File 948/1909 'Persia: Situation in the South; Condition of the Roads. Attack on Mr Bill. Road Guard Scheme.' [‎74v] (153/744)

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Government towards their chief than most tribes in Persia. Unfortunately the Persian
uuwditxa i, - j +hiq advantage. It is perhaps not
Government have never recognised or uti pintF hnt it is remarkable that
surprising that Tehran should have been dece.ved by his bluff but t is ^markable that
neonle in Shiraz should so long have taken it seriously. Last April 1 hard y _ y
one whether Persian or European, who did not believe implicitly in the invincibility of
Souiet I Of course except the Kawamis, whose views on this subject, being prejudiced,
could not te taken into much account. Zaigam’s appearance on the scene showed that
the feet of the colossus were made of clay and now no one believes m the -mcibtoy
of Sonlet though his position is now much stronger than in last April, btill, c,oulet,
mainly 1; bluff has created a special position for himself, and his overthrow is a delicate
matter ' Y He can only be overthrown by using his three b ™ tlier * to seduce a al g e
portion of the Kashgais from their allegiance to him. Last May these three brothels
had for certain on their side, among the larger Kashgai tribes, all the Shishbulou s, ad
the Darashoolis and three quarters of the Kashkoohs. A large part of the Kas gais
wouU have taken no part at all in the struggle, and accepted with indifference the
victor as Ilkhani The paramount chief of certain tribes in south west Iran. . Soulet-ed-Dowleh could then have hardly relied on the support of
more than miscellaneous bands from various tribes, which would only have stuck to jnm
as long he paid them heavily. Unfortunately, the Persian Government missed their
chance 8 andwe can now only take stock of their losses. The heaviest loss ,s undoubtedly
the Shisbuloukis, the most powerful and homogeneous of the Kashgai tubes. Half
this tribe will now undoubtedly fight t 2 Souiet, who, after the defection of then chief
Ahmed Khan to Zaigam, appointed as chief one Bagher Beg and thus bound to hs
cause, by self-interest, half the Shishbulookis. As the triumph of Zaigam-ed-Dowleh
would involve the reinstatement of his father-in-law, Ahmed Khan, Bagher Beg and his
partisans are bound to support Soulet vigorously. #
With regard to the other tribes, I have no certain proofs to go on, and cannot give
any details. Warned by the example of last May, the khans are unlikely to betray
their sympathies until the Government is actually in the field against boulet,
UndoubtedIv, many, who last May would have fought for Zaigam, will now either
fight for Souiet or‘'remain neutral. Still, even now, the Government, if they ant with
energy and skill, can assuredly count on considerable defections from Souiet. I he
Kashgais are a rich, commercial, and agricultural tribe, and their khans, who are always
ready for freebooting expeditions, are not at all partial to an open and sustained
rebellion against the Government. They all have rich properties and other valuable
wordly possessions. They are distrustful one of another and fear that by rebellion
they may give their fellow-khans the chance of despoiling them with the help of the
Government. I do not think they have any decided political ambitions ; the idea
that, jealous of the Bakhtiari success, they were anxious to emulate their rivals and
play an important part outside of their own restricted held in bars, has, I think, been
much exaggerated. They are very happy in Lars, laying up riches by trading and
robbing, and could probably only be incited to wider action, and then only fitfully,
by heavy pecuniary considerations. Soulet’s wealth, of course, gives him a great
advantage in preserving the loyalty of ',the Kashgais. However, his avarice and
hardness have made him personally unpopular with his tribesmen, and he is deficient m
courage and enterprise. On the other hand, Zaigam, although apparently rather
unsteady, has the reputation of a dashing leader. In the fighting three years ago for
the chieftainship, Zaigam compared very favourably with Souiet, and his resolution last
May created a great impression. While, of course, it is impossible to express a certain
opinion, I think that, if the Persian Government officially proclaim Soulet’s dismissal
and Zaigam’s appointment at the first opportune moment, and then act with vigour and
skill, they could still win away from Souiet a large enough portion of the tribe to give
a fair chance of success. #
If Souiet were overthrown, the task of the Government would be much simplified.
The numerous bandits, who, at Soulet’s instigation or with his connivance, have been
pillaging everywhere, from the powerful Kuhgelus to the insignificant Surkhis, would
get a wholesome fright and temporarily moderate their exuberance. The Government
could sequester much of Soulet’s wealth and thus obtain invaluable cash for further
enterprises. For, at least, a year or two, both the Kawamis and Zaigam would have
their hands too full to be able to work against the Government, who would have
breathing space to organise its strength in order to prevent either party from acquiring
a preponderant position to the detriment of the Government. Moreover, both Zaigam
and the Kawamis, being in need of Government support at the beginning, could be used,
with great effect for the restoration of order. . .
Zaigam, with Government support and with the co-operation of the Kawamis m