Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎127r] (261/312)

monly spoke as if the conjectures made
by suspicious persons "wpre too preposterous
to call for serious refutation. Thus we find our
selves on the very verge of a -war which the
public of England never knew that we were
approaching; indeed, has had the fullest assurances
that there was not the remotest chance of war
approaching. When we engaged more than
twenty years ago in the Persian War, there was a
strong feeling entertained and expressed by
independent observers belonging to all sections
of political life because of the manner in which
the war had been undertaken without the consent
or knowledge of the people of England. But in
that case the emergency was sudden. The con
ditions which brought it about had not been anti
cipated by many,, or perhaps confidently ex
pected by any; the success was imme
diate and complete; the war was over
before most people supposed it had well begun,
! and the attention of England was quickly drawn
j away to other events of infinitely greater import
ance. Had it not been for those facts the policy
which made war without the concur
rence or knowledge of the country's representa
tives would probably have been called into much
more serious question than it actually underwent.
This present case does not furnish the Govern
ment with any of the excuses which might have
been pleaded for the statesmen who made the
Persian War. The crisis which brought on that
war was not of the making of our Government.
It came on them and they had to deal with it.
In this instance her Majesty's Ministers have
themselves brought about the crisis which they
now say compels them to act.
This is the gravest part of the accusation which
will one day or other have to be made against
| the present Government. No matter what may
1 be said of the necessity for action now imposed
[ upon them, and no matter bow they may get
j through the task they have volunteered to
j undertake, the question will still have to be asked
i —why did they enter on such a policy ? Why,
above all, did they enter on it without the con
currence of the country ? So far as we can read
the history of the recent transactions, the Govern
ment appear to have prepared step by step,
and in what we cannot help calling secrecy, for
the very crisis which has now arisen. Even if
the course they took could be shown to have been
justifiable and prudent in itself, it would cease to
be either justifiable or prudent the moment it
was undertaken without the sanction of the
English people. Of course there may be occasions
when a Government may have to decide on a
policy of warlike intervention without waiting
for the express consent of Parliament or of public
opinion. Such occasion^ surely, are very rare;
they cannot arise often in the history of a gene-
j ration; but they may arise. It will, however, be
found, we think, that when they do occur they
arise oat of one of two very different con
ditions. Either some utterly unexpected emer
gency has arisen which, not allowing
; foresight, will not wait for deliberation; or
I some new incident has come up in a
: Ions and familiar controversy. In the first
instance a Government may be compelled to act
independently of all considerations, and without
any possibility of consulting public opinion, la
' the second, the incident, although itself unex
pected, is part of a controversy so well understood
and closely followed by the country, that the
Government are fairly entitled to act in anticipa
tion of what they know public opinion would be.
Nothing could have lessjaffinity to either situation
than the condition of things to which we are now
brought. The quarrel with Shere Au was not
unexpected by the Government. On the contrary,
they had every reason to know that it must come,
and were, as we are assured, fully prepared
for it. Nor was it a controversy which
the public had followed. On the contrary, the
public knew nothing at all about it. Had it been
known that such a policy was in contemplation ai
that which the Government have pursued, it ia
certain that the voice of the vast majority of the
English people would long ago have protested
against it. If the coarse which her Majesty' s
Ministers have taken be allowed to pass
without national remonstrance, then it will be
idle to talk of this country as constitutionally
ruled, so far at least as its foreign policy is con
cerned. No despotic Power can ask more of a
; * ,, '.apBaS ^8Mo{8qj ra0J J
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SATTJBDAT
OCTOBER 12.
THE RUSSIAN SCHEME.
We yesterday surmised, in connection with
1 General Todleben's sudden halt en route for
Adrianople, that " the Czar may think that the
iipplicatiun <;f a little military pressure to the
Sultan will remove the iatter's^ objections to the
audacious project for a Russo-Turkish Treaty which |
wa : lately given to the world." The sauudness of i
this opinion i? already proved, for we leara from I
Constantinople, under date of yesterday, tbat " the
Russian troops would not be withdrawn from
Adrianople until the signature of the defini-
nitive Treaty of San Stefano which is
not affected by the decisions of the Con
gress." The Times correspondent who telegraphs
, this piece of information says he has 1'eason to b3-
lieve tbat the Russian Ambassador's aim is simply
to get the definitive treaty signed as speedily as pos
sible. This coincides exactly with the view we ex
pressed yesterday, for there cannot be much doubt ,
tbat the " definitive treaty " spoken of is the |
same as the project for a Russo-Turkish i
treaty which lately w^nt the round of Europe |
as a feeler of opinion. Tnere is, however, on3 I
difference, and a rather important one too, beLwet u
tbis morning's news and tbat which we commented
on yesterday. Prince Lobanoff is now represented '
as warning the Porte that the Muscovite fors s will
not retire beyond Adrianople. whereas the previous
statement was tbat G.meral Todleben bad halted i
south of that city for the purpose of affording pro
tection to the panic-stricken Obristian popu- i
lation. This latter pretext seems to have
been dropped by the Russian Ambassador,
who takes his stand on those parts of the
San Stefano Treaty which were not set aside by the
Berlin Congress. Preferable as this new frankness
j is to the previous subterfuge, Europe will see with
i grave another coavinciBsr nroof that the
1 Czar does not intend to quit his hold on Turkey.
; Smce the Congress broke up events have happened
which have altered the situation of affairs greatly
to the advantage of Russia. Only two Powers,
Austria and England, showed themselves really
determined to resort to arms sooner than accept the
Sjn Stefano arrangement in its entirety as a part
of the public law of Europe. At that time, both
countries had their hands free and the whole of
their resources available to counteract Russian
aggression. But while, in the one case, the occupa
tion of Bosnia has proved a far different matter from
that military promenade which was confidently cxh
pected in some quarters, in the other the conduct of
Shere Ali has raised a difficulty for England in
•the far East which seems nearly certain to
lead to immediate warfare. Thus, Russia's
two stoutest opponents are more or less em-
barrassed by unforeseen complications, and
the St. Petersburg Cabinet accordingly takes
i advantage of the opportunity to force the Sultan
| to sign a treaty which, as we have pi-eviously shown,
; would afford Russia chronic grounds for interference
j in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In
other words, the main object of the Berlin compact,
namely, the future freedom of Turkey from the
domination of her aggressive neighbour, will remain
almost as unaccomplished as if the Congress had
never met.
Of course Russia has every right to endeavour to
secure what she considers her necessary objects, but
it is equally within the province and the duty of other
Powers to counteract these designs whenever their
own interests are threatened. It can scarcely be
doubted tbat the Sc. Petersburg Cabinet is now
carrying out a well matured policy, conceived,
perhaps, at the very time when Russij, had to accept
the outward appearance of humiliation by being
compelled to submit her arrangement with Turkey to
the opinion of united Europe. According to the
most trustworthy authorities, ic was Prince Gorts-
chakoff and hia able colleagues who chiefly in
fluenced Count AndrassjiT to undertake the occupa
tion of Bosnia and thft Hei zejrovina. The Russian
Plenipotentiaries well knew that even if this measure
d:d not meet with strenuous resistance on the part
or the Mahomedan population it would be certain to
breed internal dissensions in the Austro-Iiungarian
Monarchy. There was also the chance t&at the Sultan
would refuse to consent to this arbitrary alienation
monly spoke as if the conjectures made
I by suspicious persons wpre too preposterous
to call for serious refutation. Thus we find our
selves on the very verge of a vrar which the
public of England never knew that we were
approaching; indeed,has had the fullest assurances
that there was not the remotest chance of war
approaching. When we engaged more than
twenty years ago in the Persian War, there was a
strong feeling entertained and expressed by
independent observers belonging to all sections
of political life because of the manner in which
the war had been undertaken without the consent
or knowledge of the people of England. But in
that case the emergency was sudden. The con
ditions which brought it about had not been anti
cipated by many, or perhaps confidently ex
pected by any; the success was imme
diate and complete; the war was over
i before most people supposed it had well begun,
i and the attention of England was quickly drawn
away to other events of infinitely greater import
ance. Had it not been for those facts the policy
which made war without the concur
rence or knowledge of the country's representa
tives would probably have been called into much
more serious question than it actually underwent.
This present case does not furnish the Govern
ment with any of the excuses which might have
been pleaded for the statesmen who made the
Persian War. The crisis which brought on that
war was not of the making of our Government.
It came on them and they had to deal with it.
In this instance her Majesty's Ministers have
themselves brought about the crisis which they
now say compels them to act.
This is the gravest part of the accusation which
will one day or other have to be made against
the present Government. No matter what may
' be said of the necessity for action now imposed
j upon them, and no matter bow they may get
I through the task they have volunteered to
j undertake, the question will still have to be asked
i —why did they enter on such a policy ? Why,
above all, did they enter on it without the con
currence of the country ? So far as we can read
the history of the recent transactions, the Govern
ment appear to have prepared step by step,
and in what we cannot help calling secrecy, for
the very crisis which has now arisen. Even if
the course they took could be shown to have been
justifiable and prudent in itself, it would cease to
be either justifiable or prudent the moment it
was undertaken without the sanction of the
English people. Of course there may be occasions
when a Government may have to decide on a
policy of warlike intervention without waiting
for the express consent of Parliament or of public
opinion. Such occasion^ surely, are very rare;
they cannot arise often in the history of a gene-
; ration; but they may arise. It will, however, be
found, we think, that when they do occur they
arise out of one of two very different con
ditions. Either some utterly unexpected emer
gency has arisen which, not allowing
foresight, will not wait for deliberation; or
some new incident has come up in a
long: and familiar controversy. In the first
instance a Government may be compelled to act
j independently of all considerations, and without
any possibility of consulting public opinion. la
' the second, the incident, although itself unex
pected, is part of a controversy so well understood
and closely followed by the country, that the
Government are fairly entitled to act in anticipa
tion of what they know public opinion would be.
Nothing could have lessiaffinity to either sifcuatioa
than the condition of things to which we are now
brought. The quarrel with SHERE A li was not
unexpected by the Government. On the contrary,
they had every reason to know that it must come,
and were, as we are assured, fully prepared
for it. Nor was it a controversy which
the public had followed. On the contrary, the
public knew nothing at all about it. Had it been
known that such a policy was in contemplation as
that which the Government have pursued, it ia
certain that the voice of the vast majority of the
English people would long ago have protested
against it. If the course which her Majesty' s
Ministers have taken be allowed to pass
without national remonstrance, then it will be
idle to talk of this country as constitutionally
ruled, so far at least as its foreign policy is con
cerned. No despotic Power can ask more of a
people than the right to make what policy and
what wars it pleases, without entering into any
consultation of the popular will or applying for
the consent of any representative institution.
SA TURD A Y EVENING,
OCTOBER 13.
THE RUSSIAN SCHEME.
We yesterday surmised, in connection with
General Todleben's sudden halt en route for
Adrianople, that " the Czar may think that the
iipplicatiun of a little military pressure to the
Sultan will remove the Jatter's objections to the
audacious project for a Russo-Turkish Treaty which
wa lately given to the world." The sauudness of
tbis opinion is already proved, for we lear i from
Constantinople, under date of yesterday, that " the
Russian troops would not be withdrawn from
Adrianople until the signature of the defini-
nitive Treaty of San Stefano which is
not affected by the decisions of the Con
gress." The Times correspondent who telegraphs
j this piece of information Buys he has reason to ba-
lieve that the Russian Ambassador's aim is simply
to get the definitive treaty signed as speedily as poa>
sible. This coincides exactly with the view we ex«-
pressed yesterday, for there cannot be much doubt ,
that the "definitive treaty" spoken of is the i
same as the project for a Russo-Turkish j
treaty which lately w^nt the round of Europe
as a feeler of opinion. Tnere is, however, ona
difference, and a rather important one too, betwei n
this morning's news and that which we commented
on yesterday. Prince Lobanoef is now represented
as warning the Porte that the Muscovite fovrjs will
nob retii'e beyond Adrianople. whereas the previous
statement was that General Todleben had halted
south of that city for the purpose of affording pro
tection to the panic-stricken Christian popu- i
lation. This latter pretext seems to have
I been dropped by the Russian Ambassador,
who takes his stand on those parts of the
San Stefano Treaty which were not set aside by the
j Berlin Congress. Preferable as this new frankness
is to the previous subterfuge, Europe will see with
i §vave another conyinckiff nroof that the
1 Czar does not intend to quit his hold on Turkey.
Since the Congress broke up events have happened
which have altered the situation of affairs greatly
to the advantage of Russia. Only two Powers,
Austria and England, showed themselves really
determined to resort to arms sooner than accept the
Sjn Stefano arrangement in its entirety as a part
of the public law of Europe. At that time, both
countries had their hands free and the whole of
their resources available to counteract Russian
aggression. But while, in the one case, the occupa
tion of Bosnia has proved a far different matter from
that military promenade which was confidently ex-i
pected in some quarters, in the other the conduct of
Shere Ali has raised a difficulty for England ia
•the far East which seems nearly certain to
i lead to immediate warfare. Thus, Russia'a
j two stoutest opponents are more or less em-
j barrassed by unforeseen complications, and
j the St. Petersburg Cabinet accordingly takes
j advantage of the opportunity to force the Sultaw
| to sign a treaty which, as we have previously shown,
would afford Russia chronic grounds for interference
| in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In
other words, the main object of the Berlin compact,
namely, the future freedom of Turkey from tho
domination of her aggressive neighbour, will remain
almost as unaccomplished as if the Congress had
never met.
Of course Russia has every right to endeavour to
secure what she considers her necessary objects, but
it is equally within the province and the duty of other
Powers to counteract these designs whenever their
own interests are threatened. It can scarcely be
doubted that the Sc. Petersburg Cabinet is now
carrying out a well matured policy, conceived,
perhaps, at the very time when Russia, had to accept
the outward appearance of humiliation by being
compelled to submit her arrangement wit h Turkey to
the opinion of united Europe. According to the
most trustworthy authorities, ic was Prince Gorts-
chakoff and his able colleagues who chiefly in
fluenced Count ANDRASSif to undertake the occupa
tion of Bosnia and thfi Herzegovina. The Russian
Plenipotentiaries well knew that even if this measure
d;d not meet with strenuous resistance on the part
of the Mahomedan population it would be certain to
breed internal dissensions in the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy. There was also the chance tuat the Sultan
would refuse to consent to this arbitrary alienation