'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎35v] (70/248)

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PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
A. The Vincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions.
* See Appendix III
| urine bottles, cutlery and crockery. Many patients got no treatment after the application
' of their field dressing until they reached Basra.
29. The Yincent-Bingley Commission state the main causes of the breakdown at this
time as :—
(1.) The lack of proper hospital river steamers.
(2.) The lack of River Transport.
(3.) The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate staff and of medical stoics
and accessories, and
(4.) The weather conditions.
i To this we would add a 5th viz. i —The incorrect estimate as to the peiiod for which
1 General Townshend’s food supplies would enable him to hold out, which causeu Geneial
\ Aylmer to attack before his force could be organised complete at the front.
It was known when General Aylmer commenced the operations for the relief of Kut,
that his columns were inadequately organised as regards transport, staff and, adore all,
that the medical complements were quite insufficient. Military exigencies were assumed
to justify an advance in spite of these deficiencies, and it was with a full knowledge of
such deficiencies that the advance commenced. I he A incent-Bingley Commission in
their personal references to General Aylmer, acquit him of responsibility for these short
comings. We concur with them. He was acting under peremptory orders, as time was
then considered to be a paramount consideration.
March — April, 1916.
30. As regards the March fighting, we again quote and adopt from the report of the
Vincent-Bingley Commission :— : u t f u a-
For various reasons the medical arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded at the battle ot Fs-binn
were much more successful than during the operations of January. .
The arrangements were in many respects far from ideal, but we have reason to believe that the improve
ment was realised by everyone and much appreciated.
The main sources of discomfort were twofold, the use of transport carts for the conveyance of wounded
by land, and the lack of river hospital steamers. .
Subject to these defects, we think that the arrangements were satisfactory, and that great credit is du©
to the officers directly responsible for the collection and evacuation of the wounded.
31. Speaking of the battles between April 5th and 24th, the Vineent-Bingley Commis-
sioners say that the—
“ Arrangements were carefully thought out and proved very successful. The number of stretcher bearers
was sufficient, the collecting stations were conveniently situated, and ample provision was made for the comfort
and medical treatment of the wounded, who were promptly evacuated to the camp at \\ adi by the Aerial
motor boat, and in motor cars and ambulance waggons. The organisation was methodical and \\ orked smoothly
and the Commission saw nothing to call for unfavourable criticism in the arrangements made, sa\ e that the
provision of more motor boats and of additional ambulance transport would have been a convenience.
“ We think that the administrative and executive medical officers deserve great credit for the successful
collection and evacuation of the large numbers of wounded in the almost continuous fighting which took place
during this month.”
We would add ourselves that the force had by this time profited by the experience of
medical officers who had served in France.
Elsewhere we print a memorandum* handed in to us by Colonel Hehir which explains
the medical arrangements made by him and his subordinates during the siege of Kut.
They seem to us to have been excellent.
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B. Medical Administration of Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia.
32. It was only at a comparatively late period of their enquiry that the terms of
reference of the Vincent-Bingley Commission were enlarged so as to include the earlier
part of the campaign. Moreover, the chief medical officers responsible during the early
period, Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia and Surgeon-General Babtie in India, were not
available as witnesses before that Commission. For these and other reasons the Vincent-
Bingley Report does not deal, as fully as it might otherwise have done, with the medical
arrangements for the Mesopotamian Expedition up to the summer of 1915. The indica
tions which the Report contains as to these arrangements are, however, amplified rather ^
than contradicted by the evidence which we ourselves have taken.