Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎123r] (253/312)

AFGHANISTAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Your Correspondent at Berlin telegraphs a passage
from a letber in the Golos, dated frooi Orenburg, wherein ^
| it is stated that the British loss in the passes during the %
retreat frona Cabul in the winter of 1841-42, was 20,000
j men, and, strange to say, a work just published by the B
author of " In my Indian Garden," places the number at
26,000. It would be as well, therefore, that the Russian
j military party, for whose edification the Golos letter was !
I written, and that portion of the English public who do
I not care to read bulky standard works on the subject?
j should know that our entire loss was only 5,000 soldiers, of
| whom only about 700 were Europeans, and 10,000 unarmed i
camp-followers. And here I would note regarding the :
i work of Mr. Eobinson, that he is incorrect in stating that j
j Sir George Pollock received a " severe check " at Ali
! Musjid during his advance on Cabul in 1842. As the author
^ of the " Life " of tlia late Field Marshal, written from his i
papers before his decease in 1872, I can give this assertion
an absolute contradiction. The army under Sir George
j Pollock sustained no check from the time of starting on
its victorious march from Peshawur until the British flag
was planted on the Bala Hissar of Oabul.
Yours faithfully, O. R. LOW.
Kensington, Oct. 9.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—As any opinion expressed by Lord Lawrence must
naturally influence very greatly tbe views of the public on
the great question that at present occupies men's minds in j
connexion with oar relations with Afghanistan, and with
respect to the causes that have led us to the brink of war
with that country, it is only right that his letter, which
appeared in The Times of the 2d inst., should be carefully
analyzed to see how far the statements and inferences it
contains are based upon a fair and sound estimate of our
position in India.
Lord Lawrence considers it to have been a serious mis
take to organize a mission to Cabul before we had ascer
tained whether Ameer Shere Ali was prepared to receive
onr overtures or not. But the wisdom or otherwise of the
action of the Indian Government in this matter depends
upon what the Imperial and Indian Governments were
bound to do in the interest of our Indian Empire under
the circumstances of a Russian Mission being established
! at Cabul, and on this vital question Lord Lawrence ia i
silent.
It is not so much the question why the Russian Mission
is at Cabul with which we have to deal—whether it is
£ owing to our policy in Europe, or whether it is in accord
ance with a well-considered Russian policy in Central
Asia ; for whatever the cause, the result ia the same.
Russian influence is at present predominant from the
Russian frontiers to the Khyber Pass. Upon the effect the
acceptance of a Russian Mission and the rejection of a
• British Mission at Cabul are likely to have upon the various
Native States in India Lord Lawrence likewise does not
! touch ; but he speaks of the dangers and expense that
would attend the invasion of Afghanistan. Both of these
are, however, a necessity of our position in India ; danger
and expense must be ever present, whether an advance te
forced upon us or we hold back, and the latter being
probably the more dangerous of the two, it may be, con
sequently, the most expensive policy.
It may, however, be well to endeavour to trace the cause
of the present attitude of the Ameer and of Russia,
whether it has been the result of Imperial or of local
policy, or of both, as the question may affect the future
decision as to whether England or India will have to bear
the expenses of the war.
It is well-known that Russian intrigues have been active
for many years past in Cabul, and that these intrigues»
through the Ameer, react on the native hill tribes inhabit-
ing the country adjacent to our frontier boundaries. The
object of these intrigues has doubtless been to secure to
Russia such an ascendant position in Asia that she could
at any moment, if we endangered the success of her policy
S in Europe, create difficulties for us in India, and the con
duct of our Government not unnaturally led Russia to
think the time had arrived for giving effect to this policy.
Lord Lawrence considers that we have abandoned the
old policy of forbearance with the Afghans ; but how far
was that policy lo carry us, and how far was the departure
from that policy the inevitable result of the very policy
for which Lord Lawrence, whether rightly or not, is
generally considered responsible ?
The occupation of Quettah is said to be one great cause
now influencing Shere Ali's policy, but was the occupation
I of Quettah altogether an optional policy, or one that was
consequent upon the course of events ? It is not possible
within the limits of this letter to enter fully into this
question, but it will be remembered that Major Sande-
man's mission, accompanied by a large escort to Khelat, left
Jacobabad prior to the Government of India being made
over by Lord Northbrook to Lord Lytton. What Lord
Northbrook's ultimate policy might have been it is impossi
ble to say ; but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
policy he had wisely inaugurated, by sending Major
Sandeman to endeavour to reconcile tbe differences
between the Khan and his Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , and of arriving at some
satisfactory understanding with respect to the Khelat
Treaty of 1853, might have led him to the same conclusion
at which Lord Lytton arrived. Once admit tbe wisdom of
the policy of putting an end to the disturbances that have
frequently necessitated the interference of tho Government
of India, and th« occupation of Quettah as the best security
against the recurrence of these difficulties follows almost
as a natural sequence.
Tho question, however, may well be asked why were our
relations with the Ameer not as friendly and as cordial as
those between the Ameer and the Russian Government ?
Our occupation of Quettah might be set down as one cause
were it not that our unsympathetic relations with the
Ameer date from a much earlier period, and it will be diffi
cult to find any sufficient answer to the question other than
that to be gathered from the policy of successive Indian
Governments—to hold aloof from the Amesr, to reject his
advances, and to refuse all his requests, and yet to attempt
to propitiate him by the payment of a tribute, sometimes
in money, sometimes in arms, a proceeding that he must
have found difficult to reconcile with our other policy
unless dictated by fear of his power. This was the grand
non-interference policy which, while it held aloof from
appeals made to us for our friendship, armed the man on
whose friendship we could not depend until he believed
himself strong enough, through the means we had thus
placed at his disposal, to give way to his inclinations and
repay England for his many fancied wrongs by giving his
friendship to Russia. The present crisis may be partly
the result of the European policy of the Imperial Govern
ment, it may be partly due to the policy of successive
Indian Governments ; but there is this strong fact that
stands out beyond all question, that the present position
is the result of a policy long pursued by Russia ; it may or
may not have been developed sooner than Russia intended j
but there we find the machinery all ready to be put in
motion when required. I am not one of those who think
that Russia, in the absence of a well-defined understanding
with England, is not justified in the course she pursues ;
; she has her ambition, and so have we; she has interests to
i guard, and so have we ; but her influence in Afghanistan
is not compatible with our safety in India. Let us secure
our boundaries, if necessary, by a rectification of our
frontier ; let the Ameer be punished for his insolence, and
thus let the native Princes of India see we cannot and will
not tolerate insult. But let us annex as little country as
possible ; let the independence of such portion of Afghan
istan as is not required for the correction of our frontier line
be guaranteed ; let a cordial and honest understanding be
arrived at with Russia with respect to our several interests
I in the East ; and let us endeavour to view these questions
- not only as Englishmen but as Russians, who have an equal
1 interest in the honour and greatness of their country as
we have in that of ours. Your obedient servant
H. B. L.
SREUE ALTS SWORD,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Permit me, through The Times, to call to the
mind of Shere Ali, at this present crisis, the solemn de
claration which on the occasion of the celebrated Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family).
in 1869 he privately and emphatically made to the late
Earl of Mayo, then Governor-General of India, who, in
token of existing friendship, had presented the Ameer
j with his own sword. " I accept the sword," said the
Afghan ruler, " as a token of peace with England ; against
which country it shall never be unsheathed. When I look
upon this sword it shall mean to me, ' Peace with Eng
land.' " As above implied, these words were uttered at a
private assembly, and I am enabled to vouch for the truth
of the interesting incident upon the highest authority.
Yours obediently, W. CHAPMAN.
Waverley-house, Kingston-on-Thames.
"THE BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA:*
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir >—^ " C." will make inquiry he will find that the
great bulk of the 7,000,000,bullocks, cows, horses, donkeys,
and camels in the Punjab are supported out of the produce I
of the cultivated area. But I fully admit that the Punjab
is the most prosperous province ia India with the excep
tion of a few districts in Bengal. If " C." will apply his
method to the North-West Provinces or Madras not for
getting the seed and keep for the agricultural bullocks—I j
fear he will be somewhat alarmed at the results he will
obtain. Even in the Punjab, however, I cannot make
" C.'s " figures agree with mine. Taking this good year,
with wheat at a low price and other grains cheap in pro
portion, I do net discover the high standard of well-being.
When deduction is made for taxation and seed, it seems to
ma that there are not left more than seven bushels of
grain (about half of inferior kinds) per head of popula
tion, without making any allowance whatever for the keep
of the 7,000,000 head of livestock. I do not notice
either that " C." offers any explanation of the scarcity now j
prevalent in the southern Punjab. It should be remembered
also that it was the most celebrated Lieutenant-Governor
who ever administered the Punjab, who said, on the IGth
of June, 1873,-" The mass of the people in India are so
miserably poor that they have barely the means of sub-
! sistence ; it is as much as a man can do to feed his family,
i or to half feed them, let alone spending money on what
you would call luxuries or conveniences." I only wish
Sir, heartily, that " C." could " expose " or explain away
this sentence of Lord Lawrence's, as well as prove the
fallacy of tho facts on which it is based. Fone certainly
would then be better pleased than
Your obedient servant, / H. M. HYNDMAN.
October 9. /
TO THE EDITOR/OF THE TIMES.
Sir, There has lately been some discussion in The
% yd'inuyuuj pmp
t ^ngraajSAog sjaoif) eqj, 'ponesT !}nnotm3 apq-ii oq^ aq
£t'9A pinoAV 000'00firf po^at^so jo^sra oq^ jo eSpoj
I -Monij equ psq oqM asoqx -pansst aj-m OOO'ftfMi/f •
i jt -^133 .rad £oz pw 'pansst bioav OOO'OOO'T^ }} ^ ?9!) ^
3 'panssi aiaA\ OOO'OOI'T* JVi" 90 ^ %!9'P 3ns ^ OOO'OOS'l?
9 eqij ji -cpiao jad 09 aq ppoqs spnoq aq* jo aaud
I -4x130 aad QI oj, -s-nsajC (jx m pamaapa.T aq
s pfnOAi spxioq aq; '000'0067 jo,; m acm ;o srarcp ji pun sjna^f
|g7, ni aq ppiOAv uoi^draapaj oq; 'm ora-bo OOO'OOO'l? a 110
AFGHANISTAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Your Correspondent at Berlin telegraphs a passage
from a letter in the Golos, dated from Orenburg, wherein,
it is stated that the British loss in the passes during the
retreat from Cabul in the winter of 1841-42, was 20,000
! men, and, strange to say, a work just published by the
author of " In my Indian Garden," places the number at
26,000. It would be as well, therefore, that the Russian
military party, for whose edification the Golos letter was
written, and that portion of the English public who do
not care to read bulky standard works on the subject,
should know that our entire loss was only 5,000 soldiers, of
whom only about 700 were Europeans, and 10,000 unarmed i
camp-followers. And heie I would note regarding the :
, work of Mr. Robinson, that he is incorrect in stating that
| Sir George Pollock received a " severe check " at Ali
I Musjid during his advance on Cabul in 1842. As the author
; of the " Life " of the late Field Marshal, written from his I
papers before his decease in 1872, I can give this assertion
an absolute contradiction. The army under Sir George
j Pollock sustained no check from the time of starting on
j its victorious march from Peshawur until the British flag
was planted on the Bala Hissar of Cabul.
Yours faithfully, C. R. LOW.
Kensington, Oct. 9.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—As any opinion expressed by Lord Lawrence must
naturally influence very greatly the views of the public on
the great question that at present occupies men's minds in
connexion with our relations with Afghanistan, and with
respect to the causes that have led us to the brink of war
with that country, it is only right that his letter, which
appeared in T/ie Times of the 2d inst., should be carefully
analyzed to see how far the statements and inferences it
contains are based upon a fair and sound estimate of our
position in India.
Lord Lawrence considers it to have been a serious mis
take to organize a mission to Cabul before we had ascer
tained whether Ameer Shere Ali was prepared to receive
onr overtures or not. But the wisdom or otherwise of the
action of the Indian Government in this matter depends
upon what the Imperial and Indian Governments were
bound to do in the interest of our Indian Empire under
the circumstances of a Russian Mission being established
i at Cabal, and on this vital question Lord Lawrence is
silent.
It is not so much the question why the Russian Mission
is at Cabul with which we have to deal—whether it is
owing to our policy in Europe, or whether it is in accord
ance with a well-considered Russian policy in Central
Asia ; for whatever the cause, the result i> the same.
Russian influence is at present predominant from the
Russian frontiers to the Khyber Pass. Upon the effect the
acceptance of a Russian Mission and the rejection of a
British Mission at Cabul are likely to have upon the various
Native States in India Lord Lawrence likewise does not
touch ; but he speaks of the dangers and expense that
would attend the invasion of Afghanistan. Both of these
are, however, a necessity of our position in India ; danger
and expense must be ever present, whether an advance be
forced upon us or we hold back, and the latter being
probably the more dangerous of the two, it may be, con
sequently, the most expensive policy.
It may, however, be well to endeavour to trace the cause
of the present attitude of the Ameer and of Russia,
whether it has been the result of Imperial or of local
policy, or of both, as the question may affect the future
decision as to whether England or India will have to bear
the expenses of the war.
It is well-known that Russian intrigues have been active
for many years past in Cabul, and that these intrigues»
through the Ameer, react on the native hill tribes inhabit
ing the country adjacent to our frontier boundaries. The
object of these intrigues has doubtless been to secure to
Russia such an ascendant position in Asia that she could
at any moment, if we endangered the success of her policy
in Europe, create difficulties for us in India, and the con
duct of our Grovemment not unnaturally led Russia to
think the time had arrived for giving effect to this policy.
Lord Lawrence considers that we have abandoned the
old policy of forbearance with the Afghans ; but how far
was that policy to carry us, and how far was the departure
from that policy the inevitable result of the very policy
for which Lord Lawrence, whether rightly or not, is
generally considered responsible ?
The occupation of Quettah is said to be one great cause
now influencing Shere Ali's policy, but was the occupation
of Quettah altogether an optional policy, or one that was
consequent upon the course of events ? It is not possible
within the limits of this letter to enter fully into this
question, but it will be remembered that Major Sande-
man's mission, accompanied by a large escort to Khelat, left
Jacobabad prior to the Government of India being made
over by Lord Northbrook to Lord Lytton. What Lord
Ncrthbrook's ultimate policy might have been it is impossi
ble to say ; but it it not unreasonable to suppose that the
policy he had wisely inaugurated, by sending Major
Sandeman to endeavour to reconcile the differences
between the Khan and his Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , and of arriving at some
satisfactory understanding with respect to the Khelat
Treaty of 1853, might have led him to the same conclusion
at which Lord Lytton arrived. Once admit the wisdom of
the policy of putting an end to the disturbances that have
frequently necessitated the interference of the Government
of India, and the occupation of Quettah as the best security
against the recurrence of these difficulties follows almost
as a natural sequence.
The question, however, may well be asked why were our
relations with the Ameer not as friendly and as cordial as *
those between the Ameer and the Russian Government ?
Our occupation of Quettah might be set down as one cause
were it not that our unsympathetic relations with the
Ameer date from a much earlier period, and it will be diffi
cult to find any sufficient answer to the question other than
that to be gathered from the policy of successive Indian
Governments—to hold aloof from the Ameer, to reject his
advances, end to refuse all his requests, and yet to attempt
to propitiate him by the payment of a tribute, sometimes
in money, sometimes in arms, a proceeding that he must
have found difficult to reconcile with our other policy
unless dictated by fear of his power. This was the grand
non-interference policy which, while it held aloof from
appeals made to us for our friendship, armed the man on
whose friendship we could not depend until he believed
himself strong enough, through the means we had thus
placed at his disposal, to give way to his inclinations and
repay England for his many fancied wrongs by giving his
friendship to Russia. The present crisis may be partly
the result of the European policy of the Imperial Govern
ment, it may be partly due to the policy of successive
Indian Governments ; but there is this strong fact that
stands out beyond all question, that the present position
is the result of a policy long pursued by Russia ; it may or
may not have been developed sooner than Russia intended ;
but there we find the machinery all ready to be put in
motion when required. I am not one of those who think
that Russia, in the absence of a well-defined understanding
with England, is not justified in the course she pursues ;
| she has her ambition, and so have we; she has interests to'
j guard, and so have we ; but her influence in Afghanistan
is not compatible with our safety in India. Let us secure
our boundaries, if necessary, by a rectification of our
frontier ; let the Ameer be punished for his insolence, and
thus let the native Princes of India see we cannot and will
not tolerate msult. But let us annex as little country as
possible ; let the independence of such portion of Afghan
istan as is not required for the correction of our frontier line
be guaranteed ; let a cordial and honest understanding be
arrived at with Russia with respect to our several interests
| m the East ; and let us endeavour to view these questions
I not only as Englishmen but as Russians, who have an equal
interest in the honour and greatness of their country as
we have in that of ours. Your obedient, servant,
H. B. L.
SHEUE ALTS SWORD.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir—Permit me, through T /te Times, to call to the
mind of Shere Ali, at this present crisis, the solemn de
claration which on the occasion of the celebrated Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family).
in 1869 he privately and emphatically made to the late
Earl of Mayo, then Governor-General of India, who, in
token of existing friendship, had presented the Ameer
with his own sword. " I accept the sword," said the
Afghan ruler, " as a token of peace with England ; against
which country it shall never be unsheathed. When I look
upon this sword it shall mean to me, ' Peace with Eng
land. ' As above implied, these words were uttered at a
private assembly, and I am enabled to vouch for the truth
of the interesting incident upon the highest authority.
Yours obediently, W. CHAPMAN".
Waverley-house, Kingston-on-Thames.
THE BANKBUFTCY OF INDIA.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
" C." will make inquiry he will find that the
great bulk of the 7,000,000 l ,bullocks, cows, horses, donkeys,
and camels in the Punjab are supported out of the produce
of the cultivated area. But I fully admit that the Punjab
is the most prosperous province in India with the excep
tion of a few districts in Bengal. If " C." will apply his
method to the North-West Provinces or Madras—not for
getting the seed and keep for the agricultural bullocks—I
fear he will be somewhat alarmed at the results he will
obtain. Even in the Punjab, however, I cannot make
" C.'s " figures agree with mine. Taking this good year,
with wheat at a low price and other grains cheap in pro
portion, I do net discover the high standard of well-being.
When deduction is made for taxation and seed, it seems to
me that there are not left more than seven bushels of
grain (about half of inferior kinds) per head of popula
tion, without making any allowance whatever for the keep
of the 7,000,000 head of live stock. I do not notice
either that " C." offers any explanation of the scarcity now
prevalent in the southern Punjab. It should be remembered
also that it was the most celebrated Lieutenant-Governor
who ever administered the Punjab, who said, on the 10th
of June, 1873,—" The mass of the people in India are so
miserably poor that they have barely the means of sub
sistence ; it is as much as a man can do to feed his family
or to half feed them, let alone spending money on what
you would call luxuries or conveniences." I only wish
Sir, heartily, that " C." could " expose " or explain away
this sentence of Lord Lawrence's, as well as prove the
fallacy of the facts on which it is based. Fone certainly
would then be better pleased than
Your obedient servant, / H. M. HYNDMAN
October 9. /
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir, There has lately been some discussion in The
Times between " C." and/Mr. Hyndman, chiefly on some
figures in my pamphlet on '" The Poverty of India." It
may be expected that some explanation or correction of
any error I may have made is due from me ; but as in the
present state of Indian matters I ihould not give any
eccasion for the least possible suspicion that even an
humble native of 'India like myself (and I believe, natives
generally) has the remotest desire to see Russia'to be in
England's place in India, I think I would postpone] any
explanations I may have to make to an appropriate time.
In the meantime 1 may request " C." to read my pamphlet
fully, and, if, after doing so, he still th inly it requisite
for me to explain- or correct any facts or figures given in
my pamphlet, I shall readily do so, as may be necessary.
Your obedient servant,
/ DADABHAI NAOROJL
32, Great StyHelen's, Oct. 10.