'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎11r] (21/248)

PART IV.—THE ADVANCE TO AMARA AND KUT.
19
■V
13. A full and complete memorandum bv General Kemball. Sir J. Nixon’s Chiet of
the Staff, was forwarded with this request. In the memorandum he reviewed the whole
position of the river transport, pointing out the inability of the present fleet to comply
with the existing wants and the probability of a diminution in its effective number through
breakdown and want of necessary repairs. He concluded by saying :—
In short, more powerful light-draught river steamers and plenty of them, and not only ships, but peovonn- I
and material for their maintenance, are regarded by the general Staff of this Force as our principal need.
It is also thought necessary to add the warning that if steps are not taken in good time to meet these
requirements we are running grave risks of a breakdown at possibly a serious moment.
At the present time we cannot make the most effective use of the troops available owing to want of ships,
and in any crisis insufficiency of river transport would limit the scope of reinforcements, while a breakdown of
shipping might have still more serious consequences.
* A properly equipped river fleet would double and treble the effective value of the Army in occupation
of Mesopotamia at the present moment, and would continue to be an important military asset, even if a broad-
gauge railway to Baghdad were built. The formation of this fleet is considered therefore as our special and most
important need at the present time.
14. The additional transport asked for was sanctioned after a lengthy correspondence,
but the execution of the order under any circumstances would have taken from 8 to 10
months before completion, and the ships would then have had to be conveyed either under
their own steam or piecemeal to Basra. Under no circumstances could they have been
available in Mesopotamia till towards the middle of the year 1916.
15. At this time the medical equipment of the expedition was not up to its proper f
strength, even according to the low scale of Indian regulation. Although there had been
no actual breakdown, the wounded and sick, both in the actions on the Karun, at Nasa-
riyeh, and at Kut-el-Amara had been put to considerable discomfort through lack of
ambulance transport, stationary hospital accommodation and river hospital
steamers. The medical personnel was barely sufficient. Any further forward move
ment up the river, associated with an influx of reinforcements at Basra, was almost certain
to convert the existing deficiencies in medical personnel and materiel into a deadlock of
the whole system, unless exceptional and continuous good luck should attend the new
offensive movement.
16. General Nixon had now secured at Kut a highly convenient halting place. It
was well described by Sir E. Barrow, Military Secretary at the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. :—
If we sit tight at Kut-el-Amara, we can consolidate our control of the Basra Vilayet, and fortify a stro ^
position at the apex of the triangle formed by the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Hai, which with our naval comma id
of the rivers, would be unassailable by any but a very superior force accompanied by heavy artillery, while it
would at the same time completely cover the main approaches to the territory now occupied by us.
There were other considerations in favour of calling a halt. The 6 th Division had had very
hard work, and almost continuous fighting in a very trying climate, and though it had
done all that was demanded of it, it was not the fine fighting machine it had been.
I Lm*
\ AOj rr
l
c r
(C 48—ITS)