Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎119r] (245/312)

LONDON", THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10.
Our Correspondent at Simla telegraphs that the
column under General Ross is reported to have
passed the fort of Ali Musjid and to be advancing
on Dakka, which will be captured at any cost. It
was rumoured at Calcutta yesterday that a letter
had been received from the Ameer. Our Paris
correspondent sends us the text of an article by the
Hepublique Frangaise on the position of the Afghan
question, and how England and Rusia are affected
thereby.
We are unable to vouch for the accuracy of the
important news which was, late last night, tele- ,
graphed to us from Simla, but, although it will j
come upon our readers by surprise, it bears internal
evidence in favour of its truth. At present, how
ever, we can only say that if our troops have really
! performed the feats of passing the forts of Ali
; Musjid and throwing themselves between the
garrison and the reinforcements coming up to their
aid, they will have performed amost boldand brilliant
service. On the other hand, our Calcutta Corre
spondent telegraphs to us that there will be no
further advance from Peshawur, or rather from
Jumrood, for some days, and if this intelligence
represented the real position of affairs, it would
undoubtedly be taken to mean that the intention
of surprising Ali Musjid, if it were ever seriously
entertained, has been' abandoned in face of the
determined preparations of S here A li for the
defence of his dominions. It is the opinion of
I many of those who know the Khyber Pass and
the position of the fort of Ali Musjid that,
when once the Afghans were upon the alert, it
would be rash to advance against it unless in over
whelming force, and it may be that the Indian
Government thinks that, in the face of the Afghan
i reinforcements, which amount to eight regiments and i
eighteen guns, or about five thousand five hundred
men, it would be impossible to acquire possession
of that fort, unless we could bring against it a more j
considerable force than that mentioned. The normal |
garrison of Ali Musjid was eight hundred men, and '
in addition there are the Momunds, whose first i
j detachment would number probably five thousand
I men. The combined Afghan garrison of the Khyber is
I therefore in all probability over ten thousand fighting
men ; and the guns at Ali Musjid—ten they used
to be reckoned at—are now strengthened by the ;
addition of three of S here A li 's batteries. Against
such preparations it will be necessary to employ
overwhelming force, for on the result of the fighting
I in the Khyber depends, as we have pointed
out, the future attitude of the border tribes. The
Pathan element in the Punjab might also become
disturbed by any untoward events at Ali Musjid or
Jumrood. There is no doubt that the commissariat
arrangements in India are, according to European
ideas, very deficient, and unavoidable delays
must be caused by the imperfections of the
j Punjab and Indus Valley Railways, and by
the difficulties attending the passage of the Indus.
But while we freely allow that there must be per
fect latitude for the military chiefs in deciding when
and where the first blow is to be struck, and in
what manner it is best to show to the world' of
Asia that the strength of S here A li is but as a
house of cards when compared to ours, every day
makes it more clear that there must be no faint
heartedness in the councils of the Government, and
none of that dilatorinesS which many English critics
now seem to sanction because they perceive, what
we have always perceived, that the march on Cabul
is not to be an empty parade. The letter we publish
from a well-known Correspondent this morning is
in point in this matter. Speaking from the per
sonal experience he acquired when seizing in
Afghanistan, he bears out everything that has been
said in these columns of the climate of Cabul, w hich,
south of the Hindoo Koosh, is by no means the
frigid zone which the fears of some and the wishes
of others would have us believe it to be.
There is no reason in the rigour of the climate
or in the difficulties of the passes for post
poning our advance until the spring. " The
Khyber is never actually snowed up," says our
Correspondent, and his evidence is confirmed by
many border authorities : nor must it be forgotten
that whether we advance on Cabul by the Khyber
or not that pass will not be our principal
line of communication with India. We quite
agree with our Correspondent that it is necessary
to strike at the heart of the kingdom, although
it may be doubted whether the shortest road
thither by the Khyber is the best. The doubtful
attitude of our Sikh allies in 1889 compelled
its to make our chief attack from Candahar and
the south; but military strategists, German and
English, approve the choice that was thus made
under compulsion in that year, and unite in recom
mending the same point of attack now. There
are other reasons which induce us to believe that
the seat of S here A li's power is not at Cabul,
but at Candahar and Herat. To put it at the least,
I the capture of Candahar would prevent him from
i retreating on Herat and Persia, and would cut his
1 State into two. The capture of Cabul is by no
means the strategic advantage that the surrender
of Candahar would be, and it is an open question
whether our true road to Cabul is, not through
the Punjab and the Khyber, but from Kurrachee
to (^uettah and Southern Afghanistan. The cap
ture of Candahar would paralyse S here A li's
strength; it by no means follows that the capture
of Cabul would be attended with similar results.
At Cabul we should be also farther away from
Herat than we should be at. Quettah; but at
Candahar we should be equally near to the Afghan
capital and Bamian as to " the key of India."
But whatever the particular plan of operations
decided upon, we must repeat in the strongest
terms that there is nothing which necessitates a
postponement of the campaign until the spring. To
put off until then the chastisement S here A li has
earned would be only to play into the hands of the
A meer and of Russia. Tj.e letter that the A meer
is reported to have sent us cannot alter the com
plexion of the crisis very much. He has scored a
success, and no nominal concession will dissipate
the opinion that is prevalent among Asiatics that
he has bidden us defiance. To accept an apology in |
words from him when we are on the threshold of
his State would be disastrous in the highest
degree. S here A li is probably willing enough
now to accord us anything in form we may
require from him. He has slapped our face,
as the Russian journals have expressed it, and
he cannot hope to achieve more. He has done so
with a certain amount of impunity, thanks to
the forbearance we have ever shown towards him.
Even Russian advisers would now counsel him to
make a show of conceding to us some nominal points,
either in the reception of an English Envoy or in
the despatch of an Afghan Mission of apology for
the offence of the Afghan Governor of Ali Musjid.
Such concessions would mean nothing. They would
not bind S here A lt to an English alliance—they
would not compel him to forego a Russian one. In
the eyes of the Afghan as of the Indian nation they
would only signify that S here A li was content to rest
on the brilliant laurels he had secured.
The independent Prince s of India would at once
say he had insulted us, and that we had condoned
the offence. And why had we condoned the
offence ? Simply because we were too weak to
resent it. Our magnanimity would be utterly
ignored. It is quite certain that any letter
from S here A li , even though in appearance a
concession, would be in reality a sham and a
delusion. It might even be of a more pronounced
character still. It might be a kind of proclamation to
the Indian people. The role of liberator of Hindostan
would sit strangely upon the Afghan A meer ,but it is
not impossible that under Russian auspices he might
aspire to such a character. But be the tone of
this letter what it may, there can be no question
that the concessions S here A li must now make as
the price of peace will have to represent tangible
i substance, and not mere questions of form and
etiquette. It will not suffice for him to consent
to receive an English Embassy, after he has
permitted one of his Governors to offer to ourrepre-
sentative the most flagrant insult one nation
can offer to, another on terms of amity with
it. It will not meet the necessities of the occa
sion to extenuate his conduct by saying that
the Russian Mission was forced upon him, and
that he is desirous of returning to the old con
dition of indifference towards us. We must have
some real compens ition, some solid acquisition,
to redeem our dimmed reputation in the eyes
of our Indian subject s. There must be either
ms late misconcfuct uy simulated moderation, and
until he concedes the solid demands we shall require |
of him we must continue those military preparations [
which should shortly bear fruit in action of a decided :
j character. No rule could last for long in India
[ which condoned or ignored an open defiance on the
part of a semi-savage despot of Afghanistan. S herb:
A li must not only be brought to his senses^ but the
necessary process must be applied at once.
"I b ^u-wj A-IVKT OTfJ,—-*Hlg
•aavaMYis alii ao aoiiaa am ox
'J^aCINaJA'TtftfcTnS r IVJ-,TfIEOH Y *6 aaqo^oQ
LONDOK, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10.
Our Correspondent at Simla telegraphs that the
column under General Ross is reported to have
passed the fort of Ali Musjid and to be advancing
on Dakka, which will be captured at any cost. It
was rumoured at Calcutta yesterday that a letter
had been received from the Ameer, Our Paris
correspondent sends us the text of an article by the
Uepublique Frangaise on the position of the Afghan
question, and how England and Rusia are affected
thereby.
We are unable to vouch for the accuracy of the
important news which was, late last night, tele- i
graphed to us from Simla, but, although it will i
come upon our readers by surprise, it bears internal
evidence in favour of its truth. At present, how
ever, we can only say that if our troops have really
! performed the feats of passing the forts of Ali
■ Musjid and throwing themselves between the
garrison and the reinforcements coming up to their
aid, they will have performed amost boldand brilliant
service. On the other hand, our Calcutta Corre
spondent telegraphs to us that there will be no
further advance from Peshawur, or rather from
Jumrood, for some days, and if this intelligence
represented the real position of affairs, it would
undoubtedly be taken to mean that the intention
of surprising Ali Musjid, if it were ever seriously
entertained, has been' abandoned in face of the
determined preparations of Shere Ali for the
1 defence of his dominions. It is the opinion of
1 manj of those who know the Khyber Pass and
the position of the fort of Ali Musjid that,
when once the Afghans were upon the alert, it
would be rash to advance against it unless in over
whelming force, and it may be that the Indian
Gjovernment thinks that, in the face of the Afghan
reinforcements, which amount to eight regiments and |
eighteen guns, or about five thousand five hundred '
men, it would be impossible to acquire possession
of that fort, unless we could bring against it a more j
considerable force than that mentioned. The normal
garrison of Ali Musjid was eight hundred men, and |
in addition there are the Momunds, whose first i
detachment would number probably five thousand
men. The combined Afghan garrison of the Khyber is
therefore in all probability over ten thousand fighting
men ; and the guns at Ali Musjid—ten they used
to be reckoned at—are now strengthened by the
addition of three of Sheee All's batteries. Against
such preparations it will be necessary to employ
overwhelming force, for on the result of the fighting
I in the Khyber depends, as we have pointed
out, the future attitude of the border tribes. The
Pathan element in the Punjab might also become
disturbed by any untoward events at Ali Musjid or
Jumrood. There is no doubt that the commissariat
arrangements in India are, according to European
! ideas, very deficient, and unavoidable delays
must be caused by the imperfections of the
| Punjab and Indus Valley Railways, and by
i the difficulties attending the passage of the Indus.
But while we freely allow that there must be per
fect latitude for the military chiefs in deciding when
and where the first blow is to be struck, and in
what manner it is best to show to the world of
Asia that the strength of Shere Ali is but as a
house of cards when compared to ours, every day
makes it more clear that there must be no faint
heartedness in the councils of the Government, and
none of that dilatoriness which many English critics
now seem to sanction because they perceive, what
we have always perceived, that the march on Cabul
is not to be an empty parade. The letter we publish
from a well-known Correspondent this morning is
in point in this matter. Speaking from the per
sonal experience he acquired when serving in
Afghanistan, he bears out everything that has been
said in these columns of the climate of Cabul, w hich,
south of the Hindoo Koosh, is by no means the
frigid zone which the feara of some and the wishes
of others would have us believe it to be.
There is no reason in the rigour of the climate
or in the difficulties of the passes for post
poning our advance until the spring. " The
Kh^ber is never actually snowed up," says our
Correspondent, and his evidence is confirmed by
many border authorities : nor must it be forgotten
that whether we advance on Cabul by the Khyber
or not that pass will not be our principal
line of communication with India. We quite
agree with our Correspondent that it is necessary
to strike at the heart of the kingdom, although
it may be doubted whether the shortest road
thither by the Khyber is the best. The doubtful
attitude of our Sikh allies in 1889 compelled
us to make our chief attack from Candahar and
the south; but military strategists, German and
English, approve the choice that was thus made
under compulsion in that year, and unite in recom
mending the same point of attack now. There
are other reasons which induce us to believe that
the seat of Shere Ali's power is not at Cabul,
but at Candahar and Herat. To put it at the least,
j the capture of Candahar would prevent him from
retreating on Herat and Persia, and would cut his
State into two. The capture of Cabul is by no
means the strategic advantage that the surrender
of Candahar would bej and it is an open question
whether our true road to Cabul is, not through
the Punjab and the Khyber, but from Kurrachee
to (^uettah and Southern Afghanistan. The cap
ture of Candahar would paralyse Shere Ali's
strength ; it by no means follows that the capture
of Cabul would be attended with similar results.
At Cabul we should be also farther away from
Herat than we should be at, Quettah; but at
Candahar we should be equally near to the Afghan
capital and Bamian as to " the key of India."
But whatever the particular plan of operations
decided upon, we must repeat in the strongest
terms that there is nothing which necessitates a
postponement of the campaign until the spring. To
put off until then the chastisement Shere Ali has
earned would be only to play into the hands of the
Ameer and of Russia. Tj.e letter that the Ameer
is reported to have sent us cannot alter the com
plexion of the crisis very much. He has scored a
success, and no nominal concession will dissipate
the opinion that is prevalent among Asiatics that
he has bidden us defiance. To accept an apology in ,
words from him when we are on the threshold of '
his State would be disastrous in the highest
degree. Shere Ali is probably willing enough
now to accord us anything in form we may
require from him. He has slapped our face,
as the Russian journals have expressed it, and
he cannot hope to achieve more. He has done so
with a certain amount of impunity, thanks to
the forbearance We have ever shown towards him.
Even Russian advisers would now counsel him to
make a show of conceding to us some nominal points,
either in the reception of an ^nglish Envoy or in
the despatch of an Afghan Mission of apology for
the offence of the Afghan Governor of Ali Musjid.
Such concessions would mean nothing. They would
not bind Shere Ali to an English alliance—they
would not compel him to forego a Russian one. In
the eyes of the Afghan as of the Indian nation they
would only signify that Shere Ali was content to rest
on the brilliant laurels he had secured.
The independent Prince s of India would at once
say he had insulted us, and that we had condoned
the offence. And why had we condoned the
offence ? Simply because wo were too weak to
resent it. Our magnanimity would be utterly
ignored. It is quite certain that any letter
from Shere Ali , even though in appearance a
concession, would be in reality a sham and a
delusion. It might even be of a more pronounced
character still. It might be a kind of proclamation to
the Indian people. The role of liberator of Hindostan
would sit strangely upon the Afghan Ameer ,but it is
not impossible that under Russian auspices he might
aspire to such a character. But be the tone of
this letter what it may, there can be no question
that the concessions Shere Ali must now make as
the price of peace will have to represent tangible
substance, and not mere questions of form and
etiquette. It will not suffice for him to consent
to receive an English Embassy, after he has
permitted one of his Governors to offer to ourrepre-
sentative the most flagrant insult one nation
can offer to another on terms of amity with
it. It will not meet the necessities of the occa
sion to extenuate his conduct by saying that
the Russian Mission was forced upon him, and
that he is desirous of returning to the old con-
; dition of indifference towards us. We must have
some real compens ition, some solid acquisition,
to redeem our dimmed reputation in the eyes
of our Indian subjects. There must be either
a complete Afghan defeat, or its equivalent
in the strengthening of our hold upon Afghanistan.
Our relations with the border tribes, and with
our own Indian feudatories, compel, us to
adopt measures of precaution that were not
perhaps dreamt of when the Chamberlain Mission
was first decided upon. What those concessions
must be depends on two things—the first, the degree
of pressure necessary to be put upon Shere Ali ; the
second, the future action of Russia. At the present
moment, it is necessary to insist that these con
cessions must be solid. But it is still more neces
sary to impress upon Englishmen the evils of
delay. We make the fullest allowances for
any unavoidable hindrances, and for the embarrass
ments, through the insufficiency of carriage,
that may at first hamper the movements of our
Generals. But these preliminary ^ obstacles can
be overcome in a fortnight more at the furthest,
and then there should be no fresh delay. We can
easily be at Candahar, and perhaps at Cabul, before
Christmas ; and there is urgent necessity for us to
proceed to that length promptly and without
hesitation. Shere Ali has gone too far to redeem
his late misconduct by simulated moderation, and
until he concedes the solid demands we shall require
of him we must continue those military preparations
which should shortly bear fruit in action of a decided
I character. No rule could last for long in India
| which condoned or ignored an open defiance on the
part of a semi-savage despot of Afghanistan. Sherb
A li must not only be brought to his senses, but the
necessary process must be applied at once.