'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎20v] (40/248)

38 PART VIII.—ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT, REINFORCEMENTS, ETC.
There is a consensus of evidence that the force was deficient, even as late as the spring of
1916, in wire-cutters, telephones, watercarts, Very lights, rockets, tents, mosquito-nets,
sun-helmets, periscopes, telescopic sights, loophole plates, flares, bombs, hand-grenades,
and even blankets and clothing. Our heavy casualties and reverses were in fact largely
due to the lack of articles essential to the success of war carried on under modern condi
tions.
6 . Sir Beauchamp Duff’s apology for some of these defects is, that articles such as
wire-cutters, rockets, Very lights, etc., were not available or usually needed in India, or
that they were not heard of before the war. This is no defence for the failure to provide
them in Mesopotamia eighteen months after the beginning of the war, and we feel it a
discredit to the Indian Military Authorities that such a modern device as Very lights
should have been in use by the Turks in Mesopotamia, before it was supplied to our own
troops.
7 . Our evidence abundantly shows how detrimental the absence of these modern
requirements was to our men ; but we wish to draw special attention to the suffering caused
by the neglect to supply two articles of equipment, which the most ordinary foresight on
the part of the Indian Authorities should have shown to be necessary. The power of the
sun in Mesopotamia was well known in India, but the troops were normally only supplied
with light-weight, single-fly tents, quite insufficient to keep out the sun. Sir Percy Lake
and other witnesses informed us that sunstroke and heat-stroke were not uncommon
amongst those using these tents, and Captain Herbert, M.P., stated that as late as April,
1916, “ there were 21 lb. single-fly tents for four men, which would not have been healthy in
a cold climate, and were intolerable in Mesopotamia. These tents have only one fly, and
the casualties from sunstroke could be expected to be appalling.” It may be added that
the heat is so extreme that even in double-fly tents there is danger of casualties from the
sun in Mesopotamia.
8 . Even in such an obvious necessary as clothing, the Indian Government seems to ^
have been unable adequately to supply the force in Mesopotamia, small as it was in com
parison with our armies in France and elsewhere. Colonel Hehir tells us that there was
a lack of proper clothing even for the patients in the hospitals in the summer of 1915,
while Captain Herbert in April, 1916, heard many complaints that in the bitter winter
months in Mesopotamia, troops had been sent from India in “ shorts,” and tropical clothing.
The nights throughout a considerable part of the year are cold, and, during the winter
and spring, the country is subject to cold winds and icy storms. Yet apparently the Com-
mander-in-Chief in India originally intended to leave the provision of warm clothing for
the troops to private benevolence, and only consented to undertake such provision after
a protest by the Viceroy. Writing to Sir Thomas Holderness on October 21 st, 1914,
Lord Hardinge, who was then Viceroy, says :—
When some weeks ago I enquired of the Commander-in-Chief whether proper provision had been made
for warm clothing for the troops, he told me that he was relying on private charity for this. I told him at once
that I could not possibly agree to our troops being dependent for warm clothing upon private charity, and
that I insisted upon the troops being properly clad at the expense of the Government. It will cost six or seven
lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees , but In a war like this what does that matter ? It is far better to have warm men in the field than men
dying of pneumonia in the hospitals. It is the cheapest course in the long run.
9 . Among the defects of equipment one of the most important was the want of aero
planes. But for this the Indian military authorities were not responsible. When the war
broke out, they were just beginning to organise an aviation service, and had established a
Flying School." But at the request of the War Office they closed the school, and sent the
officers who were'pilots back to England. These were only three in number, as matters
were in a \ery embryonic stage. But early in the Mesopotamia Expedition the need for
aeroplanes was apparent. In January, 1915, General Barrett represented the importance of
this matter more than once, and Lord Hardinge strongly urged the need for aeroplanes upon
the War Office. But it was found impossible to supply any until May, 1915. Then two
Maurice Farmans were sent, in July two Caudrons, and in August six Martinsyde Scouts.
Somewhat later, three hydroplanes of the Short type were sent, and two naval aeroplanes,
one a Voisin and one a Henry Farman, fitted with a Canton Unne engine. In October,
four B.E .2 C’s arrived. But there were many misfortunes. The hydroplanes were not a
success, and among the aeroplanes there were losses through engine failure, through
other accidents and through normal wear and tear. These misfortunes seem to have
worked with aggravated effect by reason of the difficulties of repair, which in part