting their instructions. He
must share in the blame of the Military Authorities in India, justly assigned by the Vincent-
Bingley Commission, who say :—
We cannot, however, absolve the Military and Medical Authorities in India from responsibility for many
of these deficiencies, in particular for the continuing neglect to supply the expeditionary force with that separate
transport for sick and wounded, both by land and water, which the teaching of experience has shown to be
essential in a properly organised enterprise of this character.
And to this it may be added that notwithstanding the extreme need of medical per
sonnel in Mesopotamia the Indian Government retained in India a large supply of Medical
Officers for possible need in case of-a war upon the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , or of internal
disturbances. Sir William Babtie and the Commander-in-Chief have both admitted that
in this respect, priority over Mesopotamia was given to India. It appears to us that a
distinction may reasonably be drawn between maintaining the necessary combatant forces
to meet all internal contingencies in India and keeping up to full strength the medical ser
vices there. As between the potential claims of India and the actual claims of Mesopotamia
in respect to medical provision, it appears to us that the Indian Government might have
attached less weight to the potential claims of India and more to the actual need of
Mesopotamia.
82. Until the beginning of 1916 the Indian Government seem to have been altogether
unappreciative of the real insufficiency of the medical service of Force “ D.” This is
shown by the correspondence that took place between Mr. Chamberlain and the Viceroy
in the latter part of 1915. On August 11th the Secretary of State sent the following
private telegram to the Viceroy :— •
“Private. Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire enquires informally whether he can usefully raise funds for sick
and wounded of regiments in Mesopotamia or India. Also whether voluntary aid societies can usefully help.
Are doctors, nurses, medicines, hospital comforts required ? Anything else needed ? Please telegraph your
reply.”
Lord Hardinge told us in evidence that he showed this telegram to the Army Depart
ment and, he thinks, to the Commander-in-Chief, and that his answer was determined
by the advice he received in consequence. The Commander-in-Chief had no recollection
of the matter and suggested that the answer was framed on the advice of the Director-
General of Indian Medical Services. But as Lord Hardinge definitely said that his answer
was written by the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commander-in-Chief
professed to no distinct recollection, we think it must be assumed that the Commander-
in-Chief saw, and probably advised, Lord Hardinge’s answer, the more so as they were
constantly in communication and consultation about Mesopotamian affairs. The answer
ran as follows :—
“ I much appreciate the thought w r hich prompted kind offer of Lord-Lieutenant of Hampshire.* Having
regard, however, to the heavy demands on charity which must arise elsew T here, I am unwilling at present to
* The oSer was reallv on behalf of Lord Northbrook.
L 2
(48—176)