Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎123v] (254/312)

AFGHANISTAN.
The news which was circulated yesterday to
the effect that General Ross's column had passed
the fort of Ali Musjid and that Daka would
be carried to-day at any cost must be re
ceived with extreme caution. War is the time and
India the place for rumours. Even in periods of
the most profound peace Oriental bazaars are
always full of the most incredible tales, every im
probable story is vouched for as true, and to any
but a person well versed in Eastern ways the task
of separating the wheat from the chaff is simply
herculean.
Daka, as we have already stated, is a small town !
in Momund territory, containing about 1,200 in- '
habitants. It is situated on the right bank of the
Cabul river,about a couple of miles from the western
or Afghan entrance of the Khyber Pass. Lalpura,
the capital town of the Momunds, is on the opposite
bank of the river, and between the two places there
is a ferry. There is a road from this point to the
Peshawur valley, by which Ali Musjid could be
turned, entering our territory at Michnee ; but this
runs in its entirety through the Momund lands,
and could not be made use of at the present junc
ture on account of the openly avowed hostility of
that tribe. Michnee (a small fort situated about
16 miles to the north of Jamrood) was built in
order to hold in check the Momunds, and it was
the scene of a very sharp encounter between our
troops and the Shah Moosa Khel section of that
clan in August, 1854. The road from this place
runs nearly in a due westerly direction; little is
known of it except that it is quite impracticable for
guns. Masson, who apparently traversed it, states
that it is only suitable for a lightly equipped column,
and as such it might certainly be made use of to
effect a diversion, while the main attack was being
developed on Ali Musjid ; but it is difficult
to conceive that General Ross, with the small
force at his disposal for an advance, which
cannot amount to 6,000 men, even if he has
received reinforcements from Nowshera and
Rawul Pindee, should venture 30 miles into
an enemy's country, leaving between him and
his base the fort in the middle of the Khyber,which
is said to be garrisoned by 8,000 men with 28 guns.
The task of keeping open his communications
through the Momund hills, of escorting supplies,
and of repelling the constant attacks of the moun
taineers, who would assuredly harass him
most venomously, is one that would require a
stronger force than is at present cantoned at
Peshawur. A delay in the hills would be fatal, and
any interruption of his commissariat supplies would
entail on General Ross the same ignominious fate
that overtook Colonel Moseley six and-twenty years
ago. We cannot afford to run any risks now. Taking
into consideration the absence of any official an
nouncement on the subject, and the extreme im
probability of such a step being taken just at pre
sent, we still maintain that the attitude on the
border is merely one of armed expectation, and
that nothing beyond active military preparations
will be heard of for some weeks to come.
The forward movement of a couple of battalions
to Thull from Kohat is merely in conformity with
the general advance to our immediate border-line
from Gilgit to Quettah. Thull has been pre
viously described; it lies on the extreme frontier,
about 66 miles south-west of Kohat, 40 north of
Bunnoo, 170 east of Oabul, and 200 from
Ghuznee. Being in our territory, it has
often .been the scene of encampments of
Native troops, though as yet no British corps
has visited it. Sir Neville Chamberlain made it
his base in the operations up the Khorum Valley in
1855, as well as when he marched against the
Kabul-Khel Vaziris in 1859 ; General Keyes's force
also rested here in the Miranzae expedition of
1869. Dr. Bellew, who halted here when on his
road to Ghuznee with Lumsden's mission in 1857,
states that there would be much difficulty in finding
camping-ground for a large force at this spot, while
Sir Herbert Edwardes describes the place as a wilder
ness to any but a savage. Its proximity, however,
to the Ameer's troops even now io the Khorum
fort, and the fact that this route has been selected
for one of the expeditionary columns, has made it
necessary for us to occupy it, and it is for this
reason that a portion of the Kohat garrison has been
pushed forward, and not to herald any immediate
advance on to the Shutar Gardan.
It is the feeling that a check at the outset of the
war would be provocative perhaps of further disas
ters which is paramount in the minds of those who
are intimately acquainted with the Punjab border.
This it is that has imbued Lord Lytton with caution,
and induces him to spend his time in perfecting
his commissariat and transport arrangements rather
than to waste it in dashing fruitlessly into a wild
mountainous land,exposed to possibility of reverse. I
The columns will be dependent entirely on them
selves for food for man and fodder for beast. A small
quantity of supplies may be obtainable at Jelalabad
and at Azim Khan-ke-Killa, in the Khorum Valley,
but it will not be safe to count even upon this ;
while betweenQuettah and Jacobabad or Quettah and
Dera Ghazee Khan there is absolutely nothing to
be obtained. Those accustomed to march in
countries where cities are plentifully scattered
are unable to understand the enormous diffi
culty that attaches to the task of feeding an
army in a sparsely populated land. Not _ only
will transport have to be provided for ammunition,
warlike and medical stores, engineer equipment,
telegraph and pontoon trains, but provisions for
fighting men and camp followers for certainly a
month must also accompany the army. It is not to be :
wondered at, then, that the commissariat officers on !
the frontier have experienced some difficulty in |
obtaining a sufficient number of beasts of
burden for the large forces now being assembled.
We soon shall hear of this difficulty being over
come. District officials before this are scouring the
jungles for all available camels, mules, and yaboos,
and when once the civilian element comes forward
to aid the military in war preparations, success
ppeedily follows.
Once more we would caution the public against
accepting implicitly the numerous rumours that
from time to time will most certainly be telegraphed
home during the forthcoming operations. Bazaar
stories are proverbially baseless, or, at any rate,
grossly exaggerated. A reconnoitring party pushing
up the Abkhana road would easily be converted
into a general advance on Daka before the tale
left the Peshawur streets. The country in which
our troops are about to operate is a most difficult
one—not even the study of large scale maps will
teach a man the topography of the Sufaidkoh or
Suliman ranges, where difficulties occur at every
yard. Gradients to be eased off, roads to be
made, gorges to be widened, streams to be
bridged,—these are the tasks < our Engineers j
and Infantry working parties will have before j
them before they see even Daka. At every
ascent drag-ropes will be required for the guns j
at every descent the horses will have to be eased
of the strain. If our troops average ten miles per
diem in traversing either the Khorum or the
Khyber roads,the country will have good reason to
be proud of them, for the difficulties will not only
be those encountered in surmounting natural ob
stacles, but the task of clearing the heights, which
everywhere will be lined with hardy mountaineers
fighting on their own hills, will bo no mean effort
of hill warfare.
We have no wish to adopt a pessimist tone, or to
advance imaginary and fancied dangers in the work
now before our soldiers in Afghanistan, but we
have every reason to counsel a firm though cautious j
attitude in dealing with these savage Mahomedan j
races. Within the last few months we have seen i
raw, untrained levies, men unused to war, un
initiated into the mysteries of long-range shooting,
ignorant of the use of artillery, hold at bay very
powerful forces belonging to a first-rate Power.
We have seen the enormous strength put forward to
subdue a few thousand mountaineers fighting on
their own soil, in defence of what they deem their
just rights ; we have the memory of many a sharp
skirmish on a Punjab hillside, as well as the recol
lection of the mismanaged and ever-to-be-deplored
last Afghan campaign. It is with the yiew of avoid
ing similar errors that we counsel prudence. There
is a time for dash and a time for caution. When
our commissariat arrangements are perfected, when
our communications with the frontier are complete,
when we have sufficient troops at the front to keep
open unthreatened the passes into Cabul,—
then, and not till then, shall we deem it
prudent to encourage in our ^ Generals that
spirit of dashing enterprise which has charac
terized the leaders of our armies in every clime,
but which, perhaps, has never been shown to more
advantage than in the East.
The Generals selected for the chief commands
are men in whom the nation can have every confi
dence. They are men of tried ability in the field,
pi marked gallantry in action. They have proved
themselves heretofore men of dash, and the ener
getic preparations now being carried on m the
Punjab, the cautious attitude adopted at Jumrood
and Thull, show that they know equally well how
to be prudent.