Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎145r] (298/312)

V
B artle F rere does not commend " the masterly
" inactivity " of that eminent authority; his whole
letter amounts to a plea for masterly activity. He
argues that the advance of Russia in Central Asia
ought to be checked,that we alone can check it, and
that we ought to draw an impassable line by extend
ing our influence over Afghanistan. But there is a
very grwat difierence between his view of the Rus
sian progress and that of the alarmists who explain
It by the perfidy of St. Petersburg, and by the de
termination of Muscovite soldiers and statesmen to
overthrow our power in India. If the Russians can
stop their march, and if they still proceed at the
dictate of sinister motives, the case is very grave.
But such a theory is at once dismissed by every
man of political culture. The Russians, as Sir
B artle F kere points out, are pushing through
Central Asia on account of exactly the same
causes as those that have made us annex one
after another of the native States of India.
Uncivilized communities cannot keep their in
dependence by the side of civilized Govern-
menls ; sooner or later they must be annexed
for the sake of order. Many of the Russian
officers are also eager to distinguish them
selves by fresh conquests, and thus they proceed
in spite of stringent commands from the dis
tant capital. Sometimes they may be prompted
by secret orders. Sometimes they may feel the
ftpurof religious fanaticism or commercial avarice,
but, be the causes of advance what they may, they
will continue to operate until Russia meets with a
{State possessing the coherence and the strength of
civilization. It has sometimes been thought that
we could stop her march by entering into an
alliance with the Khanates of Turkestan ; but, if
such a union was ever possible, the day for it has
long gone by. Sir B artle F rere has equally little
faith in the protecting power of a neutral zone. We
cannot guarantee the good behaviour of the people
jfn that zone, and we must either punish their in
evitable aggressions or permit that work to be
done by some other State. At the best, therefore,
a neutral zone could only be a makeshift, and in
Afghanistan it has now ceased to be a possibility.
To address vague reproaches to Russia for ad-
/ancing towards our frontier is futile and un-
Hignified ; it becomes us only to take precautions
against a possible or probable danger ; and Sir
B artle F rere's anticipation of that danger is
much the same as Sir J ames S tephen's . He sup
poses that the C zar sends a Minister to Cabul, and
that meanwhile England finds herself burdened in
Europe by some perilous dispute, in which she and
Russia take opposite sides. He assumes that the Go
vernment of St.Petersburg then instructs the Minis,
ter at Cabul to prompt the A meer to make osten
tatious preparations for war against India. Thus
we should be obliged to increase our Indian
army, and we should be embarrassed in
^Europe. Something not unlike that anticipa
tion has actually happened. Sir B artle F rere
also supposes an Afghan horde to be really let
loose upon our frontier. It would, of course, be
defeated, but the process would be troublesome and
expensive, and no country in the world has greater
need than India of profound and prolonged peace.
Sir B artle F rere may somewhat, perhaps, overrate
the danger. It ought to be remembered, also, that
Afghan troops, even if drilled and led by Russian
officers, would be much less formidable than the
Indian soldiers of Lord W ellesley were at the
beginning of this century, because they would be
opposed, not by feeble Asiatic Princes, but by the
strongest Power in the world. Such a difference is
bo important that the policy of masterly in
activity might have been successful if it had
been consistently and thoroughly applied. The
line of the Indus having been strengthened and the
outlets of the Bolan and the Khyber fortified, it
might have been safe to wait for the day when the
Russian outposts should reach our own. But
the Indian Government has never for any length
of time consistently held by one course for
the defence of the North-Western frontier. The
disastrous Afghan war was a plunge into the most
mischievous kind of activity. Then " we main-
" tained a sullen and distrustful silence," and next
we were actively hostile to the A meer . Sir B artle
F rere says that he was severely censured by Lord
D alhousib for proposing to meet in an amicable
spirit some chiefs from Candahar who sought
to renew friendly intercourse with our of
ficers in Scinde. Lord D alhousie afterwards
changed his views so far as to cultivate the
friendship of the Afghans. Lord L awrence gave
a similar example of inconsistency, first, by his
" masterly inactivity," and then by subsidizing the
A meer . Lord M ayo equally left the Afghans uncertain
how far we should go to defend them from aggres
sion. Thus Lord L awrence's policy was never
fairly tried, and now it is too late to think of
merely waiting for the approach of danger. Unless
S here A li should be unexpectedly meek, we must
rely on something very different from inactivity.
Sir B artle F rere proposes an elaborate scheme
for the protection of our frontier. He would let
S eere A li know that we should at all
hazards bar the advance of Russia into
Afahanifltan. ^ and w ould v in case of neeea-.
sity, help him, to defend his territory. He
would also place well selected English agents at
Herat, Cabul, and Candahar to watch the Russians.
He would further put an advanced post of our
frontier army in the Khan of K helat's territory at
Quetta, so as to be able toj watch Southern
Afghanistan, and to act on the flank of any force
which might threaten India from Cabul and the
Khyber fass. That is what the Indian Govern
ment has actually done ; and, to tell the truth, the
political result of the movement has not as yet been
altogether happy. The advance to Quetta may or
may not have been necessary, but there can be
little doubt that it deeply offended the A meer,
and perhaps it has done more than anything else to
throw him into the hands of the Russians. It was
the turning point of our Indian policy—the final
abandonment of " masterly inactivity." Having
gone so far, we should have been only halting half
way if we had not invited the A meer to receive a
British Envoy at Cabul. Sir B artle F rere was
prepared to insist that the request should be
granted, and ready, of course, for the consequences
of refusal. If the A meer should yield at the
eleventh hour, we shall be able to place
British agents at Herat and Candahar, as
well as at Cabul. But let us not delude
ourselves with the idea that they could be
mere Envoys. To be of real use they must be able
to check the A meer if he should be tempted to run
the risk of foreign war, and to help him if his
power should be threatened. That is the alterna
tive ef any consistent reversal of Lord L awrence's
policy, and it would be useless to disguise the im
portance of such a change. Sir B artle F rere
does not completely lay bare its real character and
moment. But, to say the least, it is not im
probable that S here A li may decline to let
us gain so much influence in his country ; and,
if such should be his answer to the V iceroy,
the necessary consequence of the policy advocated
by Sir B aktle F rere is that we should establish
by force centres of political influence in the chief
towns of Afghanistan. We must, in other words,
undertake the defence of that country, either
indirectly by means of the A meer , or directly
by the employment of British troops. It
would be useless to contest the necessity
of such a course now that it has been deemed
needful to forbid the advance of Russia beyond the
Afghan frontier ; but it would be equally useless
to hide the gravity of the consequences, and Sir
B artle F rere's very able minute would have been
more satisfactory if it had set them forth more
clearly. _