Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎116r] (237/312)

and difficult marches from the Indus. No skill in
diplomacy and no payment of black mail, however
large, paid to the hill tribes, which have already
given us so much trouble on our own frontier,
would induce them to forego the temptation of
often trying to lay hands on the rich plunder our
convoys would place before their longing eyes. In
such a warfare blood would be spilt like water and
money would be spent by millions. Even if we
met with no serious check—and our good fortune
would, indeed, be great if none should occur—a
contest like this could hardly be continued very
long. The English tax-payers would neither be so
foolish as themselves to endure so heavy a charge
nor so unjust as to impose it on India. Sooner or
later, therefore—probably in two or three years at
the farthest,—we should be compelled to retire from
the country. Shere Ali would resume possession of
his dominions with all the popularity of success
and animated with the bitterest hostility to us.
Those who are so much alarmed at the loss of
prestige they think we should incur by submitting
to the insult we are supposed to have received
would do well to consider, before they insist upon
having a force sent in to Afghanistan, how much
more serious this loss of prestige will be if that force
should ultimately be compelled to retire. The effect
of this would, indeed, be most alarming.
Through the whole continent of Asia, and espe
cially in our own dominions, the fact of our
having for the first time been foiled in an
enterprise we had undertaken by an Asiatic Power
backed up by Russia would produce a deep im-
1 pression and encourage every plot and hostile
j design which may be entertained against us.
The belief, too, in the power of Russia would be
increased as much as that in our own would be
shaken. It is difficult to exaggerate the danger to
which our Indian Empire would thus be exposed,
and I must venture to assert that the rashness of
incurring this danger to get out of the difficulty by j
which we are now embarrassed would, in my
opinion, be inexcusable. At the same time, I am
far from denying that we shall sustain real damage
to our reputation if, after all that has been said and
done, the rejection of our Envoy should be passed
over without resenting it. But I contend that this
damage would be a trifle in comparison with the evil
of waging an unjust war,andwith that which would
result from its possible ultimate failure. It would
be far better to submit to the insult we have
brought upon ourselves by the mistaken policy we I
have of late pursued with regard to Afghanistan :
than that we should make another step in the
same unwise course with the vain hope of regaining
what we have lost by the errors we have com
mitted.
I should have been glad to add some remarks on
what I regard as the faults of our recent Indian !
policy, but 1 abstain from doing so because I am
conscious that I have already made an unreason
able demand upon your valuable space and upon
the patience of your readers.
I am, Sir, yoUf obedient servant,
Howick, Oct. 7. — GREY.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The people of England would do well to
act upon Lord Lawrence's advice and to take this j
matter into their own hands, fot both the power
and the responsibility rest with them, and the '
principal cost of an aggressive, ambitious policy
would inevitably fall upon them. Payment would
have to be made both in blood and money ; and how
are we to meet the demand for men consequent
upon a permanent occupation of Afghanistan with
out a conscription, which would be utterly incom
patible with our industrial system ? To the
elements of danger already existing in India would
be added another of a more formidable kind, and
we should place ourselves in the power of Russia
by advancing our frontier far beyond our resources
and supports, so as to become conterminous with
her in the midst of a hostile population. The last
generation was frightened out of its self-possession
by the mission of the unhappy Vicovich to Oabul,
and Russian statesmen are, no doubt, laughing in
their sleeves at having caught us in the same trap
a second time.
The position is briefly this. The intervening
space between the British and Russian possessions
in Asia is occupied by a highly warlike and, if
patriotism consists in love of home and country
and dislike of foreign interference, intensely
patriotic nation. The Afghans are also remarkable
for their mercantile genius, which finds its natural
development on the side of India. We could not |
have framed for ourselves a more advantageous
state of things than this on our only Indian frontier
which is open to invasion. The mistakes and mis
fortunes by which this vantage-ground has for the
moment been lost are important only so far as they
warn us to avoid similar, and perhaps more fatal,
errors.
Several mischievous fallacies have already come
to the surface. There cannot be a greater delusion
than to suppose that the interest and feelings of the
Afghans can be separated from those of their chiefs. ;
What is it that has enabled the Ameer to maintain [
his unfriendly attitude towards us but the sympathy
of his people ? Is it for a tnoment to be supposed
that he is the only Afghan who resents the curtail
ment of their Seistan frontier, or the establishment
of our menacing advanced post at Quettah ?
Again, it is urged that our arms and military ex
perience have so improved that we can now easily
I beat the Afghans. This may be so, but it is
entirely outside the real question. Conceive the
1 strain upon the resources of England and India that
would be caused by holding in subjection a re
markably strong,warlike country equal to, at least,
three Bosnias, without any favourably-disposed j
Christian population! If a large force were main
tained, the burden would be intolerable ; and if the
force were reduced to save expense, a popular in
surrection would be the consequence. All this oc
curred in the last generation, and,apparently,we are
going to involve ourselves a second time in the
same vicious circle.
Dost Mohammed and his son the present Ameer
always persistently declared that they could not be
answerable for the safety of a British mission at
Oabul, and they had reason for saying so in the
actual state of feeling of the Afghans towards us. It
is earnestly to be hoped that a permanent mission |
will not be forced on the Ameer, and that we shall i
forego such fidgetty precautions as sending military j
officers to the side of Afghanistan nearest to Russia, j
This is decidedly a case in which friendship is not j
likely to be improved by near neighbourhood—at j
least in the present temper of the parties.
It will be a blessed result if, after the Ameer has I
apologized (if right were done there would be ex
planations and apologies on both sides),a tenth part
of the money which would have been wasted on a j
destructive and mutually-exasperating war is in
vested in bridging the Indus and completing our
railway system to the frontier of Afghanistan. The
Afghans are now the only really independent
Mahornedan power, and if they were assured that
no designs are entertained against their national in
tegrity, and were assisted in developing the great
carrying trade between Central Asia and India, of
which they are already the principal agents, they
would soon be converted from jealous and suspi
cious neighbours to attached and useful allies.
I am, &c.,
Madrid,Oct. 6. U. E. TREVELYAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES,
i Sir,—Now that an Afghan war appears inevitable, I
^.•ust jou will cpntiniw to lenrt jour powerful columns for
; the advocacy of a lasting settlement of our future relations
| with the Government of Afghanistan ami the astablisiirnent
j of an impregnable frontier on the North-West of India.
| We had the opportunity of effecting both these objects
1 after the retributive campaign of 1S±2, but we threw it
away and are now reaping the results of our fooUshness-
We are indebted to Shere Ali for this opportunity ol
retrieving our error and for choosing a time to insult us
gratuitously when our hands are not full of business else
where, as they often are in consequence of the extent pf
the Empire. War has been forced upon us, and we shall
soon be in a position to rid ourselves for ever of that trouble
some nightmare, whether real or unreal, of Russian en
croachment in Central Asia and its danger to our inJian
Empire.
That Afghanistan will sooner or later be forced to submit
to the terms of the Indian Government admits of no doubt-
j It is possible, however, and, if the news of the Ameer'u in-
i tent ion to mass troops at the mouths of the passes be true,
1 most probable, that we shall have to conquer and oacupy
I the country first. It is incumbent on us, therefore, to con-
1 sider beforehand what we shall do with Afghanistan when
I it is in our power. Few will advocate the permanent
occupation of such a poor country and the government of
such troublesome subjects as the Afghans would always be.
Our object is not conquest, but the safety of our present
possessions. To secure this we should endeavour to obtain
the following concessions from the conquered Ameer :—
1. The cession of the valley of Pisheen, with sufficient
adjoining territory to maintain a force of all arms to bo
cantoned at Caadahar.
2. The North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India to be advanced in
such a manner as to give us the command of the entire
length of the several passes into Cabul.
3. The residence of a Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Cabul, with
assistants at Candahar and Herat.
4. The Ameer to enter into no foreign relations with
other Governments except with the consent of the Indian
I Government. In all other respects to be independent,
j This is merely a rough outline ; I will not enter into
details and thus trespass on your valuable space.
The Turis of the Korum Valley were formerly British
subjects, but we did not think them worth keeping, so we
should in that direction only be taking back what was
originally our own. The troops at Candahar and Quettah
would afford each other mutual support and those places
would be convenient halting places for an army marching
to Herat and the western frontier of Cabul, should
necessity arise for such a step.
With a strong military frontier and a force at Candahar,
no invading army would attempt to march across
i Afghanistan for the invasion of India. We could then
i afford to laugh at the periodical scares of Russian advances
in Central Asia and of disloyalty within our own frontier ;
and we should be in a position to reduce our military esta
blishments in India.
This war, therefore, may, if wisely utilized, be made the
means of relieving our Indian Exchequer instead of, as Lord
Lawrence seems to think, ruining it. I am, kif.,
Loudon, Oct. S. " POLITICAL. ,,