'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎11v] (22/248)

20
PART Y.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.
1 . Baghdad and the possibility of its becoming an objective of the expedition con
stantly crops up in the evidence before us. On October 8 th, 1914, i.e., a week before the
expedition had actually left India, the Viceroy wrote unofficially to the Marquess of Crewe
to the effect that he would be ready for an attempt on Basra “ or even Baghdad m the
event of Turkey declaring war. On November 23rd, the day after Basra was occupied
by General Barrett s forces, Sir Percy Cox, the Indian Government s Political Represen
tative in Mesopotamia, telegraphed to the Viceroy : “ With General Officer Commanding,
I have been studying topographical details bearing on an advance to Baghdad in case
sucli an advance should be decided upon,” and he proceeded to outline a reasoned proposal
for an advance on Baghdad ; while three days later, on November 26th, the Senior Naval
Officer in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. wrote to the Indian Government indicating what his requirements
in gunboats would be in the event of an advance up the Tigris to Baghdad.
2 . The Viceroy forwarded Sir Percy Cox’s proposal for an advance on Baghdad to
the Secretary of State on November 25th, and on November 27th Lord Crewe tele
graphed back : “We are not disposed to authorise an advance to Baghdad at present.
This decision was arrived at before the Secretary of State was in possession of the A ice-
rov's views, but it appears from a subsequent letter that, after consulting the Commander-
in-Chief in India, the Viceroy did not think Sir Percy Cox’s project feasible at the time.
The letter in question, which is dated December 2 nd, contains such cogent reasons for
rejecting a proposal which was subsequently almost enthusiastically accepted, that we
think it instructive to quote the following passages :—
Viceroy to Secretary of State.
You did not give me time to send you our views on Cox’s proposal to advance to Baghdad, for you sent me
a telegram crushing it. As a matter of fact, after consultation with Beauchamp Duff, I had arrived at the
conclusion that it would be impossible to execute at present. Unlike Basra, which is easy to capture from the
south and verv strong against any attack from the north, Baghdad has no advantages as a position against
an attacking enemy, and, being an extensive town situated on both banks of the Tigris, would be particularly
difficult to defend. All communications with Baghdad would have to be by water, and Baghdad is about 300
miles up the river from Basra and 570 from the Gulf. It would not be possible to entrust this long line of
communications to the Arabs, since, if they failed, a disaster must result. To avoid undue risk, it would, in
the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, have been necessary to have a whole division in Baghdad and another
on the line of communications, to keep them open in the first instance and also ready to reinforce Baghdad if
attacked. In view of the large number of troops that we have sent overseas and the very reduced military
forces remaining in India, it would be impossible for India to carry out this scheme even with reasonable
safetv. In the absence, therefore, of extraneous assistance, those political advantages, which are really con
siderable, that might accrue from the capture and occupation of Baghdad must be subordinated to the military
objections that would be involved in such a course.
3 . It will be seen that the terms of Lord Crewe’s telegram of November 27th, whilst
deprecating an advance on Baghdad at that time, did not specifically rule out such an ad
vance as a possible operation in the future. It is quite clear that India at any rate did not
consider this telegram as an absolute veto on Baghdad as a possible objective, for on Feb-
ruary 12 th, 1915, we find the Viceroy telegraphing to the Secretary of State : ‘ Baghdad
will consequently probably become our objective, and no harm will be done if in our
dealings with Persian Government we contemplate that contingency.
4 . We have already noticed that amongst the orders given by Sir Beauchamp Duff to
Sir John Nixon on March 24th, 1915, was an instruction to “ prepare a plan for a subsequent
advance on Baghdad.” This plan was not forwarded to India by Sir John until August
30th, 1915, but it is clear, from papers submitted to the Commission, that in December,
1914, and June, 1915, if not on other dates, appreciations were prepared by the General
Staff in India on the subject of an advance to Baghdad. Sir John Nixon’s plan was a
reasoned appreciation of the military situation on the Tigris at the time. In it Sir John
does not refer to his own difficulties in regard to transport, nor to the inevitable augmenta
tion of these difficulties, which would result from prolonging his line of communications
by over 200 miles. But he sets out very clearly the advantages of following on the heels of
the Turkish Army fleeing into Baghdad after a defeat in the neighbourhood of Kut; and
he contrasts with this plan, unfavourably and almost prophetically, the dangers of having
to fight his way to Baghdad through a Turkish Army well entrenched above Kut. Such
an operation, he says, “ might be more difficult and costly than anything yet met with,
and the result of a check be more serious for us.”