'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎18r] (35/248)

PART VIL—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.
33
added that General Aylmer told us he knew nothing of the short water-supply and
consequent weakness of the garrison—a bewildering statement in view of General
Gorringe’s evidence on this point.
12 . A night march is far from being an easy operation at any time. The difficulties
vary with the nature of the ground, the distance to be traversed, and the number of troops
engaged. It requires good march discipline and first-rate staff work, especially when, as
in this case, an attack is to follow immediately. To General Kemball was entrusted the
task of turning the flank to be attacked in co-operation with a column on his right.
13. In a statement submitted by him to us General Kemball calls attention to the
well-known night march in 1882 when a British force under Lord Wolseley successfully
stormed the Egyptian entrenched camp at Tel-el-Kebir. On that occasion 13,000 men
had to march about 3j miles over easy ground, and for this Lord Wolseley allowed 3j
hours. In the official account of the campaign we read : ... from previous
experience it was calculated that, making all allowances for delays, etc., during the night,
the actual rate of progress . . . would be a mile per hour/' and this proved exactly
correct. There were 48 guns, but no other impedimenta worth mentioning.
14. At Es-Sinn the ground was also on the whole favourable, but other conditions
widely differed. Nearly 20,000 men, with all sorts of impedimenta, transport, ambulances,
animals, etc., had to march distances varying between 12 and 16 miles. Some of the troops
had been on the move the night before, many had to march 1 or 2 miles from their bivouacs
to the rendezvous, the artillery 5 or 6 . A margin of one hour was allowed for unforeseen
delays such as may occur in any night march.
15. The troops had to be concentrated at 8.30 p.m. on March 7th, in time to start at
9 p.m. and reach their objective by dawn, about 5.45 a.m.
In one very important particular Lord Wolseley had a marked advantage. His
small army was entirely composed of well-trained British troops with a most efficient
Staff. General Aylmer’s force was heterogeneous, British and Indian troops being mixed
up together, and he and other Generals make many complaints of the “ scrappy ” character
of their Staffs. This army was expected to march about 14 miles in rather less than
nine hours.
The uncertainties of a night march were speedily revealed. Many of the troops were
late at the rendezvous, and the start did not take place till 10 . 22 . Thus more than the one
hour margin allowed was lost before the start. A second hour was lost through a division
missing its way ; the men were so weary that they fell dead asleep at the halts, and were
with difficulty roused. Other delays occurred, and the result was that General Kemball’s
column, which had the farthest to go,-instead of being at the point Z, where it was to
deploy for attack, at 5.30 a.m., was still 1,500 yards short of it at 6.30, when it was broad
daylight. This of course was fatal to the success of the operation so far as surprise was
concerned.
16. General Gorringe holds that in spite of this, energetic and bold action on the
part of General Kemball would still have forestalled the enemy in his attempts to reinforce
Dujailah. General Kemball’s excuse is that he received no proper support till late in the
afternoon. He adds that when the enemy’s weakness in the redoubt was discovered.
Column C on his right should Lave been put in. in spite of Column A’s late arrival. If
Headquarters were correct in their assumption that there was only a small garrison in
Dujailah, a long flank march was unnecessary, and a direct attack might have been made
from Point Y, where the columns bifurcated.
17. It is pointed out by General Kemball that General Gorringe’s statement that
everything went well up to the time the columns separated (at point Y) is quite incorrect;
they were 2 j hours late there. General Kemball also takes exception to other
assertions of General Gorringe.
18. There is a good deal of technical evidence as to the proper formations for the march
and the tactical dispositions for the fighting on the 9 th March, and Generals Aylmer and
Gorringe attribute great blame to General Kemball in these respects, and to a certain extent
they are supported by General Lake, G.O.C. “ D ” Force. It is not our province to go
exhaustively into these points ; they are detailed at length in their evidence and statements,
to which reference can be made. We may, however, point out that in a night march
which is to be followed immediately bv an assault, it is obvious that the troops should
march in such a formation as to enable them to attack with the least possible delay when
(C 48—176) E