Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎131v] (270/312)

AFGHANISTAN .
The news we publish this morning from our
Indian Correspondent confirms the view we have
hitherto adopted as to the actual state of affairs on
the frontier. No immediate move is to be at
tempted, for two principal reasons—the first being
the insufficiency of transport, the second that our ;
Envoy, the gallant old Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hus- !
sein, still remains in the Ameer's hands, and s
that it is extremely probable any forward move- j
ment on our part would be his death warrant, j i
Our own experience of Oriental potentates and the I
memory of Conolly, Stoddart, Burnes, and Mac- j
naghten, go far to prove that the persons of
Envoys are not invested with any halo of senti
mental security ; it is wise, therefore, and but just
to as good and brave a man as ever served Her j
Majesty, that every effort should be made
to insure his safety before we attempt to
coerce the Ameer. If our Correspondent is
correctly informed, Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hussein re
ceived permission to leave Cabul on the 6th of
October, and had obtained replies to the Viceroy's
letters ; we may, therefore, hear of the Envoy's
safe arrival in Peshawur at any moment,
and doubtless Lord Lytton will not be long before
he makes public Shere Ali's opinions on the steps
we proposed to undertake. There is little hope that
these missives will tend in any way to clear up the
approaching difficulty, and that this is fully recog
nized in India may be judged from the fact that
war preparations are being carried on most ener
getically.
The particulars given of the interview between
Major P. L. N. Cavagnari and Faiz Mahomed,
Shere Ali's Master of the Horse,do not confirm tbe
very extravagant reports at first circulated—
namely, that the Ameer's official had stated that it
was only his personal friendship towards the
Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur which induced
him to refrain from shooting him ; indeed, beyond
the usual Pathan bluster and arrogance, a trait
equally discemable among all Eastern races,
there appears to have been a fairly cordial tone
maintained throughout the conversation. It was
very evident, however, that the Mir Akhor was
acting under explicit instructions from head
quarters and that any attempt on tbe part of Sir
Neville Chamberlain to push on would have been
met by force.
The Government of India seem to be fully aware
of the fact, which we ourselves have so constantly .
insisted on, namely, that every precaution must be
taken to avoid the slightest mistake at the com
mencement of operations ; a check of the faintest de- :
scription experienced by any one of the columns
would increase the subsequent difficulties athousand-
fold, and would most assuredly be the signal for
all the lukewarm border tribes to throw in their
lot with Shere Ali. We had ample illustration of
the danger to be incurred in a slight check in hill
warfare in 1863 during the Umbeyla expedition,
it is not to be wondered at, then, that Sir Neville
Chamberlain, mindful of the serious losses sus
tained by his troops in that campaign, should be
foremost in urging on the Indian Government the
absolute necessity of taking such precautions that .
failure will be out of the question.
It appears that at one time it was in contempla
tion to make a rapid advance on Ali Musjid, and
seize it by a coup de main ; this was abandoned, and
most wisely too. Popular as such a scheme would
have been among the officers and men of the Pe
shawur Brigade, it could have had but one result
even if successful, and that the one most to be
guarded against in mountain warfare—namely, a
long halt in hills inhabited by doubtful friends,
before the object of the expedition has been at
tained. Prior to any advance on Ali Musjid it would
have been necessary for General Ross to have con
siderably strengthened not only the garrisons of
the Peshawur forts, but also to have thrown
more troops into Forts Mackeson, Abazae, Michni,
Mardan, and the other posts along the Yusufzae
j border, in order to hold in check any
I attempts at incursion on the part of the Afridis,
j Aiomunds, or Swatis, and assuming that the
Peshawur Brigade had been strengthened by the
regiments from Eawul Pindi and Nowshera, it is %
not probable that more than 6,000 men with 30
guns would have been available for the advance on
Ali Musjid, a force by no means calculated to in
sure success.
Defective commissariat arrangements and defi
cient means of transport appear to be the great
hindrance to the prompt advance of troops, but,
as we have before pointed out, the blame
does not lie with departmental officers so
much as with the system that maintains
during peace an insufficient number of beasts
of burden to meet the requirements of war.
Of late years, however, in India as well as
in England, steps have been taken to organize a
permanent Transport Corps ; for this purpose
Lord Napier of Magdala instituted powerful mule
trains at various points near the frontier, but
these, though equal to the strain of petty
border expeditions, are quite inadequate to the
calls of an army of invasion. Indeed, it
would be most inadvisable for financial reasons,
however desirable from a military point of view, to
maintain carriage on a war footing for all the troops
in India. Much might be done, however, to pre
vent a recurrence of the strain now felt in
the Punjab, by accurate registers being kept
in every Tahsil and Thanna throughout the country
of the number of elephants, camels, mules, ponies,
oxen, and hackeries in the district, together with
the names of the owners. Thus by simply setting
in motion the machinery of the magistrate's office,
all available transport could be readily collected
under police supervision at given points.
The conduct of the Maharajah of Alwar deserves
especial mention. Instead of sending up an indif
ferently armed, badly disciplined body of men, of
very doubtful worth in actual war, he has volun
teered to equip and maintain at his own expense a
corps of camels and camel drivers for service on the i
frontier. Whether by this is meant a transport
train or a camel corps similar to the one raised by
Sir Charles Napier in Scinde, or Colonel Boss in
Central India, we are not informed. In any case
the offer shows that the suspicion directed against
some of our feudateries in this instance is most un
deserved.
Both the Scinde and Ross' Camel Corps did such
excellent service in their time that it is a matter of
much regret that they were ever ..disbanded ; the
value of Shutar Sowars or camel troopers is recog
nized by the Indian Government, inasmuch as every
troop of the Frontier cavalry ^regiments has one or
more of these men attached to it, who are simply
invaluable for orderly duties in a body ; they
admit of a detachment of trained sqldiers being
transported 60 or 70 miles in the 24 hours
without fatigue to man or beast. Some of the
marches performed by the two corps we have here
alluded to are the most surprising on record,
though unfortunately little known even by military
men. It is to be hoped the Maharajah of Alwar's
example will be followed by other princes.
The summary of the Indian press telegrams given
by our Correspondent is worthy of notice. It appears
by it that the report of the Momunds having thrown
in their lot with the Ameer has not been authenti
cated ; their relations with us have ever been on
such an unsatisfactory footing that there is
good foundation for such a rumour ; even if they
do remain neutral, it will be incumbent on us
to maintain a strong force to watch their
borders during any operations that may be
undertaken in Cabul. Yakoob Khan's move
ments seem attended with much uncertainty ;
At one time we hear that he has been released and
is on the way to Quettp, and to-day it is reported
that he is to command the Ameer's forces in the
Kuram district ; Yakoob has shown himself not
only a personally brave man, but a very
skilled soldier, and it is certain that wher
ever he may be posted he will succeed in ^
giving us some trouble. A well-planned system
of shelter trenches or breastworks such as
the Pathan knows so well how to throw up would
render the Shutergardan Pass well-nigh impreg-
nable, and there are one or more points between it
and the Peiwar Kotal, which without much trouble
might be converted into veritable Plevnas. There
is no mention of any immediate advance
on the part of General Roberts's column
on Kuram, although a few days ago it was
confidently stated that the force would be pushed
up at once. The badness of the road between
Rawul Pindi and Kohat, the absence of a bridge
over the Indus at Kushalgarh, and the necessity of
maintaining an adequate force between the Ghub-
bar mountain and the Tirah hills in order to over
awe the Vaziris, Orakzaes, and Afridis, were all
obstacles in the way of an immediate advance.
The report that the Russians are in Yarkand !
may be dismissed ag unworthy of belief ; neverthe
less the advisability of securing the Baroghil and
1 Kamarband Passes, which lead from Kashgar to
, Cabul or Kashmir, is beyond all question.
| The fact that the Mhairwarra Battalion has
volunteered for service on the frontier is authenti
cated ; we gather from this that Government will
utilize it in replacing some of the Punjab battalions
now under orders to form part of the Expeditionary
Force, and not that it will itself join the army of
invasion. Seven officers per infantry corps are
generally considered insufficient for the exigen
cies of warfare ; it would then bejsimple madness
to send forward the Mhairwarra Regiment, which
bears on its rolls but two—a colonel and an ad
jutant—indeed, we are at a loss to conceive how
it can be expected to perform any but the poorest
police duties.
The rumour of a strong hostile feeling between
the Khyberis and the Ameer's troops, coupled with
the fact that firing had been heard in the pass (pro
bably practice from the guns of All Musjid;,
evidently gave rise to the report that a
British force was on the march to Daka.
It is most satisfactory to learn that more
sober counsels have prevailed at Simla, and that no
immediate movement is contemplated. Reports as
to dissensions among the tribes must be received
with extreme caution, and such general statements
as that the Khyberis have been attacked and their
villages harassed by order of the Ameer are utterly
unreliable. Shere Ali will do nothing to alienate
tribes whose assistance would be of such paramount
importance to his cause.
The term " Khyberi," which is so generally