Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎145v] (299/312)

AFGHANISTAN.
S imla, Oct. 17.—The mustering of Afghans in the Khyber Pass is causing
uneasiness, their disposition and intentions being unknown. The Peshawur
and Kohat garrisons are being reinforced and placed in a state of readiness^
Three Punjaub regiments have reached Thull. The Afreedee soldiers arfr
rejoining the Punjaub regiments.
It is reported that Ali Musjid and Candahar have been largely reinforced.
The Times, remarking upon a letter on the Afghan question addressed
to Sir John Kaye in 1874 by Sir Bartle Frere, observes that Sir Bartle
proposes an elaborate scheme for the protection of our frontier. He
would let Shere Ali know that we should at all hazards bar the advance
of Russia into Afghanistan, and would in case of necessity help him to
defend his territory. He would also place well selected English agents
at Herat, Cabul, and Candahar to watch the Russians. He would
further put an advanced post of our frontier army in the Khan
of Khelat's territory at Quetta, so as to be able to watch Southern
Afghanistan, and to act on the flank of any force which might threaten
India from Cabul and the Khyber Pass. That is what the Indian Govern
ment has actually done; and, to tell the truth, the political result of the
movement has not as yet been altogether happy. If the Ameer should
yield at the eleventh hour, we shall be able to place British agents
at Herat and Candahar, as well as at Cabul. But let us not delude
ourselves with the idea that they could be mere envoys. To be
of real use they must be able to check the Ameer if he should be
tempted to run the risk of foreign war, and to help him if his power should
be threatened. That is the alternative of any consistent reversal of Lord
Lawrence's policy, and it would be useless to disguise the importance of
such a change. Sir Bartle Frere does not completely lay bare its real
character and moment. But, to say the least, it is not improbable that
Shere Ali may decline to let us gain so much influence in his country;
and, if such should be his answer to the Viceroy, the necessary conse
quence of the policy advocated by Sir Bartle Frere is that we should
establish by force centres of political influence in the chief towns of
M. Arminius Vambery, writing in the Allgemeine Zeitung on the Sultan-. |
and the Ameer of Afghanistan, says that the effendis at Constantinople
look upon their co-religionists in the far East with curiosity and some
sympathy, but that this sympathy is purely of a religious and in no way of
a national character. It is only two years ago that the first book on
Central Asia in the Turkish language was published. The author of this,
work, which is based entirely on European sources of information, was
Ali Effendi, the editor of the Bassiret newspaper. As to Afghanistan, the
Turks know even less about it than of the Asiatic khanates. When shortly
before the Russo-Turkish war broke out it was decided to send emissaries
to all Mahommedan countries in order to gain allies for the Sultan against
the enemy of Islam, it was with great difficulty that a few sheikhs and
dervishes from Central Asia could be found to undertake the task. The
envoy selected for Afghanistan was Khulussi Effendi, as he had formerly
been in communication with some learned Mahommedans in India.
M. Vambe'ry expresses a decided opinion that the Sultan could not:
have the slightest influence on the conduct of Shere Alij the diplo
matic communications which have passed between Constantinople and
Cabul are, he thinks, merely demonstrations of etiquette, which can
in no way affect the political attitude of the two States. " Sixteen
years ago," adds M. Vambe'ry, "a Central Asian ruler said to me,
'The Caliph may have good soldiers and guns, his powder may be^
as fine as our barley-meal, and his fortresses as high as our moun
tains j but he is too far from us, and we can only beg for a prayer from
him in the hour of need.' If some question of ritual were at issue in
, Cabul the Afghans would doubtless submit it to the Sultan for decision
but in political matters they would care very little for his advice. They
have long gone their own way, and will do so in future."
Today are we treated to another illustration of the "story
of the steed and the stable-door." Upon the long letter from
Sir James Stephen on which we commented yesterday
follows a yet longer letter on the same subject written by
Sir Bartl'e Frere to the late Sir John Kaye in 1874, and
setting forth the neglected exigencies of Indian policy with even
more fulness and precision than its predecessor. Its reflections
and counsels are all of them as sound and sensible as Sir
James Stephen's , and all of them are now as miserably out
of date. We listen with respect to these official echoes of the j
voice of the " alarmist" and the " irresponsible politician" of
former years—echoes hitherto so carefully prevented from escape
into the outer world—but we can gain nothing from them now, I
save perhaps a truer estimate of the illusions which have been
allowed by officialism to arrest and bewilder public opinion. That
is, indeed, the solitary advantage to be derived from these tardy 1
echoes. No Indian administrator, however eminent, has been or I
will be able to add anything to the arguments and admonitions
which have been pressed upon successive English Ministries by
advisers from without. What such men can and do supply—and
it is well worth having—is the knowledge that the very same
arguments and admonitions were being pressed upon our rulers by
their most trusted and experienced councillors from within. When,
for instance. Sir Bartle Frere argues that the advance of
Russia towards our Indian frontier must, for reasons independent
of the Imperial Russian policy of the hour, be regarded as inevi- |
SIR BARTLE FRERE ON AFGHANISTAN.
Afghanist an.
OFFICIAL ECHOES OF ALARM,