Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎134r] (275/312)

garrioon would be in a very exposed position. ^
Moreover, its presenco at Herat would bo a
direct invitation to Russia to occupy them. Lastly,
tliere is the enormous expense, which would be
permanent, for in the Kstst one can never go
back.
It is suggested that we should leave garrisons at
Jellalabad and Candahar. The occupation of the
latter', however, would entail the virtual annexa
tion of Southern Afghanistan. Let us now consider
the advantages aud disadvantages of establishing 1
ourselves at Jellalabad. The argument used by
those who advocate that measure is that we have
at present a very bad frontier in the line of
mountains which fringe our north-western fron
tier. JBy occupying Jellalabad, however, we
should by no means cause the evil to disappear.
The mouB tains, full of fierce and fanatic caterans,
would still frown over and chronically threaten
our trans-Indus territory. As to withdrawing
behind the Indus, that step ia out of the
question. Our duty towiircls the inhabitants
of that part of the Punjab would not admit of
it. Besides, though a river is said to b© on© of
the worst frontiers possible, it is a ques
tion whether a mountain range—when tilled
by hostile tribes-—is not as bad or worse.
It certainly is no physical barrier, for every
mountain range, however impervious it may
be supposed to be, is always pierced by numerous
oasses and tracks, which cannot all ba guarded.
The mountains on the Punjab frontier are chiefly
difiicult for us ; to our enemies they present no
obstacles. As to subduing or conciliating those
tribes, and making of them a chevaux defrize
against the Afghans proper, the task is impossible.
We do not see, therefore, that we could improve
our frontier by advancing it; and the only
tolerably prudent measure, if diplomacy fails,
to establish cordial relations with Afghanistan is
to establish ourselves at one or two of the
debouches on the Afghan side of the mountain.
Jelialabad would be m the position of a tete-de-
pont on the bank of a river too broad for artil
lery fire to reach from one bank to the other, with
this exception, that in the one case the communi-
caiiotii would be safe, while in the other they
would be in the utmost peril. It would
therefore seem that if wo ar© to have
any fortified posts ia Afghanistan we should
content ourselves with Quetta. The only object
i in holding a post on the other side of the moun
tains would be to content ourselves with Quetta,
I which gives us at ail times an entrance into the
country. There is no need lor two entrances;
but if at any period it should appear desirable to
advance by the Khyber w© could easily force that
pass. Do what we may, however, afiairs have
been so badly managed that we cannot get out
of this clumsily-provoked contest with Afghanis
tan without difdoulty, expense, and possibly dis
credit.
LONDON, MONDAY, OCTOBER 14.
At length we have news of the Native Envoy :
whom Lord Lytton sent to Shere Ali . He states
that he had received permission to leave Cabul, and ,
would be the bearer of the Ameek's reply, but
nothing is known at Simla as to the character of
the promised communication. No official news has
reached Calcutta as to what is taking place at the
froot. _____
THE NATIVE ENVOY'S RETURN.
PROMISED REPLY FROM THE
AMEER.
(Bv Eastern leteorarn.)
(from our own correspondent.)
CALOf TTA, S unday.
There is no official news of what is taking place
in the front.
It is believed that the plan of an advance via the
Khoorum Valley has been for the present abandoned,
and that the troops detailed for that service will be
attached to the Peshawur fore© for an advance
through the Khyber Pass. This is expected to
take place almost immediately, and we may at any
moment hear that fighting has begun.
The arrangements are not as yet completed with
the Khyberees, and they are at present main'ain-
ing an expectant attitude. There is little doubt,
however, that they will give in their adhesion to us
upon our first success. They report that the enemy
in the Pass are suffering from fever.
(PROM OUR OWN CORKK8PONDBNT.)
simla, S unday.
A letter has arrived at Peshawur from Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India.
Golam Hassain, our native Envoy, dated Cabul,
the 6th of October, stating that he had received
permission from the Ameer to leave Cabul, and
that he would be the bearer of the Ameer's reply
to the Viceroy. Noth ng is known as to the cha
racter of the Ameer's communioation
In the to^al absence of official news we ar^ driven
to trust in the reports which circulate through India,
and are despatched to us sometimes from Simla,
sometimes from Calcutta, sometimes from Bombay.
Unfortunately there are no means whatever for
testing the truth of these rumours save by their j
internal evidence of probability.
Our Correspondent at Calcutta states that it is 1
believed that the advance through the Khoorum
Valley has been abandoned for the present, and
that the force detailed for this service—
i.e., General Roberts's column—will join that
assembling at Peshawur for an immediate
advance up the Khyber. We can hardly
believe that the occupation of the Khoorum
Valley is altogether abandoned, for it is agre> d
upon all hands that our possession of this valley
will greatly facilitate future opera ions. It is,
however, possible that this operation may be
postponed for the present, in order that the blow
may be struck with more speed and certainty in
the Khyber. For this expedition it must be
remembered that not only is a force required
amply sufficient to carry out the operation without
fear of a check, but that a considerable force must
be left at Peshawur and along the line of border
forts. Peshawur is a large city, containing fully
50,000 inhabitants. These are for the most part
Pathans—a wild and half-savage people, who
are, by race, Afghans, and perfectly capable of
| causing no little trouble if left without a sufficient
force to overawe the city. The hill trihes, too, may
be expected to seize this moment for descents upon
the plain, and it will be necessary to strengthen
rather than to diminish the garrisons of the
numerous forts which have been erected to repel
their incursions. This will be specially necessary
on the frontier north of the Attock, as the
Momunds, who have always been trouble
some to us, and have openly declared for the
Ameer. It was reported that the fighting men of
this tribe were marching to Lalpura to effect a junc
tion there with the Ameer's troops. It is to be
hoped that this news is true, as the army that is to
advance up the Khyber need not heed a few thou-
sand mountaineers more or less ; but if the
Momunds burst from their mountains out upon the
: plains they might give us immense trouble. In
view of these contingencies it may well be that the
authorities, in order to save time, have postponed
the expedition up the Khoorum Valley, and have
ordered General Roberts with his column to
Peshawur. The appearance there of his force would
raise the numbers of the Expeditionary Army to
astrength which would enable the advance to be begun
} at once, and for a force to remain behind at
f Peshawur of sufficient strength to overawe the
somewhat turbulent inhabitants of that city.
It is reported that fever has broken out among the
f Afghan troops in the Khyber Pass. This may be
true, but at the present time of year there does not ap
pear to be any reason why an outbreak of fever should
take place. We can well imagine that the sanitary
conditions prevalent in such an irregular army as
is there collected might, in July or August, speedily
cause an epidemic ; but it is hardly to be expected
at the present time of year.
On the 6th instant our Envoy was still at Cabul,
but had received permission to leave, and would
bring down the Ameer's answer to the Viceroy.
The tenor of the letter was unknown, but the
answer was virtually given when the Ameer marched
his regular troops, with artillery, down to bar our
way up the Khyber Pass.