Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎139v] (287/312)

THE CABITIi MASSACEB,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE DAILT KEWS,
S ir ,—In a recent articl# in your columns, npon
the Cabul Massacre the followiu,^ passage appears, viz. :
— " Sale's example establishes the truth that the calamity
which has befallen our soldiers iu Cabul might have been
avoided if wis«r counsels and a more resolute policy had
bean adopted/' And again, u Who can reasonably doubt
that what Sale had d«ue at Jollalabad, JBlphinstone, or
some commander less enfeeblad by ill iiaalth, could have '
i accomplished at Cebul ?" In justice to the memory of the
! late Colonal John Sholton, who was then eoinmandmg the
44th Be'imeRt, and second in command in Oabul, I deem
it right to mention what did occur at a Council of War
hald soma short while previous to the evacuation.
Colonel Shelten had a habit of cutting any bit of
wood that was near him with a penknife, and
whilst the conference was proceeding, sat silent,
making no remark, but shaving off little slips from the
table. This annoyed ths envoy, Sir William MacNaghten
who sharply remarked, " I think at a time like this
Colonel Sbelton, you might be doing: somathing better
than 'whittling sticks.' Pray, sir, will you give us your
adviceV' "My advice," replied Colonel Shelton. "is
that General Elphinstone shauid at ouce place himself :
upon the sick list, for he is at this moment so ill that he is
utterly unfit for duty, and ought to bo in his bed, and
having done so place me in command." " Well, sir " said
the envoy, "and if in command what would'you then
do?" "I should at once," replied Colonel Shelton
" place the Balta Hissar in such a state of defence as to
emible us to stand a siege. I should make sorties and
bnng in cattle and grain and wood, and send down to
India for an army to come up and relieve us." " And you
i would withdraw all protection from Shah Sooiah r" re
torted the envoy. " No," said Shelton, " Let him stay
in our midst, and we will protect him from all the Afghans
but I tell you that once you leave here you will
not be able to protect youraalves." " I could sane- j
tion no such act," replied the envov, "or consent
to such a step." "Well, eir," said Colonel Shelton 1
"that is my opinion , 'and advice; and if you put rse in com
mand that is what I shalldo. As it is, gire ire whatever i
| orders you and General Elphinstone think fit, and I will '
i carry them out to the best of my ability." Alas his ■
; advice was rejected, and all who left Cabul on the final
i retreat were massacred except Lieutenant Souter and
j seven soldiers of the 44th, and three European artillery-
j men, with one Company's officer whose name I now
j forget. Colonel John Shelton was not a pleasant man
| upon parade, or the most popular commanding officer in
the army; but he was a gallant soldier, a brave and deter
mined man. He bad seen service and know what war was
for he had fought at Eolica, Vimiera, Corunna, riushing',
Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid, Burgos, Vittoria, St. Sebas
tian (where he lost an arm), Ava, and Arracan, and a host
of minor battles. This is a slight record, due to tho
memory of Jack Shelton, from one who feels that he
deserves it, and who had the honour of serving as an
officer in tho 44th in India when he was at its hnad.—I am
i Sir, your obedient servant, AN OLD 44 th. '
Public opinion at home has demanded speedy^
and energttic measures against S heke A li for tha
irault to the British Envoy at Ali Muajid. The
most recent ielegrama from India throw consider
able light upon the motives which hava inducad
the V iceroy to act with more deliberation than
many persons in England have deemed advisable.
There was fct one time a nervous fear in some
quarters that certain members of the CUbinet were
not only opposed to immediate action against the
A meeb , but that a positive danger prevailed
of the Y icerot being instructed to refrain
from any action whatever until tha spring.
The object of that supposed restraint on
the part of the Home Government was somewhat
subtle, but it seemed not unreiaonable, though
there is eow cause to consider it as absolutely
groundlfss. In their delight .at the prospect of
seeing this country embroiled with Affghanistan
the St. Petersburg press made no secret of the
fact that an Anglo-Affghan war would be used as
a lever to develop the projects which Russia
entertained on her -own account in European
Turkey, This candour on the part of the Russian I
papers aroused tha 'fetfr that our own Cabinat *
would keep open the Affghan question as long as |
possible in order to prevent its playing any part
in the Turkish settlement. It was also regarded as a
greater danger that some bargain might ba struck
with Russiaunder which that Power should concede
her more flagrant demands in Turkey, on obtain
ing compensations in Central Asia, as, for instance,
a silent approval of the occupation of Merv, or
the right to advance her frontier to the Hindoo
Kush. A third fear was that Russia might ba
promised to do very largely as she liked in Turkey
if a guarantee were given that the Turkestan
Government would leave S here A li in the lurch.
These various considerations, or some of them,
inspired alarm lest Lord L ytton might ba pre
vented from inflicting that summary and energetic
punishment on. S here A li which his offence
deserved, and which would at the sama
time strengthen our rule and prestige
n India. It is doubtful whether the Cabinet
as a whole ever entertained such intricate
and far-reaching projects as those above described.
The past few months have shown that a plain,
honest, and outspoken policy is far more likely to
bring credit to the Ministry than bartering with
the least of British interests. After some of the
episodes of the Berlin Congress, the country is in
no mood for making bargains with a Power like
Russia, and a hundred broken pledges warn us
against ever again taking her word in regard to
affairs in Central Asia.
But Bupposing any intention existed to enter
upon another process of " arrangement" or
u understanding" in regard to Affghaniatan,
the attitude of the A meer might at any moment
thwart the schemes of English and Russian statea-
iren. A few hours before the last Cabinet meet
ing there was such an obvious prospect of S herb
An forcing our hands and compelling us to make
an advance before we were actually ready that
any Minister who entered that day's council with
the subtle design of settling the Affghan difficulty
at St. Petersburg must have had little cause foe
encouragement of that proposal. There is every
reason for believing that the Cabinet has left Lord
L viion practically untrammelled. The V iceroy I
seems to have had as keen an appreciation as we i
at home of the nAessity of summary action. He
even sanctioned the attempted capture of AliMas-
jid by a coup de main, and there are signs of a rapid
advance up the Kurum having been also decided
upon. But the same reasons which frustrated any pro-
i posed interference by the Home Government with
the military action of the V iceroy also induced
the latter to abandon the initial plan of campaign.
S hebe A li rapidly concentrated mnforcements at
Kurum and AliMusjid, and the temper of the hill
tribes demanded the exercise of the greatest
caution lest a disaster in the early stages of tha
camoaign might turn the wavering clansmen into
fees. However useful a brilliant initial success
might have been to our arms, the state of the
traneport service would not permit of that suc
cess being followed up by a further advance. Lord
L yitck has therefore decided to make no move
ment whatever till his arrangements place all risk of
failure beyond reasonable question. Ic is to ba
regretted that punishment could not immediately
follow the insult, but the V iceroy's military
advisers at this moment are such pre-eminently
well-qualified men that we are bound to raspect
their decisions. "VVe believe, however, that
though immediate action has been abandoned the
forward movement into Affghaniatan will not ba
delayed to so remote a period as next spring.
Another three weeks will see an enormous im
provement in the state of preparations, and, so far '
as can be judged in this country, there is no
reason why the Quetta column should not
open the campaign in three weeks from
the present date. None of the telegrams
lecently to hand shake the opinion that
the serious business of invasion will ba under
taken from the base at Quetta, conjointly with
ihe column along the Kurum. Unless rare faci
lities are offered for its advance, the work of the
Khyber aimy is likely to be no more than a de
monstration. In the campaign of 1833-9 the
: Quetta column opened the invasion, and it
fought the battle of Ghuznee before the Peahawur
column left its cantonments. Now that the attack
on Ali Musjid has been abandoned, the proba
bility increases that the first serious operations
will be n ade in the direction of Candahar.
There are other reasons than the deficiencies of
transport which caused the V iceroy to pause
before hurling his forces against the AiviEEa. Tna
native Envoy, Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. G holam H ussein , is still
in S hire A li 's hands. Ho has received permis
sion to leave the country, and brings with him
1 the A meer's answer to the V iceroy's overtures.
The commencement of operations before G holajvi
H csseln's return might endanger the old N awab's
life, but we confess to no great fear of tha A meer i
resorting to such an extremity, though the Envoy
might be imptisoned. G holam H usseix is, wa
believe, a member of one of the branches of S herb
a li's family, and the A meer andtheEavoy are by no
^ means unfriendly. The N awab has also always had
j ir fluential friends at the Cabul Court. Apart i