Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎109v] (224/312)

At any moment we might now hear of that
first shot having been fired npon the Indian
frontier which would echo all over Asia, and be
the commencement of a third Afghan war. The
British troops must be by this time in some
force within and near Jamrood, which lies about
five miles from the actual entrance of the Khyber
Pass. Not very far up the valley, although
inside the gorges opening thence, stands upon
a lofty rock the square-shaped fortress of Ali
Musjid, which is the present frontier post of
S iiere A li Khan, and has a garrison said to
have been recently strengthened by four regi
ments of Afghan fighting-men. It is an easy
day's march from Jamrood to this stronghold,
and the intervening vale and pass are full of j
caves in the nearly perpendicular rocks, which
furnish the ordinary abodes of Khyberees and
Momunds, and would probably now be occupied
by some of S here A li's outposts. At any
time a body of these may descend into the
plain of which Jamrood marks the verge, and
exchange warlike salutations there with our
vedettes; while at Quettah, which cannot yet
have been sufficiently reinforced, Afghan horse
men are said to have been seen reconnoitring
on the Candahar road as if half inclined to
make a dash at the British cantonment. Thus,
albeit no proclamation of hostilities has ap
peared on either side, as far as is yet known,
any pugnacious Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. or even a fanatic Afghan
" jezailchee" might at any time kindle the
flame of a war ; and this is all the more pos
sible because the superstitious mountaineers
attach considerable importance to "first blood."
The likelihood of a conflict being thus forced
upon us by active challenge is increased by the
apparent readiness of the Ameer for the quarrel.
If it be true that he has been able to send large
bodies of troops at once to Ali Musjid as well
as up the long roads leading from Cabul and
Candahar towards the Kurrum Pass and Quettah,
this in itself would go to prove that at the date
of the repulse of our Envoy the Afghan army
was already mobilised, so far as such a highly
civilised term is applicable to the Ameer's rude
levies. In ordinary times the soldiers of the
Cabul ruler would be billeted about the country
in tic villages of the peasantry, whom, by the
way, they solely maltreat and plunder. To collect
these men—the " regulars " of the Afghanis
tan army—would bo a somewhat slow process,
and therefore it must either bo. the fact that
they were to a great extent already in hahd,
or that the troops spoken of as crowding
down to the frontier are chiefly irregular tribal
bands turning out from their caves and mud
huts at the earliest scent of battle. In either
and in any case the most cautious policy must
lie largely at the mercy of. chance as regards the
commencement of hostilities, for if these regular
or irregular frontier-troops of S here A li should
shoot down even a camp-follower of our columns,
or cut off a friendly village, the " fire will be set
to the hills." " The rumour of a British advance
on Ali Musjid," as our Simla despatch yesterday
stated, " is quite unfounded," and could hardly
fell to have been preceded by a formal declara
tion of war, which again would scarcely issue
until the return of the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. G iiolac H ousse J n,
our native emissary. If any violence had been
done to him, or if his return were signalised by
any sudden act of hostility at the mouth of the
Khyber, then forthwith the smouldering sparks
of enmityjDiight instantly leap into flame^ and
whither that conflagration might spread no ono
can foresee.
There is, nevertheless, an object set before us
in such a, third Afghan war—if it must come—
which well warrants a cheerful prosecution of
the task. We may trust by conduct and cou
rage to put an end to Afghan wars altogether,
and simultaneously to thrust far back from our
Indian frontier, for good and all, that foreign
intrigue which at present costs us so much
silent expenditure and hidden perturbation.
Afghanistan has been "severely let alone" by
previous Viceroys, on the theory that it might
serve as a non-conductor between Russia in
Asia and England in India. We have reason
to believe that Lord L awrence himself, at the
time when he was the illustrious representativo
and director of a "masterly inactivity," always
held the view that Russian influence would not
and could not pass so far along the thin line oJ
its Asiatic posts, and that before the Czar's arm
could be extended to Cabul it would " break off
at the shoulder-joint." Events have utterly over
thrown this hypothesis, and Afghanistan, far from
proving a non-conductor, is now palpably em
ployed by the machinations of Prince G o R tsgiia-
kofp as an Indian Servia, none too distant
for "unofficial warfare" or European "diver
sions." We are thus compelled to regard the
mountain Principality in a new light, and to
take steps to utilise it as an outwork which it is
eminently capable of, becoming. Those who
oppose this on the ground that the inner ends of
the passes, or even the Indus banks, would
furnish our best strategical lines, forget the
serious danger of leaving Cabul, Candahar,
Herat, and the Oxus wholly and permanently to
Russian manipulation. To do so would be as
if the defenders of a great fortress should com
placently sleep inside its gates, while outside the
enemy was quietly piling up powder-barrels
against the portals, and blowing the slow-
match with which to ignite them. We must
have a friendly Afghanistan either by agree
ment or by subjugation, although—or perhaps
because—this will place us on both flanks of
Persia and face to face with the Russian ad
vance. Then, and then only, will that impend
ing peril be stayed, and the sooner the better for
the peace of India. With fairly good manage
ment—and with that ilcbal or " happy fortune"
of our rule in which the East still thoroughly
believes—we may win the good will of the
Afghans, after perhaps well beating and dis
arming them ; for the task is really not so im-
I possible as once seemed the taming of the
Punjab or the safe occupation of Scinde. Then,
too, we shall obtain strong frontier posts within
reach of the Oxus, and frontier-guards, it may
be, of mixed Belooch and Pathan troops, with
such a regenerated Afghanistan as would pro
tect the Oxus and never suffer Balkh, Merv, 01
Badakshan to be annexed by those who noM
hold the right-bank of the Amu Daria. Thu»
there is here an excellent object to keep in view,
and one well worthy of large sacrifices and efforts.
To tell the simple truth, we can submit no longer
to be harassed by Russian intrigue so close out
side our boundaries. It is an evil which must be
dealt with decisively, and which will cost us less so
to deal with it than to meet it with ever-increas
ing precautions and unworthy anxieties. S herb
i A li is the first Cabul ruler who has publicly
I played off the Russian power against that of
England in full sight of the East. He must be
1 the last; for a repetition of such a spectacle as
his conduct presents would be in the highest de
gree injurious to our domination.
We publish this morning an item of intelli
gence which shows that Lord Lytton's Govern
ment is on the alert all round the frontier. la
Cashmere we have a friendly Prince who, in
name independent, yet gladly acknowledges sub
stantial fealty to her Majesty ; and this ruler,
R ungbeer S ingh , is the guardian of some very
important gateways of India. Two of them, the
Baroghil and the Karambar, might possibly
become of real moment in certain eventualities,
and it is satisfactory to hear that these passes
have been occupied in force by the troops of the
Maharajah of C ashmere. R ungbeer S ingh' s
army consists of about seventeen thousand men,
we believe, fairly drilled and armed, and accus
tomed to the climate of these lofty passes, which
| lead from the basin of the Oxus into that of tho
j Indus, and the lowest point among which mounts
to twelve thousand feet above the sea level. At
I that elevation the ice and snow are sufficient
I barriers against any hostile visitor during tho
! winter ; but the passages are open at present,
and will remain so for some weeks, while be
tween them and the Russian frontier atKhodjend
and Khokand there is nothing save the Southern
Pamir. It is upon ourselves, however, that we
must finally rely for the forces and the resolution
i necessary to place our Indian Empire out of reach
of further alarms; and though, perhaps, less
may be communicated in future about the move
ments and objects of our troops, it should not,
therefore, be imagined that the slightest didn-
clination exists on the part of the Home and
Indian Governments to confront the present
^crisis with all its perils and all its opportunities.
i A passage in Sir J ohn K aye's " Sepoy Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. War" has
! been just usefully resuscitated. It runs as fol
lows ; " Promptitude of action is often of tnore
I importance than completeness of preparation,
i and to show ourselves confident of success is in
| most cases'to attain it. The British power in
India cannot afford to be quiescent under insult
and outrage. Delay is held to be a sign of
weakness. It encourages enmity and confirms
vacillation. It is a disaster in itself, more serious
often than any that can arise from insufficient
preparation, and that great bugbear the in
clemency of the season." These words are saga
cious as well as high-spirited, and fitly become
an English historian, nor can it be supposed
that her Majesty's Ministers are blind to their
profound truthfulness.