Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎119v] (246/312)

THU AFGHAN WAR.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE STANDARD.
S ib ,—Having served two years in Afghanistan
in the years 1839-40, I desire, with your permis-
, sion, to write a few words regarding the present
: posture of affairs between the Indian Government
and the Ameer of Cabul.
I thoroughly agree with those who urge that the
blow, if blow there is to be, should be struck at
once. Delay would not only produce a bad moral
effect throughout India, but wouldgive the Afghans
time to prepare for a more stubborn resistance and
to seek aid from without.
Nearly three months of open weather lie before
us, which would be ample for the purpose, should
our commissariat arrangements not require any
great delay before commencing a forward move.
While some advocate an advance on Candahar,
and others operations in the Koorum Valley, thus
threatening Cabul from the south, I can myself per
ceive no means more forcible to bring the Ameer to
his senses, or otherwise to avenge the affront which
he has put upon us, than a march upon his capital.
It is useless to strike at the extremities. The heart
of the kingdom should be our object.
There is some misapprehension, I think, regard
ing the climate between our frontier at Peshawui
and CabuL At no time is the Khyber Pass, as s
rule, blocked by snow. It does fall on the summits
of the mountains in the winter, but to no great
extent. I marched through the Pass with
Horse Artillery guns in the middle of December j
the difficulties of the route were by no means great,
and the cold was moderate, not more intense than
in the northern parts of the Punjaub. The valley
of Jellallabad possesses a mild climate. At Cabul
itself snow does not fall to any great extent until
after Christmas ; and the passes and defiles, though
they have obtained a mournful celebrity, do
not present any serious difficulties to the passage
of an army with artillery. When I made
the march at the close of 1840, we found nc
obstacles in our way that our own teams could not
overcome, with an occasional pull at the drag-ropes.
The country generally between Peshawur and Cabul
is nothing more than what a well-appointed army,
skilfully directed, should be able to traverse success
fully, even though opposed by brave mountaineers,
as the hills which command the passes and defilea
are accessible, and should be crowned by flanking
parties before the gorges are entered by the
columns. Under such circumstances, with troops
in good order and high spirits, the Khyber,
Jugdulluck, and Koord Kabul Passes would lose
much of their supposed importance, even though
there might be, perhaps, some snow in the last-
mentioned defile.
It must be remembered that when our troops
j commenced that disastrous retreat from Cabul in
[January, 1842, they were, with a few noble
exceptions, already in a demoralised state. For
two months they had been almost completely shut
up in their cantonments, and unfortunately that
1 portion of the brigade upon which commanders are
wont to rely principally in times of extreme danger
had lost all spirit, and had learned to turn theii
backs to their enemies.
There was another circumstance that added most
materially to the difficulties of the situation, and
that was the enormous number of camp followers
that accompanied the brigade. They far outnum
bered the effective fighting men, and at each
renewal of the Ghiljies' attack they so crowded
upon and hampered our soldiers that the latter
could scarce use their weapons against the enemy,
but had often to turn them against the poor
shivering fugitives, to clear the way for their own
march.
These were the real evils of the flight; otherwise,
neither the snow nor the passes, nor the incessant
assaults of the mountaineers, could have so entirely
overthrown an Anglo-Indian brigade, under British
officers, So I trust that neither dread of the snow,
nor an exaggerated idea of the difficulties of the
road will induce those in whom the direction of
affairs rests to order any half measures, or indirect
attacks, except that these latter would be useful aa
aiding in the general plan of the campaign, and
perhaps tend to mislead the enemy. But the real
attack, I feel confident, should be through the
Khyber, against Cabul itself.
Much, of course, depends on the commissariat,
for it would never do to depend on the valley of
the Cabul river for supplies for our troops- If
there be no difficulty on this head, I do not see
why we should not march upon the capital at once.
I dare say the Afghans can fight better (I do iiot
mean more bravely only, but with more skill also)
than was the case forty years since ; and doubtless
we have, since we annexed the Punjaub in 1849,
made enemies of many hill tribes on our own borders,
who must be looked after while our brigades are
across the frontier.
But if the Afghans have acquired some of the
science of warfare, and are better provided with
ordnance than when we first encountered them, so,
on the other hand, are our officers and soldiers
better accustomed to mountain operations, and the
latter more usefully armed with weapons of pre
cision than was the case in former days.
Doubtless, however, it will take a considerably
larger force now to accomplish the invasion
successfully than that which was under the
orders of Sir John Keane in 1839. Then the
Afghans did not know that they could beat 'us tinder
any circumstances, and then our Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. little
dreamed that anything but victory could attend
our arms. A native brigade with six light guns
could then open the Khyber Pass. But now I
should be sorry to see any force of less than two
divisions attempt to force its way through. A check
at the outset would be provocative, perhap^ of
further disaster.
There is still nearly three months before us, for
snow need not be taken into calculation till January.
But if there be a little snow, what then 1 Have we
not lately read what the Russians did at the passage
of the Etropol Balkans ? How they wort ed 'mic'
snow and ice ? Can British soldiers not accomplish
what others have done 1 But, south of the Hindu
Koosh, there need be no apprehension of such
difficulties as were encountered in the Turkish
mountains.
Of the two years that I served in Afghanistan,
twelve months were passed in the Bamian Valley.
There, indeed, we were blocked up by snow. For
months no horse or baggage animal of any kind
could cross the snow ; and often, for intervals of
two and even three weeks, not even a footman could
pass the mountains. For more than twenty days
we had not a word of intelligence from the south ;
while further north we constantly received infor
mation of the movements of the Russians.
But the communication between Jellallabad and
Cabul is never so completely broken.
There is more that I would say on the subject a'
another time, if you will permit me.
I am. Sir, yours faithfully,
October 8. E, K,
THE FRENCH PRESS ON THE
AFGHAN QUEST-ION.
(By Submakine Telegraph. )
(from: our ownt correspondent.)
PARIS, W ednesday.
The Hepuhlique Frangaise to-day publishes an
important article on the Afghan Question. It
says ;—
" There can be no doubt that the English Govern* 1
ment has resolved to teach Shere Ali a severe lesson. I
This Afghan Prince has gravely insulted England,
and must be punished for it. But what increases
the gravity of the fact is that the Ameer, who has
never liked the English, has not given vent to his
hatred till after the visit of a Russian Mission to
his capital. Public opinion in England has been
aroused by these two facts ; and the English see in
them, and not without reason, a serious menace
to their Indian Empire. From all points of
view this Afghan affair was bound to produce a great
impression both on the people and Government of
Great Britain. First of all there was a premeditated
offence to the Envoy of the Viceroy of India, and
without desiring to discuss with the adversaries of
the Ministry the question whether Lord Lytton
took the right means to get the Mission of
General Chamberlain accepted at Cabul, we
cannot disguise the fact that the discourteous
and brutal conduct of the Ameer's officers
was absolutely intolerable. Let us not be told that
we ought to be indulgent towards half-civilised
Orientals, towards barbarians ignorant of the rules
of diplomatic and international civility, and that
what would not be borne from a European
Government is of no consequence when the
insult comes from an Eastern Power. Nowhere
more than in an Asiatic Court are forms and cere
monies regarded, and Shere Ali knew perfectly
well what he was doing when he prohibited the
English Mission from entering his territory. Now
it must not be thought that because there are few
or no newspapers, telegraphs, or rapid means
of publicity or communication in the East the
people are not informed. News spreads there
! with surprising rapidity, and the gossip and
talk of the bazaars do the work of the press. If
the Ameer of Cabul remained unpunished the
prestige of England in Asia would soon be
diminished, and she would quickly lose her
authority over her neighbours, her vassals, and her
subjects in India. From this point of view alone
the British Government is bound to adopt a policy
of action. But there is another and not less
powerful motive why England should take up the
gauntlet thrown down to her by Shere Ali. The
progress of Russia in Central Asia is continual, and
little by little the Empire of the Czar is extending
like a stain of oil over the map of that region. From
the valley of the Lower Yaxartes and the Kirghise
Steppes Russian domination has reached the rich
valley of the Zerafchan. Samarkand has