Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎131r] (269/312)

LONDON, MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1878.
Our Darjeeling telegram of this mornirig throws
all obtainable light on the Afghan question up to
the date at which our Correspondent is writing. It
gives us the exact story of the repulse of our Mis
sion by the Afghan Commandant at Ali Musjid. It
tells us of the military preparations which the Indian
(iovernment is making with a view of being in readi-
nessfor whatever turnaffairs may take. It contradicts,
partly in express terms, partly by its mere silence,
some exciting reports which have been circulating,
both in this country and in India, during the course
of the past week. For further and more definite
news we must be content to wait a little longer. The
Vicbroy's Envoy is on his way back from Cabul,
and he brings with him the A meek's replies to the
Viceroy's letters. In another day or two these will
be in the hands of the Indian Government, and
we shall then know certainly the disposition of
the A meer himself and the line of policy which it
will be necessary for us to follow. It is still open
to the A meer to disclaim the deeds of his subordi
nate and to make reparation for them by a full
submission to our demands. That he will choose
this course is possible, but it is, we fear, far from
likely. Nothing has yet occurred which could be
expected to lead him to so, decided a change of
front. Whatever motives he may have had for j
resisting us in the past are still as strong as they !
liave ever been. His confidence in himself and
jin his friends must have been very slender indeed
if it has given way already at the bare rumours
of our uncompleted military preparations. That
he should send an answer of any kind is a new
piece of civility, and is welcome so far ; but
the safe return of the bearer will not improbably
prove to be the most satisfactory part of the whole
business. There will be work found for our soldiers
In any case. If the A meer continues obstinate, it
will be necessary to bring him to reason by force. I
If he yields without fighting, we shall still need
men to occupy the new line of frontier which we j
Intend to substitute for our present one, or to
hold the advanced stations at which we may insist
that our presence is to be permitted. At the present
jnoment there is no news either way. We have
inade no attempt to strike a first blow and to obtain
the prestige of a first success, at the risk, of course,
of the discredit of a first failure. There are, as
our Correspondent points out, sufficient reasons
why nothing of the kind has been tried. If we are
forced to make war on Afghanistan, we shall pro.
hably set to work in the slow, safe way in which we
conducted our campaign in Abyssinia. We shall
have a more difficult task before us, but one easily
within our power to bring with certainty to the
same successful issue. We shall lose nothing by
waiting a few weeks, or even a few months. We
often hear of the peculiarities of the Asiatic mind,
and of the absolute necessity of doing something
Startling with the view of duly impressing it with
l sense of the reality of our strength. It would
be better, on any calculation, to allow the most
erroneous ideas to prevail for a time over the
Imaginative and unreasoning East rather than to
furnish good ground for a slighting estimate by
Attempting some feat which we failed, for any
reason, to carry through. Small, too, as the chance
may be that the A meer will give way before we
begin actually to move, it would be unwise to de
stroy it by moving immediately. In one way, and
in one only, can our hand be forced. If the
A meer attacks any of the hill tribes beyond our
own frontier which have declared themselves
friendly to us, it will become our duty to support
them at once and at almost any hazard. There
Would really be no choice left ub in the matter. An
attack upon our allies is the same thing as an attack
upon ourselves. If we were to abandon them with
out an effort to protect them, we should make
thereby a confession of weakness or untrustworthi.
ness which would be more justly fatal to our influ
ence than any partial defeat could be. There is a
report, our Correspondent states, that some such
movement has been made by the A meer's troops j
but it has not been authenticated, and,as we hear of
no corresponding movements on our part, we may
assume that it is not true.
The full story of the affair of the 21st of Septem
ber, and of the manner in which the advanced
guard of our Mission was received at Ali Musjid, is
told at length in our Correspondent's despatch. It
gives one or two important variations upon what
has hitherto been the accepted version. The inter
view between Major C avagnari and the Com
mandant of the fort is set before us in picturesque
detail, and with less staring colours than have been
somewhat needlessly added to it. The fact remains
unshaken that our representatives were refused a
passage, and that the refusal, although not specially
directed by S here A li , was in accordance with the
general orders by which the Commandant at Ali
Musjid was bound. When the solid part of
the alfrout remains it may be thought a
matter of small consequence that the mere
outlines should be toned down. Our Mission
was not suffered to pass. As far as it is any
satisfaction that the passage was blocked with all
due civility of forms,our Correspondent's letter will
be found to furnish it. The Commandant of Ali Mus
jid is not shown as swaggering and blustering and
regretting the ties of friendship which prevented
him from shooting down our representative on the
spot. Once, and once only, does there seem to
have been a little outburst of temper ; but it was
not lasting, and it can scarcely count for much.
But whatever blame we are enabled to withdraw
from S here A li's officer must be borne by S here
A li himself. If the Commandant at Ali Musjid i
could possibly be thought to have been wrought upon j
by his own hostile feelings, and to have gone, conse- i
quently, beyond his orders, the whole matter would |
admit more easily of being explained away. But
it is clear that he had no choice, except to act pre
cisely as he did. We would not permit him
to send a messenger to Cabul, and to wait
instructions on our case. The A meer , we knew, had
nothing to learn of which he was not already well
informed, aud t he delay, therefore, w ould have been
useless. Thus compelled to act, and to act at once,
the Commandant could hardly have ventured to
take a line of his own and to suffer our Mission to
go by, when he had been directed to pass nobody.
It is with the principal, and not with the subordi
nate, that the responsibility must therefore rest. If,
indeed, we were to suffer an outrage at all, it
could hardly have been inflicted with more polite
ness than Commandant F aiz M ahomed seems to
have done us the favour to display. That he re
ceived the thanks of Major C avagnari for his cour
tesy and that the Mission was at once dissolved
f are facts which may be taken to show
what the transaction really was. The Mis-
>j, sion was dissolved because it was S here
-f Axi who had turned it back, and not a possibly
wilful and headstrong officer, whose conduct might
be repudiated as soon as the news of what he had
done reached head-quarters at the Cabul Court.
It is of little use now to look back upon our pre-
•>. vious relations with S here A li and to ask whether
our treatment of him has been quite as wise or quite
as courteous as itmight have been. Thetime has now
f gone by at which such an inquiry could be of any
practical use. We must start with the 21st of Sep
tember, and with the policy to which the proceed
ings of that day have now unalterably committed us.
Little as we may like the prospect of an Afghan war,
and great as must be the burden which it will entail,
i it is no longer within our power to decline war, if
war is offered us. The only alternative would be
that we should obtain the results of war by
some other and less troublesome method. But it
is not with us that the issue can be thought to rest.
The letters which our Envoy is bringing with him
will determine our conduct in one way or in another.
If, as we may suppose, they should not give proof
of an altered disposition in S here A li and of
a willingness to do now what he has refused
to do hitherto, our course is clear before
us. We have gone so far that it would
be simply impossible for us to draw back. What
ever our delay may mean, it does not mean
that we can have any thought of this. If we
are slow in setting to work, it is only because we
are determined that the work shall be done tho-
^ roughly, and shall not be so left that it will
need to be done again by and by. Our expe
rience of Afghan warfare has taught us a
good many things, and it has taught us, not least
how little, with due precautions, an Afghan enemy
is to be dreaded. Of S here A li's power to offer
us resistance we are not yet fully informed. His =
authority may prove to be much more slender than
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4? '(eg) sauref qSats ^jg) ^aoofli sioubjj ojSa;
r 8 '(IS) nMoag {©ignis '( T g) GAoqtj oqa jo
jo 'jtypmn,! qSnjj p|iqo eao pun 'paujBca '(gg) Altnmx • A
H 3 '• (61) 3nip«jj qefosop jponaeag ^ papisa 'j '0i3a|
Pf ''OS) jCagop nmniAi • (6T(q»FA PW ■ oapnpatqrf jo os]
LONDON, MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1878.
Our Darjeeling telegram of this morning throws
all obtainable light on the Afghan question up to
the date at which our Correspondent is writing. It
gives us the exact story of the repulse of our Mis
sion by the Afghan Commandant at Ali Musjid. It
tells us of the military preparations which the Indian
Government is making with a view of being in readi
ness for whatever turn affairs may take. It contradicts,
partly in express terms, partly by its mere silence,
some exciting reports which have been circulating,
both in this country and in India, during the course
of the past week. For further and more definite
news we must be content to wait a little longer. The
V icekoy's Envoy is on his way back from Cabul,
I and he brings with him the A meer's replies to the
V iceboy's letters. In another day or two these will
"be in the hands of the Indian Government, and
We shall then know certainly the disposition of
the A meek himself and the line of policy which it
will be necessary for us to follow. It is still open
to the A meer to disclaim the deeds of his subordi
nate and to make reparation for them by a full
submission to our demands. That he will choose
this course is possible, but it is, we fear, far from
likely. Nothing has yet occurred which could be
expected to lead him to so. decided a change of
front. "Whatever motives he may have had for
resisting us in the past are still as strong as they
liave ever been. His confidence in himself and
jin his friends must have been very slender indeed
if it has given way already at the bare rumours
of our uncompleted military preparations. That
he should send an answer of any kind is a new
piece of civility, and is welcome so far ; but
the safe return of the bearer will not improbably
prove to be the most satisfactory part of the whole .
business. There will be work found for our soldiers
In any case. If the A meer continues obstinate, it 1
will be necessary to bring him to reason by force. |
If he yields without fighting, we shall still need
men to occupy the new line of frontier which we j
intend to substitute for our present one, or to
hold the advanced stations at which we may insist
that our presence is to be permitted. At the present
jnoment there is no news either way. We have
made no attempt to strike a first blow and to obtain
the prestige of a first success, at the risk, of course,
of the discredit of a first failure. There are, as
our Correspondent points out, sufficient reasons
why nothing of the kind has been tried. If we are
forced to make war on Afghanistan, we shall pro.
laably set to work in the slow, safe way in which we
conducted our campaign in Abyssinia. We shall
liave a more difficult task before us, but one easily
within our power to bring with certainty to the
same successful issue. We shall lose nothing by
waiting a few weeks, or even a few months. We
often hear of the peculiarities of the Asiatic mind,
and of the absolute necessity of doing something
Startling with the view of duly impressing it with
% sense of the reality of our strength. It would
be better, on any calculation, to allow the most
erroneous ideas to prevail for a time over the
Imaginative and unreasoning East rather than to
furnish good ground for a slighting estimate by
attempting some feat which we failed, for any
reason, to carry through. Small, too, as the chance
may be that the A meer will give way before we
begin actually to move, it would be unwise to de-
Btroy it by moving immediately. In one way, and
in one only, can our hand be forced. If the
A meer attacks any of the hill tribes beyond our
own frontier which have declared themselves
friendly to us, it will become our duty to support
them at once and at almost any hazard. There
would really be no choice left us in the matter. An
attack upon our allies is the same thing as an attack
upon ourselves. If we were to abandon them with
out an effort to protect them, we should make
thereby a confession of weakness or untrustworthi.
ness which would be more justly fatal to our influ
ence than any partial defeat could be. There is a
report, our Correspondent states, that some such
movement has been made by the A meer's troops^
but it has not been authenticated, and,as we hear of
no corresponding movements on our part, we may
assume that it ia not true.
The full story of the affair of the 21st of Septem
ber, and of the manner in which the advanced
guard of our Mission was received at Ali Musjid, is
told at length in our Correspondent's despatch. It
gives one or two important variations upon what
has hitherto been the accepted version. The inter
view between jJajor Cavagnari and the Com
mandant of the fort is set before us in picturesque /
detail, and with less staring colours than have been \
somewhat needlessly added to it. The fact remains
unshaken that our representatives were refused a
passage, and that the refusal, although not specially '
directed by S here A li, was in accordance with the
general orders by which the Commandant at Ali j
Musjid was bound. When the solid part of
the alfrout remains it may be thought a
matter of small consequence that the mere
outlines should be toned down. Our Mission
was not suffered to pass. As far as it is any
satisfaction that the passage was blocked with all
due civility of forms,our Correspondent's letter will
be found to furnish it. The Commandant of Ali Mus
jid is not shown as swaggering and blustering and
regretting the ties of friendship which prevented
him from shooting down our representative on the
spot. Once, and opce only, does there seem to
have been a little outburst of temper ; but it was
not lasting, and it can scarcely count for much. .
But whatever blame we are enabled to withdraw
from S here A li's officer must be borne by S here
A li himself. If the Commandant at Ali Musjid
could possibly be thought to have been wrought upon
by his own hostile feelings, and to have gone, conse
quently, beyond his orders, the whole matter would
admit more easily of being explained away. But
it is clear that he had no choice, except to act pre
cisely as he did. We would not permit him
to send a messenger to Cabul, and to wait
instructions on our case. The A meer, we knew, had
nothing to learn of which he was not already well
informed, aud t he delay, the refore, would have been
useless. Thus compelled to act, and to act at once,
the Commandant could hardly have ventured to
take a line of his own and to suffer our Mission to
, go bj', when he had been directed to pass nobody, f;
It is with the principal, and not with the subordi- -
nate, that the responsibility must therefore rest. If, I
indeed, we were to suffer an outrage at all, it '
could hardly have been inflicted with more polite
ness than Commandant F aiz M ahomed seems to
have done us the favour to display. That he re
ceived the thanks of Major C avagnari for his cour
tesy and that the Mission was at once dissolved
are facts which may be taken to show
what the transaction really was. The Mis- ■
sion was dissolved because it was S heke
A li who had turned it back, and not a possibly
wilful and headstrong officer, whose conduct might '
be repudiated as soon as the news of what he had j
done reached head-quarters at the Cabul Court.
It is of little use now to look back upon our pre- j
vious relations with S here A li and to ask whether ,
[ our treatment of him has been quite as wise or quite ,
as courteous as itmight have been. Thetime has now j
" gone by at which such an inquiry could be of any j
practical use. We must start with the 21st of Sep
tember, and with the policy to which the proceed
ings of that day have now unalterably committed us.
Little as we may like the prospect of an Afghan war,
and great as must be the burden which it will entail,
S it is no longer within our power to decline war, if
war is offered us. The only alternative would be
that we should obtain the results of war by
some other and less troublesome method. But it
is not with us that the issue can be thought to rest.
The letters which our Envoy is bringing with him
will determineour conduct in one way or in another.
If, as we may suppose, they should not give proof
of an altered disposition in S here A li and of I
a willingness to do now what he has refused
to do hitherto, our course is clear before ;
us. We have gone so far that it would
be simply impossible for us to draw back. What
ever our delay may mean, it does not mean
that we can have any thought of this. If we
; are slow in setting to work, it is only because we !
are determined that the work shall be done tho
roughly, and shall not be so left that it will
need to be done again by and by. Our expe.
rience of Afghan warfare has taught us a
good many things, and it has taught us, not least
how little, with due precautions, an Afghan enemy
is to be dreaded. Of S here A li 's power to offer
us resistance we are not yet fully informed. His
authority may prove to be much more slender than
■ it is supposed to be,< and it may disappear almost ,
entirely at the first downright shock. But,
taking it at its utmost, and supposing the
entire strength o^ Afghanistan to be ranged against
us, it is as nothing by comparison with the force at
our own command. Ihe event is certain, whether
it comes this autumn or. whether we have to wait six ^
months for it. Whether or no the same will prove
to be worth the candle must depend wholly on the
use we make of it when we have won. It is not
only in our warlike relations with Afghanistan that
the teaching of the pa^st ought to prove serviceable
to us.