Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎126v] (260/312)

secution. The " peace with honour " which was
^ brought back hither from Berlin had better lose
its first than its last characteristic, and it were
better that the " state of war" with which Prince
L obanoff menaces the Sultan should be roundly
recognised than that Great Britain should look
on while the provisions enforced upon Russia at
Berlin are openly set at naught. One of the
first measures adopted by her Majesty's Mini
sters, if this intelligence is confirmed, ought to be
the return of our Fleet to the vicinity of Constan
tinople, together with its strong and immediate
reinforcement. Any feebleness in our action
against one flank of this vast Russian plot will
only enhance the difficulties to be encountered
at the other; while, if we are firm with Prince
G tORTsciiakoff in Roumelia, the advantages of
that policy will quickly be seen in Cabul. The
intimate connection between Russia's breach of
her pledge as regards Afghanistan, and her con
tempt for international faith as regards the
evacuation of Turkish territory, is no longer
matter of doubt. No temporising or tentative
steps will therefore serve to uphold the security
and credit of Great Britain, cajoled and defied,
as she is, along the whole line of her Oriental
interests from the Bosphorus to the Khyber Pass.
The Czar's Government must be compelled to
observe its contract to the letter in all dates
and details of the evacuation of European
Turkey, just as surely as his agents must be
made to, withdraw from Afghanistan, never
again to re-enter it, except with British permis
sion. In five years' time this programme of
resolute right and wise insistance might indeed
become difficult of execution, but the case is not
i so now, when Russia is labouring under financial
! embarrassmeut and internal disaffection, and
carries on her twofold plot in the trust that she
may obtain by audacity what she has not strength
enough left to snatch by force. To a firm front
opposed by Turkey, with the support of Eng
land, Prince G ortschakoff will most probably
at once yield. But the language employed by
the Q ueen's Ministers must in any case be un
mistakable, and the retreat of Russia from her
aggression through Cabul and from her present
attempt upon the validity of the Berlin Treaty
ought to be made as public as her assault upon
our peace in India and her machinations against
our honour and interests at Constantinople.
ENGLAND AND AFG HANISTAN. 1
STRENGTHENING OF THE IHYBER
GARRISON,
INTENDED ADVANCE OF BRITISH
TROOPS.
(BY EASTERN TELEGRAPH.)
(from our special correspondent. )
„ SIMLA, EEIDAT EvBiriiro,
The Ameer makes no sjign. He has, however, I
greatly strengthened the Khyber garrison.
a|93«a ]dd s^sanS avoj v q,doi{ ^nq 'jnoq -[sSo^ eqcj.
^naraqsi^qmsa erq jo aoop ^ uojj 9q^ posop uBoiiqnd
Y 'jxre^aoduii sso^ 'sssbo seaq.) ao OAvq. ©.re
•ooT^snf jo jCjuSajui
0t ft i0 J AT- 111089 011 s t .to 'psuxnua^ap uaaq
sauq o'} ijqSno !jmod estJO au« ui ^nq jaq;o
eqi jo ano— paTji ^snf xyibi>a| sbaj. jfaqo o\ pifenjaj
s £ .to|[aou , EqC) ei R 10 'paiiaqo traaq ©Asq oj ^qiJno
pu« jtqnSa.! s«Ai. suomiuns ^.cq^ aaq^xg; ^dma^uoo
q^iM. suorarans siq o; ssau^TAv v Qtraaad o?
?ou 'aoi^snC jo asmoo ajoqAi. aq^aoj os^t? $iiq ^jiioo
havo sxq jo A^uoq^nB aq^ joj .(|uo }oa 'aou^aodnii:
^som^n aq; jo b'bat ij'Bq^ pappe eAt?q ptnoA\ eq
niq ; uoi^cutjjap joj ui a ^uapaoaad jo pasu xn
AJJO'BSO }oa sttM. Xa^unoo aq} ^qj pi«s aATiq
ppiOAV oq anouoq jo asaas Jinv pwq puq aSpuCj
.suirptsaad eq) jj ^ jCbju. emisa oq^ tii pguos
-tjea eA«q (l aaquisqQ ,, uqjsg; oqt^ qoupjnoqs XqAV
P U V ud saaaapuBis pan saAaxq; S uij C j ; uo oS o? am
.iajj ns noinido oijqud 'easnsa Gjqtiqoad^aa ssap
naaa jo A^Tpxaii; o; paquoss oq ppiOAv aouajagipui
Am ^uq) uoi^tsod ut q2tq os snosjad jo s^pawssn aq)
ttrojj eAoqc "a^piAm raaq; eAjasaid 50a op
J Ji 'aopsanb ui oar; 'aox^snf jo ^^niSip oq^ 'qjnoo
aui ^ jo noi^nda.i aqj;—pres aABq Xidtms ppiOAV
eq jo e< ©oaaxos ,, ©qq. ^noqo ^tiupoa SmA-kOu^j
•pasnooe aqj ^ oiauoo o ^ u«qj ^CjxuStp umo sxq o^BOxp
-11TA oj snoxxu^ aaoui nsaq ©Atiq pjnoM ptiTt 'aaq^o
oqi jo A t?av auo pa^nj oabq ppoav 'ayaavubs ?am
eAtjq pp;oM 'pnonjo qSrq « iq eocj sxq ux iiAvojq;
snq^ oijU8[Ti?qo o .ouiAwq 'aSpnf qsqgng; un ^nq^
aou«j j avojsj "pioaiaosiadaix s t JiBa^ jp?q « pui; 0110
!).ai:pucjap ^jjonpm oq^ pGoao^xiGs pan 'pma^in
ion fiBA\ at a-sm T)ar>ToaD at f qjclon o'm oa
O ur Correspondent at Simla sends us a tele
gram which is full of interest. It helps to clear
away much of the uncertainty which for a few
days hung around the condition of things at
Peshawur, and which furnished occasion or ex
cuse for various exciting and bewildering rumours.
Indeed, if we are not mistaken, some portion of
the public of London have during the past week
been reading daily accounts of great military
movements in the Khyber Pass; of for^s captured,
important positions seized, and a war in fact
already tolerably far advanced. Our Simla Cot-
, respondent tells us what has really happened.
There was, it would appear, some intention to
, make a dash and surprise the Ali Musjid fort, but
the plan has been given up. The military autho-
l rities considered the capture of Ali Musjid a useless
i performance, unless it were part of a general
j movement, and we were prepared to go
farther at once. This was exactly the opinion
which we expressed the other day when the report
came that the fort had been captured, and which
we repeated when it was made certain that the
rumour was unfounded. Our Correspondent tells
us that the original plan of combined ad
vance from two or three points will be carried
out early next month, 'as the military authorities
consider October a peculiarly unfavourable month
for operations in the Passes. An advance does not
necessarily mean, in this case we presume does
certainly not mean, an advance on Cabxil, but
only on some points that in the opinion of the
1 Viceroy and his advisers would be suitable
for the demonstration from which they are
I believed to expect so much. Many additional
regiments have been ordered for service. The forces
already sanctioned are likely, our Correspondent
believes, to be doubled. The Viceroy and his
staff will remove to Lahore next month, but the
Viceroy's Council will remain in Calcutta. The
Ameer has made no sign—that is to say, no
friendly sign. He has strengthened his force in
the Khyber Pass, and our Correspondent states
that ali hopes of a pacific settlement are at an
end. The temper of the tribes that were friendlv
to us remains, he adds, just the same, and this is
perhaps the only particularly encouraging piece of
information contained in his long and interesting
despatch. He sees no prospect of any peacefxil end
to the dispute, anticipates an immediate doubling
of the force our military authorities originally
ordered, and is plainly of opinion that long and
troublesome operations are to be expected. All
this is the result of a controversy which most
persons are satisfied ought never to have been
entered upon, and which when entered upon
was conducted with a laok of discretion and a pro
fusion of something veryJLike discourtesy well cal
culated to bring any discussion to an unsatisfactory
conclusion. Were we at aloss to accoxznt for the atti
tude of Shere Ali, explanation enough might be
found in the fact that in all probability he in
ferred from the proceedings and the demeanour of
the Indian Government a determination to make
war on him in any case, and he therefore believed
that there was nothing to be gained by any attempt
at compromise or conciliation.
We are going to war with Sherb Ali, if we are
to regard war as unavoidable, in a quarrel and for
a pxirpose which are disapproved by the highest
authority on Indian policy now in England-we
were going to say, now alive. Other men, not
perhaps of authority as high as Lord Lawrence,
but whose judgment on Indian affairs every one
respects, have added their influence to his in
warnings which we fear will prove now too late,
against the coxxrse of policy on which the Govern
ment appear to have long since entered. There
were indeed warnings given long before, but they
were founded on conjecture, not on certainty;
and they were readily met by assurances that her
Majesty's Ministers had no such purpose
as that ascribed to them. There was no
way of bringing public opinion to bear upon the
plans of the Government, for the plans were not
known, and every tendency to such a purpose was
disavowed as soon as it was conjectured. The one
thing on which the public in general seem to have"
made up their mind was that the policy of inter
vention in the affairs of Afghanistan was abso
lutely a thing of the past. Most men would as
soon have expected to hear of a new French
project for the invasion of Mexico as an English
plan for an invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore
such warnings as were given failed to arouse much
attention. When a member of the Government
had to say anything on the subject he com-
secution. The " peace with honour " which was
brought back hither from Berlin had better lose
its first than its last characteristic, and it were
better that the " state of war" with which Prince
L obanoff menaces the Sultan should be roundly
recognised than that Great Britain should look
on while the provisions enforced upon Russia at
Berlin are openly set at naught. One of the
first measures adopted by her Majesty's Mini
sters, if this intelligence is confirmed, ought to bo
the return of our Fleet to the vicinity of Constan
tinople, together with its strong and immediate
reinforcement. Any feebleness in our action
against one flank of this vast Russian plot will
only enhance the difficulties to be encountered
at the other ; while, if we are firm with Prince
GrORTSCHAKOFF in Roumelia, the advantages of
that policy will quickly be seen in Cabul. The
intimate connection between Russia's breach of
her pledge as regards Afghanistan, and her con
tempt for international faith as regards the
evacuation of Turkish territory, is no longer
matter of doubt. No temporising or tentative
steps will therefore serve to uphold the security
and credit of Great Britain, cajoled and defied,
as she is. along the whole line of her Oriental
interests from the Bosphorus to the Khyber Pass.
The Czar's Government must be compelled to
observe its contract to the letter in all dates
and details of the evacuation of European
Turkey, just as surely as his agents must be
made to. withdraw from Afghanistan, never
again to re-enter it, except with British permis
sion. In five years' time this programme of
resolute right and wise insistance might indeed:
| become difficult of execution, but the case is not
i so now, when Russia is labouring under financial
I embarrassment and internal disaffection, and
carries on her twofold plot in the trust that she
may obtain by audacity what she has not strength
enough left to snatch by force. To a firm front
opposed by Turkey, with the support of Eng
land, Prince G ortschakofp will most probably
at once yield. But the language employed by
the Q ueen's Ministers must in any case be un
mistakable, and the retreat of Russia from her
aggression through Cabul and from her present
attempt upon the validity of the Berlin Treaty
ought to be made as public as her assault upon
our peace in India and her machinations against
our honour and interests at Constantinople.
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
STEENGTHENIVG OF THE EHYBEIi
GARRISON.
INTENDED ADTANCE OF BRITISH
TROOPS.
(BT EASTERN TELEGRAPH.)
(FfiOAt OUR SPECIAL OQRRESPONDENT.)
SIMLA, E eidat E vrning.
The Ameer makes no sign. He has, however,
greatly strengthened the Khyber garrison.
AU pacific hopes are ended.
There is no news of the "Wroy's Envoy;
in faot, no trustworthy news whatever from
Cabul,
The meditated surprise of Ali Musjid has been
abandoned. The military considered it useless unless
we were prepared to proceed beyond. October i 8
a deadly month in the Phss to troops occupying
it. The original programme of a combined
advance at two or three different points early in
November will be adhered to. Preparations to
that end are being vigorously carried on,
Ihe temper of th© frontier tribes remains
friendly.
Many additional regiments have been ordered
for service. The force of 13,000 already sanc
tioned is likely to be doubled.
The Viceroy and the military and foreign,
secretaries and military members of the Council, |
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Punjab will proceed to Lahore
next month. The Ticeroy's Couacil will meet in
Calcutta as usual.
(BY SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH.)
(PROM OUR OWTST CORRESPOJTDEJST.)
n BERLIN, F eidat N ight.
Considerable discussion is ^oin^ on in the
Russian Press over the question whether or no
Russia ought to give the Ameer of Afghanistan
aid m the coming conflict with England. Various
shades of opinion are represented, the extreme
anti-English view being apparently that of the
St. Petersburg Exchange Gazette, which, assuming
that General* Chamberlain's military mission was
undertaken because the Ameer had refused to
expel the Russian envoy on the demand of the
Viceroy, and that it was arrested because its
military character made it a species of menace,
declares that it would be pusillanimous for Russia
to abandon a friend who had got into trouble on
her account.
(THROUGH REUTER's AGENCY An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. .)
^ , BOMBAY, Oor. 11.
The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore states
that General Haines will take the command at
Peshawur. The force is composed of 35,000 men.
An outbreak of hostilities is regarded as inevitable.
It is believed that Ali Musjid is armed with
stronger guns than was expected.
The Afghans are practising with heavy guns in
the Khyber Pass.
The garrison of Peshawar is being strongly
reinforced.
Our Correspondent at Simla sends us a tele
gram which is full of interest. It helps to dear
away much of the uncertainty which for a few
days hung around the condition of things at
Peshawur, and which furnished occasion or ex
cuse for various exciting and bewildering rumours.
Indeed, if we are not mistaken, some portion of
the public of London have during the past week
been reading daily accounts of great military
movements in the Khyber Pass; of forts captured,
important positions seized, and a war in fact
already tolerably far advanced. Our Simla Cor
respondent tells us what has really happened.
There was, it would appear, some intention to
make a dash and surprise the Ali Musjid fort, but
the plan has been given up. The military autho
rities considered the capture of Ali Musjid a useless
performance, unless it were part of a general
; movement, and we were prepared to go
farther at once. This was exactly the opinion
which we expressed the other day when the report
came that the fort had been captured, and which
we repeated when it was made certain that the
rumour was unfounded. Our Correspondent tells
us that the original plan of combined ad
vance from two or three points will be carried
out early next month, 'as the military authorities
consider October a peculiarly unfavourable month
for operations in the Passes. An advance does not
necessarily mean, in this case we presume does
certainly not mean, an advance on Cabul, but
only on some points that in the opinion of the
| Viceroy and his advisers would be suitable
for the demonstration from which they are
I believed to expect so much. Many additional
regiments have been ordered for service. The forces
already sanctioned are likely, our Correspondent
believes, to be doubled. The Viceroy and his
staff will remove to Lahore next month, but the
Viceroy's Council will remain in Calcutta. The
Ameer has made no sign—that is to say, no
friendly sign. He has strengthened his force in
the Khyber Pass, and our Correspondent states
that all hopes of a pacific settlement are at an
end. The temper of the tribes that were friendly
to us remains, he adds, just the same, and this is
perhaps the only particularly encouraging piece of
information contained in his long and interesting
despatch. He sees no prospect of any peaceful end
to the dispute, anticipates an immediate doubling
of the force our military authoritiea originally
ordered, and is plainly of opinion that long and
troublesome operations are to be expected. All
this is the result of a controversy which most
persons are satisfied ought never to have been
entered upon, and which when entered upon
was conducted with a laok of discretion and a pro
fusion of something very like discourtesy well cal
culated to bring any discussion to an unsatisfactory
conclusion. Were we at a loss to account for the atti
tude of Shere Ali , explanation enough might be
found in the fact that in all probability he in
ferred from the proceedings and the demeanour of
the Indian Government a determination to make
war on him in any case, and he therefore believed
that there was nothing to be gained by any attempt
at compromise or conciliation.
We are going to war with Sherb Ali , if we are
to regard war as unavoidable, in a quarrel and for
a purpose which are disapproved by the highest
authority on Indian policy now in England—we
were going to say, now alive. Other men, not
perhaps of authority as high as Lord Lawrence,
but whose judgment on Indian affairs every one
respects, have added their influence to his in
warnings which we fear will prove now too late,
against the course of policy on which the Govern
ment appear to have long since entered. There
were indeed warnings given loug before, but they
were founded on conjecture, not on certainty ;
and they were readily met by assurances that her
Majesty's Ministers had no such purpose
as that ascribed to them. There was no
way of bringing public opinion to bear upon the
plans of the Government, for the plans were not
known, and every tendency to such a purpose was
disavowed as soon as it was conjectured. The one
thing on which the public in general seem to have
made up their mind was that the policy of inter
vention in the affairs of Afghanistan was abso
lutely a thing of the past. Most men would as
soon have expected to hear of a new French
project for the invasion of Mexico as an English
plan for an invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore
such warnings as were given failed to arouse much
attention. When a member of the Government
had to say anything on the subject he com-