'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎18v] (36/248)

34
PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.
the objective is reached. That was Lord Wolseley’s intention at Tel-el-Kebir to arrange
the troops in such order that it should require no manoeuvring to pass from the forination
of march to the formation of attack, but although this intention was not fully carried out
and the Divisional Commanders did not adopt the same formation, there was no serious
difference, and the spirit of the Commander-in-Chief’s order was not infringed.^
Wolseley allowed more latitude to his Divisional Commanders than General Kembali
enjoyed. Whether any such formation in a night march is possible under modern con
ditions is hard to imagine. We conceive that the question for us is whether the night maich
under the conditions already described offered a reasonable prospect of success.
19. General Aylmer himself admits that the march was a close run—that an hour s
margin was scanty ; but owing to the necessities of the situation he could not spare more,
and that the plan of attack he adopted was the only one he could think of as
likely to succeed. Our opinion is that the chances of A Column being up
to time were slender ; that the operation, to use a term that has cropped up elsewhere,
was of the nature of a “gamble ’ in which the odds against success were high, but whether
they were too high to justify the action taken cannot be stated in terms of certainty.
20 . There is another matter which demands attention—whether it was necessary to
break off the fight on March 9 th, as was done by General Aylmer s orders. General Kembali
declares that the Turks had been retiring in the night and he reported this to Headquarters.
However, the report was not credited. General Gorringe, in his despatch, says the aeio-
plane reconnaissance showed no signs of withdrawal, and it may be that it was only partial.
21 . General Kembali said that in spite of their severe losses, he had full confidence
in h;s men ; that he had been in a much tighter place at Sheikh Saad and had come out
successfully, and was anxious to try again. Headquarters did not accept this offer, and
it can hardly be said that they were wrong. The other reason given for not renewing
the attack was the deficiency of water. General Kemball asserts that there was plenty
where he was, and very likely there was enough for his men, but it is not clear there was
for the whole force. On the whole we do not see sufficient reasons for imputing blame to
the Corps Headquarters for the action they took.
22 . We have gone at length into this controversy because much depended on this
battle, and because we think that the unfortunate result had so much to do with the
final catastrophe of the fall of Kut; and for the same reason we propose to go with some
minuteness into the details of the defeat at Sanaiyat, which followed not long after.
23. The battle of Sanaiyat was in two parts. The first, on April 5th, on both banks
of the river, was highly successful, the 13th British Division, under General Maude, recently
arrived from Egypt, particularly distinguishing itself by carrying five lines of entrench
ments in succession. General Gorringe commends General Maude and all under his
command for the brilliant success of this assault.
24. This fine piece of work was followed on the evening of the same day by another
equally good, carried out by the same division, of which General Gorringe speaks in these
terms : “ The highest praise is due to General Maude and his Brigade Commanders and
all under their command for this successful night attack, a difficult operation at all times,
requiring great dash and good leadership as well as personal bravery among the junior
commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.” These eulogiums are quoted to justify
the belief that this new army division would prove itself equal to any duty that might
be imposed upon it. It should be added that it was not without experience of war ;
it had served in Gallipoli and suffered heavy losses there.
25. There was no time to be lost; the sands were running out at Kut, and the situation
there was very critical. The river was rising, and more floods were to be expected, and
no intermission in active operations was possible. On April 6 th, at 1 a.m., the 7th Division
attacked the left of the Sanaiyat position under very unfavourable conditions; they could not
break through, and in the afternoon they were flooded out of their trenches. It was evident
that no attack by day over such sticky and open ground could succeed, nor even at night
unless the assaulting force could be assembled under cover within assaulting distance, so
preparations were made for this to be done. These were completed by evening on the 8 th
and the 13th Division were again selected to assault, and they started at 4.20 a.m., the 9th.
26. At first it seemed as if the successes won on the 5th were going to be repeated.
The leading lines, moving with great dash, penetrated into the centre of the enemy’s