Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎115v] (236/312)

TIMES, THURSDAY,
AFGHANISTAN,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—In the excellent letter addressed to you by
Lord Lawrence and in your own articles on the
present relations of the Indian Government with
the Ameer of Cabul. two important questions are
raised—first, has Shere AH, by forcibly stopping
the Mission sent to him by the Viceroy, given just
grounds for war with him ? and, secondly, sup
posing the right to be established, is there any such
advantage to be gained by war as to make it ex
pedient to undertake it ? On these questions you
have come to conclusions directly opposed to those j
arrived at by Lord Lawrence, which appear to me
to be so erroneous and to be calculated to lead to
such calamitous results if they should be adopted
by the Government and the nation, that I venture
to ask you to allow me to explain in your columns
my reasons for dissenting from them.
With regard to the first question, I am not aware
that in all that has been said and written on the
subject any attempt has been made to explain upon
what grounds it can be maintained (as those who
take the warlike side in the discussion seem to
assume) that Shere Ali, though the ruler of an in
dependent State, had not a right to decline to re
ceive the Mission which the Governor-General of
India proposed to send to him. I believe the
right of every independent nation to refuse to re
ceive an Envoy from another has never been
questioned ; and Lord Lawrence has shown that in
the case of Afghanistan so long ago as 1857 this
right was exercised by its then ruler with our
assent, and has again been exercised, with the
same assent on our part, by the present Ameer
from 1869 to the present time. How, then, can
the refusal to admit our Envoy be regarded as
giving us any right of making war upon the
Afghans ? Nor is the case altered by what is
called the insulting manner in which the Mission
was stopped, or by the fact that the Ameer has
thought fit to receive an Envoy from Russia while
he rejected ours. For the insult the Viceroy has
only himself to thank. He thought fit to send
forward his Envoy with a formidable escort, with
out waiting for the Ameer's answer to the letter
(which, to say the least of it, was not a courteous
one) which announced the Mission. Sir N. Chamber
lain, on reaching the frontier, made known his ar
rival to the Ameer's officer in a letter still more want
ing in courtesy, and distinctly intimating his in
tention of advancing with or without permission.
This left to the Afghan officer only the choice of
allowing the Mission to proceed contrary to the
orders of the Ameer, or of telling the Envoy, as he
did, that his advance would be opposed by force.
Nor does the fact that a Russian Envoy had been
received at Cabul give any just ground of quarrel
to the Indian Government against the Ameer. It
is asserted that the Russian Mission was not sent
to Cabul in any spirit of hostility to us, and we
cannot disprove the assertion, though I am not more
disposed to give credit to it than yourself. But
even if the object of the Mission were not a mere
matter of suspicion, and if it had been avowedly
sent as a measure of precaution against the exten
sion of British power in Asia, it would have been
quite within the clear right of both Russia and
Afghanistan to enter into communication with each
other for this purpose. Who can contest the right
of these States to enter into a defensive alliance for
this object if they think fit to do so ; or who can
deny that the conduct of the Indian Government for
some time past has been well calculated to create in
the mind of the Ameer a strong impression that if
he desires to preserve a real independence, and not
to be reduced to the position of a vassal of the
Anglo-Indian Government, like the Indian Princes,
it is necessary for him to repel every advance on
the part of that Government towards establishing
its authority over him, and also to look out for the
best support he can find in his resistance to it ? I
am by no means surprised that in the position in
which he is placed, and looking to the language
notoriously held in India, the Ameer should have
been led to think that his wisest policy is to culti
vate the friendship of Russia. This is the lesson we
have been doing our best to teach him, and we have
no right to complain that he has learnt it, or that
he should now, in consequence, be pursuing the
policy he thinks best for his own interest. So long
as he abstains from aggression or menace of aggres
sion against us, we are not entitled to interfere
with him or to insist that he shall be friendly to
us rather than to Russia merely because he rules
over a territory which in former times has been
made the road for attacks upon India. Unless,
therefore, it can be shown that an offensive alliance
or hostile measures against the Anglo-Indian Go
vernment were contemplated by the Ameer and by
Russia, we have no right whatever to make war
upon either on account of what has lately occurred.
I need hardly observe that there is not the slightest
reason for supposing that the conclusion of an
offensive alliance against us lias ever been sug
gested, or that any attack upon the British do
minions was thought of by the Ameer j so that if
the Indian Government should declare war against
him, it would be a war of aggression, justified by
no principle of national law, and this country would be
responsible for all the blood that must be shed in it.
OCTOBER 10,
1 trust that this view of the subject may on calm
reflection be adopted by the British Government
and nation, and that the project of invading
Afghanistan (if it is really entertained by the
Indian Government) will consequently bo over
ruled ; but it is desirable also to consider the
second question raised by Lord Lawrence—Has this
country anything to gain by going to war with the
Ameer if it can be made out that we have just
grounds of quarrel with him ? The main object of
going to war (if I rightly understand what has
been urged in favour of that course) would be to
increase the security of our Indian Empire by pre
venting Russian influence from being so established
in Afghanistan that at some future time an attack
might be made upon India by the Russians com
bined with the Afghans. I will not stop to inquire
if there is any danger of such an attack being ever
made (which, for my own part, I altogether dis
believe) ; but, assuming the danger to be a real
one, would invading Afghanistan be calculated to
avert it ? Lord Lawrence thinks not ; and I am at
a loss to guess how what he says in support of that
opinion can be answered. A sufficient force under
British officers would, no doubt, be able to force its
way through the passes and to capture Cabul and
the other Afghan cities and fortresses, killing in
these operations many of the Afghans, and of
necessity laying waste much of their territory and
destroying a great deal of their property. But
certainly this would not tend to make the Ameer
and his followers more friendly to us than they
now are ; on the contrary, it could only make their
hostility far more bitter than it is. It is, indeed,
not impossible that in this manner a treaty might
be extorted from Shere Ali binding him to dismiss
the Russian Envoy and to enter into no further
communication with Russia, but to become our
ally and give us his assistance if there should be war
between Russia and ourselves. Such a treaty
might perhaps be extorted ; but nobody can be
simple enough to suppose that it would be observed
a moment longer than it could be enforced, or to
doubt that, in spite of any promises to the contrary,
the Ameer would find means of communicating
with the Russian authorities, and that his great
object would be to concert with them measures for
revenging himself for the injuries he had sus
tained. Our position, therefore, so far as regards
our prospect of having the Afghans on our side, in
stead of on that of Russia, in any contest which
may take place between us, would be injured in
stead of being improved by the most successful
war if Shere Ali were allowed to continue to be
ruler of Afghanistan. Perhaps it may be sug
gested that this difficulty might be obviated by
effecting a change of rulers in Afghanistan, and
placing power in the hands of one more friendly to
us than Shere Ali ; but such a scheme Will find no
favour from those who know anything of Indian
history and of the utter failure of the same scheme
when Dost Mohamed was deposed and our puppet
Shah Shujah set up in his place. To resort agdn
to such a device would be even worse than to resolve
avowedly to annex Afghanistan—that is to say, to
take upon ourselves the task of governing a poor
and mountainous territory, having a long and
difficult line of communication with the seat of our
power, and inhabited by a warlike and turbulent
population, which we could only rule by force, and
which never could be made to pay a tithe of the
cost of keeping it in subjection. The impolicy of
such an annexation appears to me so obvious that I
will not waste time in trying to prove it.
Even, therefore, if an invasion of Afghanistan
should meet with the greatest possible success by
compelling Shere Ali to submit to whatever terms
the Governor-General of India might think fit to
dictate, no real advantage that I can see would be
gained. But things might more probably take a
different course. It may be expected that a British
army would, without much difficulty, overcome any
force the Afghans could oppose to it, and would
capture Oabul and whatever fortresses they possess ;
but Shere Ali might neither be taken nor
frightened into submission. He might retreat
before us beyond the boundaries of his dominions !
with as many armed followers as he might be able 1
to keep together, leaving the rest to profess sub- j
mission until another opportunity of taking arms i
against us should arise. If this should happen, it
is clear that our troops could follow him but a little
way, if at all, beyond the Afghan frontier, and
must before long retire. But as soon as our pur
suit ceased, the Afghans would follow upon our
heels and carry on a guerrilla warfare against us, i
harassing us without ceasing and striving to cut
off our supplies. They would have the whole popu
lation helping them—every peasant when plough
ing his fields would have his gun concaaled hard
by, ready to be used whenever an opportunity
offered. They would have, too, the aid of many
wild and warlike tribes even from a long distance,
as well as the underhand, if not the open,assistance
of the Russians, who would furnish them with arms
and ammunition and officers to direct their efforts.
The Anglo-Indian army would find that, though it
had to meet no enemy able to stand against it in
the field, it could command only so much of the
territory as it could actually cover, while it would
be able to draw from it little of revenue or supplies,
and every convoy would have to be defended by a
strong escort and to fight its way through the long