'Zanzibar, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf' [‎43v] (4/8)

4
measures to remove our agent of the Indian rr [ e > r ‘
chants, whose safety was likely to be compromised in
the disturbances, from the scene of this act of violence;
and it was only after the parricide son had succeeded
in establishing himself that the Indian Government,
from motives of policy, recognized him as the dt
facto ruler. We cannot now ignore the circum
stances under which this sovereignty was obtained.
But we have lost our opportunity for rectifying and
improving the relations between him and his uncles.
He had evidently, nay, he has now, no means
whatsoever of acting offensively against Zanzibar.
He relies upon us entirely to enforce his claim to
the subsidy agreed upon. He relies upon us lor a
great deal more. There is the farm of Bunder
Abbas, which the Persians have given him notice to
close. He looks also to our assistance with arms,
if not with money, to enable him to resist further
aggressions from the Wahabees of Nejd. He has
from the first of his usurpation been in a position
to accept from us any terms as the condition of
obtaining thu moral support of our recognition, and
the further support of our good offices and eventual
assistance in his other difficulties. What would
have been more easy than to have suggested as one
of his conditions, and as a means ot securing our
intervention to prevent troubles from the assertion
of the claims of his uncle of Zanzibar, that the
money payment engaged to be paid to his lather
should be permanently remitted }
Until lately we had only a Native Agent Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. at
Muscat, and the present appointment of Captain
G. Atkinson is not a permanent one. We have
had, therefore, very imperfect information as to
the policy, disposition, and fitness of Syud kalim.
We know nothing of the relations subsisting between
him and the Wahabees. It has been our aim
hitherto to use our influence to prevent the exten
sion of Wahabee dominion, because it is cruel and
fanatical in the extreme, and we see in it an ob
struction to our endeavours to suppress piracy and
promote beneficial commerce. We do not know
whether Salim is pursuing a course likely to
assist or obstruct our views in this respect. And
yet the Government is drifting into a course or
measures which have the effect of upholding this
Chief as our especial protegt. Whether this con
duces to give us popularity, or to make us odious
to those whom we desire to conciliate, we have had no
means of judging. If we are to do so much for
Muscat, we ought at least to have a permanent resi
dent British Officer to manage our relations, and to
keep us well informed of all that passes.
4. Amongst the troubles brought upon us by our
relations with Muscat, is the farm tenure, by which
that Government has hitherto held Bunder Abbas
from Persia. Syud Salim has failed in the pay
ment of the rent or tribute settled as a condition of
his tenure. His people further are alleged to have
been guilty of acts of violence, even of piracy,
which gives Persia another plea upon which to
forfeit the lease. Persia evidently desires to extend
4. Notice by
Persia of the for
feiture of the lease
of Bunder Abbas
to Muscat, and of
the intention to
resume.