File 948/1909 'Persia: Situation in the South; Condition of the Roads. Attack on Mr Bill. Road Guard Scheme.' [‎74r] (152/744)

think last April that the situation still admitted of a native settlement. I venture to
think that subsequent events justified my qualified optimism. By the end of May the
situation had suddenly changed for the better, and the Government were in a winning
position. ^ Unfortunately, the removal of Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Assad from the Ministry of the Interior
at the critical moment; the reversal, mainly owing to reasons unconnected with Fars,
by Sipahdar of his predecessor’s wise policy, and the incredible incompetence of Zafar-
es-Sultaneh, not only wantonly lost the Government all the ground they had gained, but
so increased the strength and audacity of the elements opposed to the Government,
so weakened and disoigamsed the elements available for support of the Government,
so discredited the already waning authority of the Government, that the situation has
now become almost desperate.
Last May it would have been quite easy to overthrow Soulet-ed-Dowleh ; it will
now be much more difficult. Last May, after overthrowing Soulet-ed-Dowleh, the
Government could have brought about a general restoration of order in Fars without
great difficulty.
Now, even if Soulet-ed-Dowleh be overthrown, the Government will experience
considerable trouble in bringing about a general restoration of order, for the reason
that the Kashgais are no longer under the control of their chiefs, and the little
authority still possessed last May over the Khamseh tribes by the Kfawamis, has been
almost destroyed. Nevertheless, although I fear I am almost alone among Europeans
to hold this belief, I still think that, in spite of the weakness of the Government and
the aggravation of the situation during the last six months of suicidal madness, there
is just a chance of a native settlement. That settlement, however, can, in my opinion,
only be satisfactorily effected by the overthrow of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. I can think of
no combination or combinations by which the Persian Government could now retain
Soulet-ed-Dowleh and yet bring about a general restoration of order in Fars as an
integrant part of the Persian Empire. Even if the Persian Government, in desperation,
decided to hand over Fars altogether to the tender mercies of this Turkish nomad and
content itself with a vague suzerainty over the province, which is the home of the
Persian race and language, I doubt whether Soulet-ed-Dowleh, even if he had the
wisdom to rest satisfied with this local domination, which is more than doubtful, could
restore order and govern Fars beneficially. The chiefs of the Kashgais are very
ignorant men ; they have not even the veneer of civilisation and statecraft which has
enabled some of the Bakhtiari khans to occupy important administrative, posts without
discredit.
Of course, ignorant tribesmen in Persia have in the past often shown themselves
capable even of founding empires, but Soulet is certainly not such a man. He has
disappointed his staunchest partisans ; although he started with the majority of the
population of Shiraz on his side, he has now not a single respectable friend in the town, i
Perhaps his youth and the novelty of his grandeur are responsible to some extent for
his lack of wisdom and statesmanship. Experience might improve him, but I doubt it.
He is, on the admission of his own partisans, avaricious, devoid of the power of
attraction, deficient in courage and enterprise. Lacking all the qualities of a ruler of
men, he is not, I think, capable of prudently protecting his interests in co-operation
with the Government or of plaving satisfactorily the part of a semi-independent
potentate in Fars. He had not the wisdom to co-operate with Saham-ed-Dowleh, whose
enlightened administration he wrecked by stirring up disorders. Zafar-es-Sultaneh
gave him more than he asked for, supported him consistently, and the result is the
present aggravated situation. It is impo-sible to have any conhdence in his promises.
In return for our valuable support at the critical moment in the summer of 1909 he
assured Mr. Bill that Ala-ed-Dowleh was the only governor he objected to, and that he
would co-operate with “ any dog ” who might be named in the place of Ala-ed-
Dowleh.
Last May, under the influence of fear, he promised, in return for the governorships
of Abadeh. Kazeroun, Dashti, and Dashtistan, with an annual reduction of 1*2,000
tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. in his maliyat, to open up the Kazeroun road. Subsequent events tell their own
story, and I need not insist further on the untrustworthiness ot Soulet-ed-Dowleh. In
my opinion, he has been weighed in the balance and found wanting ; the sooner he
goes, the better for Fars. ^ . '
Taking it for granted that the suppression of Soulet-ed-Dowleh is a si/ie qua non
for the restoration of order in Fars by the Persian Government, we have now to considei
the chances of success in an attempt to overthrow him.^ Soulet s power has been
largely built up by bluff and the exaggerated respect paid to him by the ignorant
central Government. The Kashgais are more influenced by the attitude of the