'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎36r] (71/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
09
f- B. Medical Administration of Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia.
33. Colonel Heliir’s able statement of evidence gives his official account of the medical
arrangements during the period up to April, 1915, when he was principal medical officer
in Mesopotamia. He has submitted to us his periodical reports to Surgeon-General
Babtie in India and in the direction of sanitary and preventive medicine they display a
watchfulness and foresight over the needs of the situation, which are in refreshing contrast
with the administration of his successor, Surgeon-General Hathaway. Thus at the very
outset of the campaign he calls attention to the crying need for a proper water-supply at
Basra and does his best to grapple with the insanitary conditions in that town and else
where. He suggests and obtains spine-pads, tinted glasses, mosquito-nets, soda-water, &c.,
&c. He asks for a dentist and a bacteriological expert. He takes scientific measures to
cope with a possible outbreak of malaria, and he warns the Indian Government against the
danger of scurvy arising from the deficient ration of the Indian troops. He cables early in
February for typhoid and small-pox vaccine and anti-tetanus serum, and by using the latter
is able to report that there was only one case of tetanus out of nearly a thousand wounded at
Shaiba. We consider that Colonel Hehir worked with zeal and on the whole with success : •
and he can take credit for a remarkably low rate of sickness in the force during the winter of
1914-15. But it is quite clear from Colonel Hehir’s evidence, and from other sources, that
many of the defects in the care of the sick and wounded, which afterwards proved so
disastrous, were existent during the earlier phases of the campaign, and were only prevented
from becoming conspicuous, by a certain combination of good luck and good management, /
which distinguished Colonel Hehir’s administration.
34. The battle of Sahil, November 17th, 1914, w~as the first battle in the campaign
in which the casualties were considerable. The medical experience of this battle
indicated defects, which, if they had been appreciated and remedied in time,
would have saved much suffering later in the campaign. The battle was fought
before the full medical persomiel had arrived, the personnel had been separated from
their equipment by the embarkation officers at Bombay, some of the wounded were left
out all night, and the absence of any hospital ship necessitated wounded being sent back
to India m an ordinary transport, which had previously carried animals. But the com
paratively small number of casualties and the energy of Colonel Hehir in dealing with them
would seem to have minimised in his own mind, and in those of the authorities in India and
Mesopotamia the serious nature of the defects disclosed at this battle. At any rate every
one of these mistakes was repeated later in the campaign with disastrous results.
35. Colonel Hehir had been D.D.M.S. at Simla and had worked out with Surgeon-
General Babtie the medical requirements of Force “ D.” He must therefore have been
aware that no British Stationary Hospital accompanied the force and also that the British
General Hospital was 50 beds below the standard scale. He knew too that by the end of
March the force had been doubled in size, and brought up to the strength of two divisions
without any additional Stationary, Clearing, or General Hospitals being provided, and he
made no protest against the omission to provide such hospitals. Owing to the fact that it
was the cool weather and that such fighting as occurred was spasmodic and not as a rule
severe, Colonel Hehir was able to manage normally with the existing hospital accommoda
tion without serious overcrowding. But even so, he was forced at times into such doubtful
expedients as the use of transports as overflow hospitals, the borrowing of medical per
sonnel from the field ambulances, and the use of field ambulances as General Hospitals.
All these measures diminished the pressure on the hospitals and their staffs in a manner
which would have been impossible in times of widespread sickness or continuous fighting.
Unfortunately, however, his success in overcoming these difficulties led Colonel Hehir
not sufficiently to realise the danger of allowing the original shortage of medical personnel
and equipment to persist. He was content to “ make do ” with the low scale of medical
personnel provided and such deficiencies as he represented were only in respect of shortages
on that scale. He even acquiesced in the failure of the Indian authorities to send out
with the reinforcements at the beginning of 1915 their proper complement of field ambu
lances and hospitals, and it was not till towards the very end of his administration as
Principal Medical Officer that he appears to have begun to realise the dangers of the
situation. It is an ironic comment on Colonel Hehir’s policy that, in giving evidence as
to medical administration in periods of stress under his successor, Surgeon-General
Hathaway, he is again and again forced to criticise the perpetuation and development of
expedients which he himself initiated in easier times. /
36. A case in point is the non-provision of hospital river steamers. In his evidence