Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎107ar] (219/312)

10
PALL MALL GAZETTE.
[October 8, 1878.
calculated to inaugurate a period of sensational politics, during whi
democratized Belgium would gravitate towards a confederacy witn t
French Republic. On the whole, it would be a blessing for this little country
which has been hitherto so well governed, and is in many respects so
interesting, if a strong National party could be formed by the breaking-up
of the present Catholic and Liberal factions. A coalition between t e
more moderate Churchmen and the tolerant Liberals could keep tne
whole cohort of "eccentrics"—Jesuits, Federalists, Democrats, and others
—in check; but nothing less than such a union will bring the kingdom sate
through the very delicate pass into which it has come after nearly ntty
years of cloudless prosperity.
THE STORY OF RUSSIAN INTRIGUE IN ASIA:
BROKEN PLEDGES.—11.
In the autumn of 1869 the principal point of discussion between the
English and the Russian Governments, in which Mr. Forsyth and Sir A.
Buchanan played a leading part on the side of England, related to the
necessity of exactly defining the boundary of Afghanistan. The Indian
Government had objected to that country being regarded a,s a neutral
zone, and the English and Russian Cabinets were endeavouring to arrive
at an understanding which should fix the limit over which the influence of
each Government should be recognized. England was prepared to exclude
herself from all points north of the Oxus. The territory of Dost
Mohammed had extended to that river ; and though Badakshan and
Wakhan were the last provinces to come under Shere Ali's rule, the
English Cabinet maintained the Ameer's right to those two districts.
Russia, however, put forward a claim to both on the part of Bokhara
and Khokand. But, plainly, she adopted that course on her own
behalf; for the Bokharian Ambassadors then in St. Petersburg intimated
to Mr. Forsyth that Bokhara had no power whatever over Badakshan.
Russia's object in endeavouring to withhold those provinces from Afghan
istan was evident. An examination of the successive steps in Russia's
advance across Asia will show that, where the selection was possible, the
Russian commanders have always preferred a mountain to a river frontier.
When these negotiations were afoot Russia had neared the Oxus, her
influence extended to that river, and the idea was already present to her
generals that the Hindoo Koosh would be the preferable frontier. Sir
Henry Rawlinson gives another reason for Russia's patronage of the claims
of the khanates to the Afghan territory. He points out that the high road
of trade between Western and Central Asia had always passed through
Badakshan and Wakhan to Yarkund and Kashgar; and that it was Russia's
aim to prevent such an important route coming into the hands of a State
under English influence. It is amusing to see how skilfully Russian
diplomatists laboured to veil this contemplated advance towards India
under the guise of anxiety for the rights of Bokhara and Khokand.
Foiled by the arguments of Mr. Forsyth and Sir A. Buchanan, they
temporized by proposing that the negotiations should be deferred until
a report had been presented on this subject by General Kaufraann.
The British Cabinet^ frequently and persistently asked for the production
of that report, but different pleas for delay were made year after year. At
length Lord Granville, in a despatch dated October 17, 1872, endeavoured
to bring the question to a settlement. He proposed that the northern
boundary of Afghanistan should include Badakshan and Wakhan, and
that the line of frontier should begin in the north-east at Wood's Lake
and extend along the Oxus to Khoja Saleh. Travelling westward from
that place, he proposed that the frontier should touch Andkoi, which
would be its extreme point to the north-west, and include Shibberjan,
Seripol, Maimenat, and Aksha. Roughly speaking, the proposed limit of
the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of Afghanistan extended from Khoja Saleh on the
Oxus to a point on the Persian frontier a few miles south of Sarrakhs.
The Russian reply to this despatch admitted all that Lord Granville sug
gested frorn Khoja Saleh westwards; but Prince Gortschakoff continued
to raise objections to those portions of the north-east boundary which
included Badakshan and Wakhan. The October despatch of Lord Gran
ville had also the effect of drawing forth the long-expected report of
General Kaufmann. The document is full of detail, but it suggests no
new points that deserve special notice.
Shortly after this exchange of ideas Count Schouvaloff unexpectedly
arrived in London. On the 8th of January he had an interview with Lord
Granville, and the various points of difference between the two Cabinets
were considered. The leading subjects of discussion were the boun
daries of Afghanistan and the proposed expedition to Khiva, about which
the English Government had been making some pressing inquiries. It is
not too much to say that the main object of Count Schouvaloff's mission
was to obtain English approval of that expedition, and that his instructions
were to offer in return for that approval an acceptance of the British
demand in regard to the Afghan frontier. On the 31st of January Prince
Gortschakoff, assured of the success of the Schouvaloff mission finallv
surrendered on the question of Badakshan and Wakhan, taking care
however, to represent his concession as "an act of courtesy," and as also
involving a responsibility on our part "to induce Shere Ali to maintain a
conquest " ttltU ^ ^ UP Ineasures of a gg ressi ™ or further
We now propose to deal with the engagements which Russia made and
broke respecting Khiva. That khanate had come under discussion when
the negotiations were progressing about the Duke of Argyll's proposal to
make the Oxus _ the limit of Russian influence. Baron Briinnow pointed
out as an objection that the proposed boundary would include a port on
of the Khiyan territory, and that Russia would thus be prevented from
chastising the ruler of that country for outrages inflicted upon Ru sian
subjects. Lord Clarendon admitted the right of the Czar to puS
the Khan on his own territory," adding this important proviso "S
England would rely on the honour of Russia as soon as she had obtained
reparation again to revert to the arrangement, should she have assented
to it, and consider the Upper Oxus as the boundary which was not to be
passed." Shortly after that conversation rumours of an intended expedition
against Khiva assumed a definite shape, and Sir A. Buchanan questioned
Prince Gortschakoff on the subject. The Chancellor denied that the
Russian Government had any intention "to despatch a military expedition
to Khiva." He declared, moreover; that " he would never consent to any
further extension of the territory of the empire." " Prince Gortschakoff's.
language was so apparently sincere," exclaimed Sir A. Buchanan, " that,
notwithstanding the strong grounds which exist for believing that an
expedition is preparing against Khiva, I shall endeavour" to believe
every word the Russian Chancellor has said. In the course of some
further conversation on the Khivan question in June, 1870, Prince
Gortschakoff assured the English Ambassador that " Russia neither
required nor desired to possess the khanates." Khokand and Bokhara,
he said, were ready to act according to her wishes, but Khiva was
still disposed to be hostile. Nevertheless, at the same moment Russia
was secretly preparing an expedition to Khiva; while as to Bokhara,
within two months of the last-mentioned date Russia took the important
Bokharian fortress of Shahr-i-subz (August 24, 1870). But the promises
about Khiva still went on. In June, 1871, M. Westmann declared
to Sir A. Buchanan that "he was aware of no change in the policy
of the Government or of there being any intention to send expe
ditions either to Khiva or Bokhara." He added that an expedition
to punish the Khan of Khiva, in order to force him to respect the
Russian caravans, "had been contemplated, but the expedition would
not take place, and any measures which might be adopted would be
limited to partial operations on the frontier " in order to protect it. He
further volunteered the statement that the relations with Bokhara " were
satisfactory," and this representation was confirmed a few months later by
the Ameer of Bokhara expostulating with the Khan of Khiva, and advising
him to come to terms with the Russian Government. In March, 1872,
the Director of the Asiatic Department at St. Petersburg (M. Stremooukoff)
admitted that reconnaissances had been already made against Khiva, and
that the Russian generals had found " the occupation of the place would
offer no strategical difficulties." In summing up the result of his conversa
tion with M. Stremooukoff, Lord Augustus Loftus wrote: "I have gained
the conviction that an expedition against Khiva is decided upon, and will
be made as soon as the weather and circumstances permit." Six or seven,
months later the Russian papers announced that the expedition had been
prepared, but M. Westmann denied (in September) that measures had
advanced to such a stage. He, however, practically admitted that if the
Khan interfered with commerce, and refused to give up the Russian
prisoners, the Russian Government would punish him. As the winter
advanced evidence increased of the Russian intention to send a force
against Khiva. The subject came up, as we have already described, in the
celebrated interview between Count Schouvaloff and Lord Granville. The
Russian representative admitted that an expedition was decided upon for
the^ spring, but declared that both its composition and its objects would
be insignificant. The force would consist of "but four-and-a-half batta An extra allowance of pay granted to soldiers involved in special field service or to public servants on special duty.
lions," and its objects would be " to punish acts of brigandage, to recover
fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his
part could not be continued. Not only," continued Count Schouvaloff,
" was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva,
but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given
that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way
lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva." It was not long before the
departure of the expedition gave an opportunity for testing the veracity of
one of Count Schouvaloff's promises. The insignificant force of four-andr
a-half battalions grew into three columns, which altogether numbered about
10,coo men, and was accompanied by forty guns. On June 10, 1873,
Khiva fell, and the time came for fulfilling the second of Count Schou
valoff's engagements. The treaty which was imposed upon the Khan, in
face of the Russian promise to make no territorial accessions, bestowed on
Russia the whole of the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Oxus.
Besides thus taking possession of a large extent of country, the treaty
prepared the way for the entire absorption of the khanate, if Russia were
so minded. It imposed an enormous indemnity, the payment of which
extended over nineteen years ; it extorted a declaration from the Khan of
Russian suzerainty, and a renunciation of the right to maintain diplomatic
relations or enter into treaties with the rulers of neighbouring khanates.
Russia also obtained exclusive control of the navigation of the Oxus,
and the right to establish commercial buildings on the left bank of the
river.
Lord Granville's criticism on this flagrant breach of engagements was
amazing. He saw " no practical advantage in examining too minutely
how far these arrangements were in strict accordance with the assurances
given in January by Count Schouvaloff." More surprising still, on
the very heels of this experience of the value of Russian pledges, he
proposed another arrangement. He declared the necessity of " a clear
and frank understanding " as to the relative position of British and Russian
interests in Asia, but suggested no definite plan for the attainment of that
object further than to recommend another pledge from Russia not to take
Merv nor interfere with the independence of the Ameer of Afghanistan.
Lord Granville's moderation proved very agreeable to the Government
of St. Petersburg. Prince Gortschakoff expressed his "entire satisfac
tion" at the "just view which Lord Granville had taken." "1°
my opinion," he exclaimed, " the understanding is complete." All that
was required, according to his opinion, for the future agreement of the
two Governments was a spirit of mutual goodwill and conciliation. The
understanding between the two Powers rested " not only upon the loyalty
of the two Governments, but upon mutual political advantages." As a
proof of this loyalty, he repeated " the positive assurance that the
Imperial Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely b a " rtnrI lts
sphere of action." This was in January, 1874.