Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎138v] (285/312)

the Line Regiments at KawuTPindi,Nowshera, Sial-
kot, Dugsh'ae, Subathoo, Chukrata, Ilanikhet,
Mooltan, Meerut, and Ferozepore can easily be
spared. These, together with the four now under
orders in ordinary course of relief from England,
would give a force of 15 British Infantry
battalions ; made up into brigades of the
usual strength, "this would give a total of
7,500 British, with 15,000 .Native Infantry, which,
together with a proper proportion of English and
Native Cavalry, Sappers and Miners, and the Ar
tillery already detailed, would provide a force large
enough to carry all before it with the most con
summate ease.
We must again caution the public against ru
mours baseless as they are absurd. We had ample
proof last week of the ease with which war news is
concocted. Firing in the Khyber was promptly con
verted into a max'ch da Daka, an intended assault
on Ali Musjid. Fortmiacely for the reputation of
Indian Generals, fAa difficulties before them are
thoroughly appreciated and will be well provided
against. The Government of India are very un
likely to divulge their plans prematurely, and Sir
F. Haines is not the stamp of General to run any
chance of failure by sanctioning useless and im
practicable enterprises, however much they may
commend themselves to the few who seek their
own honour and glory, and who do not consider
the effects of every single action in its bearing on
the whole campaign, but simply as it affects their
own individual merits. There are some doubtless
who advocated the bold idea of an assault on
AH Musjid only for the purpose of wiping out
the fancied disgrace its commandant had in
flicted on us. Fortunately more sober counsels than
theseprevailedatSimla, andnowthefallof AliMusjid
will be but the immediate prelude to the downfall
of Shere Ali's power, not a spasmodic act of re
venge calculated to irritate the Afghans without
being of any advantage to us.
"fte-W iff is:
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
(B y E astern C ompany's C able. )
(fkom our special correspondent.)
BOMBAY, M onday.
It is reported that Yakoob Khan, while proceed
ing to Ali Musjid, stabbed a high officer who had
been deputed to act, conjointly with others, as his
escort. He was consequently taken back as a
prisoner to Cabul.
i The Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Ghoolam returns via Kurrum.
RUSSIA AND CABUL,
(from our own correspondent.)
ST. PETERSBURG, O ctober 7.
The Afghan question, though extensively discussed
of late by the Russian Press, has had comparatively
little hold on Russian society. The Press, however,
has taken up the question of Austrian and Afghan
politics in good earnest, and hardly a day passes
without every one of the chief Petersburg and
Moscow papers devoting a leader to the result
of military operations in Bosnia, or to Afghan
affairs, or to the dull prospects of Russian finances,
which, having of late fallen into a state of uninter-
mittin*} indisposition, have experienced the same
sad fate that attends human sufferers under like
circumstances, viz., a multitude of gratuitous coun
sellors. Of course, in saying that Indian politics
have no interest for Russian society I by no means
wish to assert that they are not discussed by
Russians, only that the interest taken in
them is simply passive. Educated Russians
—uninfected by Slavophilism — who have no
reason for concealing their feelings, will
tell you that they are not displeased with the turn
affairs have taken in Afghan, " We don't think,''
they say, " that it will come to an open rupture
between us. It is simply that we have been able
to put a spoke in England's wheel and to checkmate
her, as it were. Thus we have the chance, in this
affair, of making ourselves extremely disagreeable
—negatively only, of course—to Britain, and at
hardly any cost or outlay to ourselves. Your
country," they observe, " cannot be more unfriendly
to us than it has shown itself all along since the
commencement of the Eastern Question, and, short
of an actual declaration of war, you have done
everything in your power to harm us. How can
we but feel pleased at any misfortune that may
befall you, or at any compiications -that may arise
in your foreign affairs—in whatever part of the
world—so long as they distract your attention from
meddling in questions concerning South-eastern
Europe'! Of course we shall go through the comedy
of strictly prohibiting Russian subjects from
supplying the Afghans with munitions of war, and
through the still greater farce of gravely warning
Russians from entering the ranks of the Ameer ? s
army and taking part against a country
with which we are on friendly terms. But
those who pay no heed to the exhortations
of the Imperial Ukase also know full well
that no punishment will overtake them. Even our
Government, whilst thus hypocritically protesting
against any violation of neutrality by its subjects"
will, on the sly, probably assist the Ameer in money
and arms—just as your Government did the
Turks." (The most reasonable, enlightened, and
well-informed Russian is firmly convinced that
during the late war we sent money and arms to
the Turks, and there is no arguing him out of it.)
"We have no love for Shere Ali, and consider him in
the light of a cruel, petty. Eastern tyrant; but we
cannot help feeling grateful to him for having re
ceived our Mission (which came to Cabul humbly,
quietly, secretly if you like, with no flourish of
trumpets) mostkindlyandfavourably. Wecannotalso
but feel thankful to him for having refusedadmission
to your pompous Embassy—the more so as we are
well aware that you insisted upon ours being
turned away. You desire to go to war with
Afghan, and no doubt you will conquer in the end;
but the conquest will bring you neither glory nor
rest. If you keep the subdued country, it will
greatly increase the expenses of your aheady over
taxed Indian Budget, and you will have to put !
down many a rising for many a year to come. If
you leave Afghanistan after having punished the
Ameer and his subjects, you will perhaps at
no very distant date have to fight your battles over
again, and you will probably have still greater diffi
culties to surmount. Now, if you had left the
Ameer to himself, and if Russia—ever ready and
willing as you think her, to pounce upon your
Indian possessions—had thought of passing through
his territory to attack you, he would have
become your staunchest friend and ally, and
would have done all in his power to help you to
repulse us. Now, however, you have made him
look to us for protection, and even if we do nothing
for him he will only like us the less, but his hatred
of England will be greater than ever. What was
thje object of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission
but to humble Russia 1 And if his Mission has
failed you must not be astonished at us Russians
feeling pleased."
Such are the opinions expressed—more or less
fully—by many educated Russians regarding the
Afghan difficulty. It must be confessed, how
ever, that most of the St. Petersburg news
papers have viewed the matter more coolly and
philosophically, and it is only here and there that
the angularities of the past have not been
forgotten. I have already telegraphed extracts
from the Russian papers, giving their opinions
regarding the attitude their country ought to
assume jn Afghan politics. The Golos, which
flNaata3Ma»A<lVJ'-T8 'eg 'noptroi ^aans-pjojxo
EQfr 'dnn^f) '0 Xjnejj Xq po.reda.ifl '.lOAvatrair jren iraoixsn; am
oj ijsituoxio.moX >isv "pajfeoap ion aite sptrerS ajaqAv 's^ods
l©q uo .ireq jo i ^ avoj S eift Sm^oracud sc |[sa\ s-o ^aji^n ^aq
j [Sotai.reqa jreq aq^ „ ^ora: jo ipMS aiq^
paaStssip aqi'f!r :iat;of ir.oqqiin. 'anopo jmuStao oj jreq entqav
b A0jS 'ssno X.I3AO ni'a.ioisaj XiaAiitsod {[Uv joj 'joA -iauo ^j
jt ?| I u»riixax\r 9i$ esii "jjo ao 'ain )a\ .16 fajs Snm.tn^
t sreq anoA IJ—-aivH aiM mi xaaAoosiG snavnlVA
[•jsKsmasu.HaA
ay]—'P9 'El? pms -PS ■s^sitnoqo II' 1 ' M PPS -suBaiu
ration A'q snotitq s^noASjd ptre 'a.md pocqq oq^ sdaajf
I -Sni^JoSiAui ptre "jinqsa.Tja.i 'Snirooo 'Suipijwia 'aStoaAoq
iTTBSBaict b sx if vjm.ij adu 'ptmos raoaj poj'Bda.id s.oug;
.•naaott3i na'tt. iouj etq 1 ) aspsiu pitioqs nox "satJa.-C X^uaAA^ ^noqB .toj
jauajfns si siqj puB 'am ijaj a^niT) oABq ''ccy 'saqoupuaq Xra
ninioin pnu ^qSpt ipsg ftiiutf s.oug; pasn aAtsq j aonig : saiUAi
iis'iueftuaS v—'AiOKji os iaoaiHSAg; .ivhav
•sa^BptpuiJo paAOJdde 59
0 v jo i^tio uorm^sm ot^ o;ui suCoq gj pspaao
ojc I uajq^ojq e'qj,' 'paugtsyj 'uo.i^k I goia 'spuoui ^g
iqof j]\j jo raooj oqq, ni putij pjauaS aqq. jo 0a;sn.iq.
1 paijoap sviAv AairaiiTJjp ni qanoo
[[ja^junb uoaaaq^ jaodaj oq. paB 'spt0 aoj noiqnq
t^sui oraos^xu eqq jo ea^tmmoo paqnioddB Aptqiims
1 i ^ iav aajuoo oq jaMod qquv ' sm - bi aqq jo notsiAM u
fo iiiTtqtsfApis oqa noi^japisuoo o^ui 0% paquioddB sbav
pa^ituraon p.xaitaS ©q^ jo sjaqtuaui auiu jo aa^xuiuioo-qns
V •sjooqos oraofi«i\[ eqq oq.ui ua.ip|Tqo asaqq x^oq Xnq
lappap^sp p-ct{ aa^iuuuo'o aqq. quqij SuiounouuB 'pnnj
)siioh uo7.siii;;tj aqq jo UBuuiBqo-aotA 'xoq - jq; "Aay; aqq uiojj
ooAiooaj puq eq uaMSajaq d pwai 'Ainqojoas aqq. •saspui^j
■ua\'b.tpq^pn s-ba\ qnoq^im. poqag oqi oiui s^oq
u^qdjo fcvauip.rep vipj jo a no jo raoissiiapu oqq. joj aoiqom
gq; 'aoip,,' ssaaupj eqq ui paaAvoip svw oqAY 'euipauf "JM
10 pip unqdio uu uoi^oEqa qnoT^m {ooqos aq^ oq gni^rapB
pqq oq qoadsaj t^tav 'Aupjtiqu^ no '[ooqog 4 S[j[0 oqq jo q.moo
K]UiO!|.'rent> aqa uoisioap aqj Souipnoj •papisoid noquajn
[anopo 'ujaAt;^ t suosxjmaaj^j ye Aupja^saA piaq sbah notq,
■uqiijsui stqq oq sjaqLiosqns aqq jo pnoa Apia^-renb aaqo^OQ
Wjj—-SAOg ■ao.'I KOIInXIXSMJ OIKOSVJ^; IVAO-JJ
pfg si ^qSif qotja joj jnoq aad qsoo aqq pn-B 'sajpuno p,repure!)8
0008 01 suAV jSAiod Snt^tiuitundi eqj '^qS}! x{3'Ba JOJ
auo 'Raniqo-era ouiT ?niCp oav^ aAOip qaiqM 'auxSua a ^quqiod v
paotijd shaa poS ip^a paiqag 's.iaputijq aSacaqs pasnBo pun
+v.qA\atnos s.ia^Bjd aq^ papz^p qoiq/A aqi jo AouBi^uq
pqq. A'q pasnuo si:av quauiaauuiB auio^ •^saaa^ui q.tiajS tj ^ tav
smuo aqq paqo!ji!A\ Tiaqq. pws '^ptio^ pajaaqa pAvo .io aq^
oo paujnq. sbav aqq. uaif^v '^upttoou sb sb
1 solu [ b uaas gq pynoo saa^Bid aqq puB 'spunoaS aq^ jo apqAV
oq^ apreau paqqbij 'aonb^juq ^vjq.is jo emts qntqav 'sab.i aqq
|puB 'punojS aqq uiojj qaaj qc 'gdoiB]; Jnoj cuoaj pnnoj§ arpj
ao ttA\ojq:) sbm ^qStj; ouipap aqj, •qqSut q.B jpop.o uaAas
ifSBd-jpq ^ b paouatximoo 'uoipioossy ^peq^ooj ppggaqg
aq^ SutSuopaq suiBaq oav ^ Aq paAB^d swav qoiqAV 'qo ^Btit
9T liTj '^qSii ouqoaia aqq jo euBam aqq Aq qo^Bin ^Bq^ooj v ssaa
- ijtav oq.'spitrio ,T') oxnq -^rctKBJff aq^ %v, pajaqpS afdoad QOO'OS
Aui'aii xiaqM 'ppgjaqs m qqSm ^sb^ qua.reddB sbav sasi\
3"a r.ll-03. itiSh oT.Ti.osra ana 10 noigBpggdB ,9^ .m
the Line Regiments atKawuTrlndijHowahera, Sial-
kot, L>ugshae, Subathoo, Chukrata, Ranikhet,
Mooltan, Meerut, and Ferozepore can easily be
spared. These, together with the four now \:nder
orders in ordinary course of relief from England,
would give a force of 15 British Infantry
battalions ; made up into brigades of the
usual strength, this would give a total of
7,500 British, with 15,000 .Native Infantry, which,
together with a proper proportion of English and
Native Cavalry, Sappers and Miners, and the Ar
tillery already detailed, would provide a force large
enough to carry all before it with the most con-
eummate ease.
We must again caution the public against ru
mours baseless as they are absurd. We had ample
proof last week of the ease with which war news is
concocted. Firing in the Khyber was promptly con
verted into a march da Daka, an intended assault ;
on Ali Musjid. Fortmiacely for the reputation of
Indian Generals, kha difficulties before them are
thoroughly appre ciatett and will be well provide d
| against. The Government oF India are very tin
I likely to divulge their plans prematurely, and Sir
F. Haines is not the stamp of General to run any
chance of failure by sanctioning useless and im
practicable enterprises, however much they may
I commend themselves to the few who seek their
, own honour and glory, and who do not consider
the effects of every single action in its bearing on
the whole campaign, but simply as it affects their :
own individual merits. There are some doubtless
who advocated the bold idea of an assault on .
Ali Musjid only for the purpose of wiping out
the fancied disgrace its commandant had in- ^
flicted on us. Fortunately more sober counsels than i
theseprevailedatSimla, andnowthefallof AliMusjid
will be but the immediate prelude to the downfall v
of Shere Ali's power, not a spasmodic act of re
venge calculated to irritate the Afghans without
being of any advantage to us.
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
(Bt Eastern Company's Cable. )
(feom our special correspondent.)
BOMBAY, Monday.
It is reported that Yakoob Khan, while proceed
ing to Ali Musjid, stabbed a high officer who had
been deputed to act, conjointly with others, as his
i escort. He was consequently taken back as a
j prisoner to Cabul.
| The Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Ghoolam returns via Kurrum.
RUSSIA AND CABUL.
(from our own correspondent.)
ST. PETERSBURG, Octobee 7.
The Afghan question, though extensively discussed
of late by the Russian Press, has had comparatively
little hold on Russian society. The Press, however,
has taken up the question of Austrian and Afghan
politics in good earnest, and hardly a day passes
without every one of the chief Petersburg and
Moscow papers devoting a leader to the result
of military operations in Bosnia, or to Afghan
affairs, or to the dull prospects of Russian finances,
which, having of late fallen into a state of uninter-
mittinw indisposition, have experienced the same
sad fate that attends human sufferers under like
circumstances, viz., a multitude of gratuitous coun
sellors. Of course, in saying that Indian politics
have no interest for Russian society I by no means
wish to assert that they are not discussed by
Russians, only that the interest taken in
them is simply passive. Educated Russians
—uninfected by Slavophilism — who have no
reason for concealing their feelings, will
tell you that they are not displeased with the turn
affairs have taken in Afghan. " We don't think,''
they say, " that it will come to an open rupture
between us. It is simply that we have been able
to put a spoke in England 's wheel and to checkmate
her, as it were. Thus we have the chance, in this
affair, of making ourselves extremely disagreeable
—negatively only, of course—to Britain, and at
hardly any cost or outlay to ourselves. Your
country," they observe, " cannot be more unfriendly
to us than it has shown itself all along since the
commencement of the Eastern Question, and, short
of an actual declaration ot war, you have done
everythins in your power to harm us. How can
we but feel pleased at any misfortune that may
befall you, or at any complications -that may arise
in your foreign affairs—in whatever part of the
world—so long as they distract your attention from
meddling in questions concerning South-eastern
Europe l Of course we shall go through the comedy
of strictly prohibiting Russian subjects from
supplying the Afghans with munitions of war, and
through the still greater farce of gravely warning
Russians from entering the ranks of the Ameer's
army and taking part against a country
-with which we are on friendly terms. But
those who pay no heed to the exhortations
of the Imperial Ukase also know full well
that no punishment will overtake them. Even our
Government, whilst thus hypocritically protesting
against any violation of neutrality by its subjects,
will, on the sly, probably assist the Ameer in money
and arms—just as your Government did the
lurks." (The most reasonable, enlightened, and
well-informed Russian is firmly convinced that
during the late war we sent money and arms to
and there is no arguing him out of it.)
We have no love for Shere Ali, and consider him in
the light of a cruel, petty, Eastern tyrant; but we
cannot help feeling grateful to him for having re
ceived our Mission (which came to Cabul humbly
quietly, secretly if you like, with no flourish of
trumpets) most kindly and favourably, Wecannotalso
but feel thankful to him for having refused admission
to your pompous Embassy—the more so as we are
well aware that you insisted upon ours being
turned away. You desire to go to war with
Afghan, and no doubt you will conquer in the end;
but the^ conquest will bring you neither glory nor
rest. If you keep the subdued country, it will
greatly increase the expenses of your alieady ovef- 1
taxed Indian Budget, and you will have to put
down many a rising for many a year to come. If
you leave Afghanistan after having punished the
Ameer and his subjects, you will perhaps at
no very distant date have to fight your battles over
again, and you will probably have still greater diffi
culties to surmount. Now, if you had left the
Ameer to himself, and if Russia—ever ready and
willing as you think her, to pounce upon your
Indian possessions—had thought of passing through
his territory to attack you, he would have
become your staunchest friend and ally, and
would have done all in his power to help you to
repulse us. Now, however, you have made him
look to us for protection, and even if we do nothing
for him he will only like us the less, but his hatred
of England will be greater than ever. What was
the object of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission
but to humble Russia ? And if his Mission has
failed you must not be astonished at us Russians
feeling pleased."
Such are the opinions expressed—more or less
fully—by many educated Russians regarding the
Afghan difficulty. It must be confessed, how
ever, that most of the St. Petersburg news
papers have viewed the matter more coolly and
philosophically, and it is only here and there that
the angularities of the past have not been
forgotten. I have already telegraphed extracts
from the Russian papers, giving their opinions
regarding the attitude their country ought to
assume in Afghan politics. The Golos, which
would be nothing were it not prophetic, and
which never forgets to say to its readers
" Didn't I tell you so ?" has suddenly dis
covered that England intentionally picked a
quarrel with the Ameer, and that it was
her fervent desire to see her Embassy snubbed,
in order to find a pretext for occupying
the chief strategic points on the Afghan frontier?
The Golos has, however, all along considered that
there will be no collision between Russia and
England, and that the former will not take an
active part in the Afghan war, should such take
place. Not so the Birjeviya Fyedomosti, or
Exchange News. This paper, which has always
hitherto preached peace, and which energetically,
consistently, and perseveringly expressed its dis
approval of the late war between Russia and
Turkey, has suddenly changed its views and
become the hottest of fire-eaters, at any rate re
garding the Afghan difficulty. And it is not in
a single, accidental leader, as it were, that war
is insisted upon, but in a long series of articles.
"If our relations towards the East," says the
Exchange Neivs, '' are of any value ; if, by con
tinued advances in Central Asia we have pursued
any material aims ; if we hope to obtain any benefit
from our possessions in Central Asia, and not to let
them remain like a leech sucking away at our Im
perial budget, then we not only cannot remain in
different, but are forced to insist that the settlement
of the Afghan question should be none other than
one which will be fully in lieeping with Russian
interests. If we considered it possible to carry
on a war, and to sacrifice our money for
the sake of certain demarcations of the Balkan j
Peninsula, and without any chance of our will
being obeyed, how much more serious to us is the
question as to who will occupy those mountain
passes that constitute the only available means of
communication between British India and our
central Asiatic possessions ?"
Of course, the Exchange News has been taken to
task for its remarkably warlike tendencies by
several Petersburg newspapers, but it has justified
itself thus However unwilling we may be to
desire anything like war ; however anxious to avoid
a collision with England, we cannot allow the
Ameer to be swallowed up under present circum-
..ataaces— i.e., simply because_oi-his wod relatjrps
' towards Russia, and because of the presence of*£
Russian Resident in Cabul. This would be contrary
to the simplest feelings of decency and justice.
To help the Ameer does not mean a march to India
—a march useless to us, and associated with
enormous expenses and great risks. It does not
mean a war for the sake of uniting several peoples
nor a war for purposes of civilisation (seen by us
through a fog)—but is simply an act of self-defence
m a daring attack directed against us through the
medium of a suffering third party, whom we have our
selves placed in the position of victim and accused "
Besides itsbeinganaflairconcemingRussia'shonour
the Exchange News considers that Russia should
be impelled to assist the Ameer by f< simple political
calculation." " If," observes the paper in question
" for many years past we have continually been t
moving forwards in Central Asia, it can hardlv be '
supposed that we did so simply for the pleasure of
vanquishing the Tashkentans and Khokanians ; but
for the purpose—once we are settled in our Central
Asiatic dominions—of approaching the densely
populated East, and opening up communica
tions with it that might prove useful to our
selves. In this respect it is extremely important
for us to wm the friendship and respect of our
new neighbours, and in particular of him who
must always remain the intervener in all our rela
tions with the East Indies." It then continues •
"Such are the reasons for our daring to assert
that the Ameer of Afghan has a 4 right to calculate
upon our assistance," although we still hold to our
former opinions regarding union of races, the I
re-establishment of nationalities, the freeing of
peoples from the heavy yoke of oppression, and the
forcing upon them of civilising principles, which we
have ourselves not as yet assimilated properly,"
Such is the warlike tone of the most peace-lovinc
of all the Russian papers- But for the last six davs
even the press seems to have grown tired of the
Afghan question, and hardly a leader has appeared
upon the subject in any of the Petersburg or
Moscow newspapers. It will be interesting to
read the opinions of the Russian monthlies for
October, and to see whether they back up the "go-
ahead " policy of the Exchange News, or take their
stand upon the more moderate views ^Dressed by
the maiority of the daily press.