Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎133v] (274/312)

There may be minds to which this sort of per
formance seems heroic and imperial, but such
minds do not by any means represent the dis
position of the English public. Most Englishmen
regard Sheke Ali exactly as a plain and practical
man would have regarded the rirer that offeHded
Cybus, and woold have about as much anxiety for
personal vengeance in the one case as in the other.
Of course we may be told that there is a policy
cherished by our rulers which has nothing to do
with personal vengeance; that it is part of a
great imperial plan conceived with far more com
prehensive purpose than anything which the
ephemeral good or bad humour of Shere Ali
could affect. The river is to be drained, we may
be assured, not because we feel offended by any
thing it has done, but because we require for our
i own purposes to have as dry land the soil through
i which the stream now flows. We are quite prepared
to believe that the plans of the Government really
have some such inspiration. Nothing of the kind
will be readily acknowledged at Simla or in White
hall. It will be left to injudicious advocates of the
Government to proclaim that there are such pur
poses in existence, and that the Imperial policy
was not fired into action by aay impulse so insig
nificant as the rudeness of Sheke Alt. It is
likely enough that the injudicious supporters of
the Govemmejat have hit upon the truth. If that
be to, we must not build much hope on any
apologetic or conciliatory disposition which may
possibly be shown by the replies of Sherb Ali.
Moreover, if the suspicions so commonly felt in
London should be convictions in Cabul, it is not
likely that the Ameer will be able to see any
better course left open to him thau that which
sheer desperation may suggest. In the effect of
the grand demonstration of our strength which
appears to be so much relied upon we have, for
ourselves, but little faith. It will probably seem
to Shere Ali not a demonstration of what we
could do but of what we -have all along been
determined to do, and he may be driren to the
conclusion that he might as well fight it out first
as last.
Perhaps the most curious fact noticeable in the
whole state of thiugs is the absolute ignorance in
which the English public are left with regard to
the designs and the policy of the Government.
Men look on with the same kind of curiosity as
they might have felt some fifteen years ago about
the next move to be made by the Emperor of the
French. There was a time when the Poet
Laureate described in language of unwonted
emphasis the fact that although we had a
faithful ally, none 'of us exactly knew what he
meant. We are in much the same condition now
^s regards the policy of our own Government
with relation to Afghanistan. That policy m^kes
no part of any scheme disclosed to and sanctioned
by Parliament. It has not been suggested by any
movement, impulse, apprehension, or ambition
on the part of the English people. There is no
tradition even which could commend or explaia
it. The Government, of course, would not admit
that it is simply a renewal of what we had all
believed to be the dead and buried policy of mere
annexation; and if it is not to be thus
explained there is no traditional policy, living
or dead, with which to connect it. We are
therefore left to wait and see what little
surprise the Viceroy of India, may yet have in
store for the world. India is truly the land for
marvellous feats of jugglery, and perhaps in
certain minds the atmosphere of the place may
engender a desire to create surprises worthy of
i the region. Mark Antony was said to have
; fallen into the style of Oriental hyperbole from
j his residence in the East, and Napoleon had
j serious ideas of palming himself off on the Mo-
| hammedans as a sort of Caliph. We cannot help
fearing that the atmosphere of India has been
somewhat too seductive to the imagination of the
Viceroy, and that the sober and practical tone of
English statesmanship is now too prosaic for the
council# and the projects of Simla. Certainly since
Lord Lytton's appointment we have had nothing
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THE
INVASION OF AFG HANISTAN.
(FROM A MILITARY CORRESPONDENT.)
In the present lull of the affairs connected with
Afghanistan it may be useful to consider the
military aspect of an invasion of the country, for
which preparation is being made.. Of course its
immediate purpose is to exact reparation for the
insult offered to Major Cavagnan. Probably the
advance will be made on Cabal from one direction
and on Candabar from another. That both armies
after more or less fighting will reach their destina
tions is, humanly speaking, certain. It may be that
the Ameer will then submit to any terms
we may choose to impose upon him;
but it is at least as possible that he
will escape to Afghan Turkestan, and from
thence organize a guerilla war against us. It
mu^t be remembered that he is accustomed to a
life of adventure, and to the most severe rebuffs
of fortune. He is, moreover, a singularly resolute
man, and -rcall ho doubt bear it in mind that his
brother Akbar Khan avenged the defeat and
surrender of his father by the destruction of a
British brigade. On the whole, we think it more
probable than not, that when beaten in the open
field and driven from his capital, ho will betake
himself to the almost inaccessible country
in the north of his dominions. If he
should adopt such a course there can be no doubt
that Russia directly but secretly, or indirectly, will
give him aid to continue the struggle. Our
position in such a case will be a very awkward one.
For though the south and north-west of Afghan
istan is comparatively well known and suitable
for the operations of regular trbops, the very
reverse is t he case with respect to the districts in
the north and north-east. We could, no doubt,
follow him in!o his fastnesses, for where Afghans
can go British troops can follow; but from the
difficulty of obtaining supplies and transporting
sick and wounded, the columns which wo might
seud would have to be small. In the last war
it was found impossible to convey guiis over the
mountaiua to the north of the capital, but we are
better provided now, having mountain bat
teries which can accompany infantry anywhere.
Possessing, however, perfect knowledge of the
country, dispensing with commissariat, transport,
and ambulances, and having the inhabitants on
their side, the Ameer would carry on a harassing
war with many chances in his favour, and it would
be very difficult to capture him or bring him to
bay. Indeed, our necessarily small columns would
run a great risk of being overwhelmed by a sudden
combination of the Afghan forces. In fact, till roads
had been cut in every direction, and strong gar
risons established all over the country, it would
be impossible to subdue, or even to hold in check,
active hostility. The fact is it would not be a
difficult task to defeat the main army of the Ameer
and to capture his principal cities, but to hold the
country would tax our resources to the utmost.
There is the alternative, having thus shown
our power, of withdrawing our troops from the i
country. Such a proceeding would, how
ever, hardly be satisfactory. We should,
it is true, prove that we are not to be in
sulted with impunity, but a mere raid
into Afghanistan would scarcely place our relations
with that country ou a more satisfactory footing
than that which now exists. The Ameer and the
Afghans would not certainly be better disposed to
us. Far from securing him as an ally we should
throw him into the arms of Russia, and it would
be useless to repeat our request that an English
envoy should be permitted to reside at Cabul." We
should have spent much money without in any
way repairing the blunders of our diplomatists.
The Afghans would be sure to boast now, as they
did in 1842, that, unable to subdue them, wo
were obliged to quit the country, and the belief
that such was really the case' would soon be
current all over Asia. There is a third course,
which is, that we should evacuate the
country with the main body of our forces,
merely establishing garrisons at certain important
strategical points, such as Candahar and Jellala-
bad. Some loose-talking amateur statesmen
apeak of placing also a garrison in Herat; but the
idea does not deserve being entertained for a
j moment, save on the condition that a strong ruler
occupies the throne of Cabul, that he is our firm !
I ally, and does not object to one of his most im
portant fortresses being held by British troops.
Herat is 400 miles from Candahar, and 300
from Jacobabad in Scinde, Before we could
send a force to Herat we should have
to establish ourselves strongly in Candahar to
avoid our communications being cut oil. Indeed.
even if we were nominally a firm ally of the Sove^
reign of Aighamstan, it would be imprudent to
leave a gamson at Herat without something more
than a mere garrison at Candahar. The teak of
sending a force to Herat with the mission of can
turing that town at the end of the march would
present difficuhies indeed-yet only difficulties
i W1 " ch energy could overcome. The point
1 is that when the place was captured the British
There may be minds to which this sort of per
formance seems heroic and imperial, but such
minds do not by any means represent the dis
position of the English public. Most Englishmen
regard S heke A li exactly as a plain and practical
man would have regarded the rirer that offemded
C ybus , and would have about as much anxiety for
personal vengeance in the one case as in the other.
Of course we may be told that there is a policy
cherished by our rulers which has nothing to do
with personal vengeance; that it is part of a
great imperial plan conceived with far more com
prehensive purpose than anything which the
ephemeral good or bad humour of S here A li
could affect. The river is to be drained, we may
be assured, not because we feel offended by any
thing it has done, but because we require for our
own purposes to have as dry land the soil through
which the stream now flows. We are quite prepared
to believe that the plans of the Government really
have some such inspiration. Nothing of the kind
will be readily acknowledged at Simla or in White
hall. It will be left to injudicious advocates of the
Government to proclaim tbat there are such pur
poses in existence, and that the Imperial policy
was not fired into action by any impulse so insig
nificant as the rudeness of S hebe A lt . It is
likely enough that the injudicious supporters of
the Government have hit upon the truth. If that
be so, we must not build much hope on any
apologetic or conciliatory disposition which may
possibly be shown by the replies of S hebb A li.
Moreover, if the suspicions so commonly felt in
London should be convictions in Cabul, it is not
likely that the A meeb will be able to see any-
better course left open to him than that which
sheer desperation may suggest. In the effect of
the grand demonstration of our strength which
appears to be so much relied upon we have, for
ourselves, but little faith. It will probably seem
to S hebe A li not a demonstration of what we
could do but of what we -have all along been
determined to do, and he may be driven to the
conclusioa that he might as well fight xt out first
as last.
Perhaps the most curious fact noticeable in the
whole state of things is the absolute ignorance in
which the English public are left with regard to
the designs and the policy of the Government.
Men look on with the same kind of curiosity as
they might have felt some fifteen years ago about
the next move to be made by the Emperor of the
F rench . There was a time when the Poet
Laureate described in language of unwonted
emphasis the fact that although we had a
faithful ally, none 'of us exactly knew what he
meant. We are in much the same condition now
^s regards the policy of our own Government
with relation to Afghanistan. That policy mr^kes
no part of any scheme disclosed to and sanctioned
by Parliament. It has not been suggested by any
movement, impulse, apprehension, or ambition
on the part of the English people. There is no
tradition even which could commend or explain
it. The Government, of course, would not admit
that it is simply a renewal of what we had all
believed to be the dead and buried policy of mere
annexationand if it is not to be thus
explained there is no traditional policy, living
or dead, with which to connect it. We are
therefore left to wait and see what little
surprise the Viceroy of India may yet have in
store for the world. India is truly the land for
marvellous feats of jugglery, and perhaps in
certain minds the atmosphere of the place may
engender a desire to create surprises worthy of
! the region. M ark A ntony was said to have
; fallen into the style of Oriental hyperbole from
i lug residence in the East, and N apoleon had
j serious ideas of palming himself off on the Mo-
i hammedans as a sort of Caliph. We cannot help
fearing that the atmosphere of India has been
somewhat too seductive to the imagination of the
V iceroy , and that the sober and practical tone of
English statesmanship is now too prosaic for the
councilf and the projects of Simla. Certainly since
Lord L ytton's appointment we have had nothing
but a succession of surprises. Theatric scenes,
. gorgeous Imperial progresses, marvellous displays
' of poetic eloquence—all these were, perhaps,
only the on»mental preludes to some strokes
of audacious policy which might .bring the
name of the V iceroy into the mouths of
men everywhere. We have only to say that
the public feeling and conscience of England
have no manner of sympathy with any policy of
mere show and surprise either in Europe or in
Asia. The time will come when this will be made
clear, but, unfortunately, it is left very much'at
the mercy of some of our statesmen to say whether
great mischief may not be done before the public
opinion of the country has any chance of making
I itself authoritatively known.
THE
INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.
(FHOM A MILITAEY CORRESPONDENT.)
In the present lull of the affairs connected with j
Afghanistan it may be useful to consider the
military aspect of an invasion of the country, for
which preparation is being made.. Of course its
imaiediate purpose is to exact reparation for the
insult offered to Major Cavagnari. Probably the
advance will be made on Cabal from one direction
and on Candahar from another. That both armies
after more or less fighting will reach their destina
tions is, humanly speaking, certain. It may be that
the Ameer will then submit to any terms
we may choose to impose upon him;
but it is at least as possible that he
will escape to Afghan Turkestan, and from
thence organize a guerilla war against us. It
must be remembered that he is accustomed to a
life of adventure, and to the most severe rebuffs
, of fortune, lie is, moreover, a singularly resolute i
man, and will no doubt bear it in miud that his
brother Akbar Khan avenged the defeat and
surrender of his father by the destruction of a
British brigade. On the whole, we think it more
probable than aot, that when beaten iu the open
field and driven from his capital, ho will betake
himself to the almost inaccessible country
in the north of his dominions. If he
should adopt such a course there can be no doubt
that Eussia directly but secretly, or indirectly, will
give him aid to continue the struggle. Our
position in such a case will be a very awkward one,
For though the south and north-west of Afghan
istan is comparatively well known and suitable
for the operations of regular trOops, the very
reverse i« the case with respect to the districts in
the north and north-east. Wo could, no doubt,
1 follow him into his fastnesses, for where Afghans
can go British troops can follow; but from the
difficulty of obtaining supplies and transporting
sick and wounded, the columns which wo might
eeud would have to be small. In the last war
it was found impossible to convey guns over the
mountains to the north of the capital, but we are
better provided novr, having mountain bat
teries which can accompany infantry anywhere.
Possessing, however, perfect knowledge of the
country, dispensing with commissariat, transport,
and ambulauces, and having the inhabitants on
their side, the Ameer would carry on a harassing
1 war with many chances in his favour, and it would
be verv difficult to capture him or bring him to
bay. Indeed, our necessarily small columns would
run a great risk of being overwhelmed by a sudden
combination of the Afghan forces. In fact, till roads 1
had been cut in every direction, and strong gar
risons established all over the country, it would
be impossible to subdue, or even to hold in check,
active hostility. The fact is it would not be a
difficult task to defeat the main army of the Ameer
and to capture his principal cities, but to hold the
country would tax our resources to the utmost.
There is the alternative, having thus shown
oiir power, of withdrawing our troops from the
country. Such a proceeding would, how
ever, hardly be satisfactory. We should,
it is true, prove that we are not to be in
sulted with impunity, but a mere raid
into Afghanistan would scarcely place our relations
with that country on a more satisfactory footing
than that which now exists. The Ameer and the
Afghans would not certainly be better disposed to
us. Far from securing him as an ally we should
throw him into the arms of Russia, and it would
be useless to repeat our request that an English
envoy should be permitted to reside at Cabul." We
should have spent much money without in any
way repairing the blunders of our diplomatists.
The Afghans would be sure to boast now, as they
did in 1842, that, unable to subdue them, we
were obliged to quit the country, and the belief
that such was really the case' would soon bo
current all over Asia. There is a third course,
which is, that we should evacuate the
country with the main body of our forces
merely establishing garrisons at certain important
strategical points, such as Candahar and Jellala-
bad. Some loose-talking amateur states men
speak of placing also a garrison in Herat; but the
idea does not deserve being entertained for a
| moment, save on the condition that a strong ruler
occupies the throne of Cabul, that he is our firm
! ally, and does not object to ono of his most im
portant fortresses being held by British troops.
Herat ia 400 miles from Candahar, and clOO
from Jacobabad in Scinde. Before we could
send a force to Herat we slionki have
to establish ourselves strongly in Candahar to
avoid our communications being cut oil. Indeed,
even if we were nominally a firm ally of the Sove
reign of Afghanistan, it would be imprudent to
leave a garrison at Herat without something more
than a mere garrison at Candahar. The task of
sending a force to Herat with the mission of cap
turing that town at the end of the march would
present difficulties indeed—yet only difficulties
i wmch English energy could overeome. The point
is that when the place was captured the British