Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎107r] (218/312)

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f or calculated to inaugurate a period of sensational politics, during which
now democratized Belgium would gravitate towards a confederacy with the
whe French Republic. On the whole, it would be a blessing for this little country
nea which has been hitherto so well governed, and is in many respects so
L a j interesting, if a strong National party could be formed by the breaking-up
thai present Catholic and Liberal factions. A coalition between the
on more moderate Churchmen and the tolerant Liberals could keep the
jnil, whole cohort of " eccentrics"—Jesuits, Federalists, Democrats, and others
—in check; but nothing less than such a union will bring the kingdom safe
through the very delicate pass into which it has come after nearly fifty
years of cloudless prosperity.
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THE
STORY OF RUSSIAN INTRIGUE
BROKEN PLEDGES.—11.
IN ASIA
I n the autumn of 1869 the principal point of discussion between the
English and the Russian Governments, in which Mr. Forsyth and Sir A.
Buchanan played a leading part on the side of England, related to the
necessity of exactly defining the boundary of Afghanistan. The Indian
Government had objected to that country being regarded as a neutral
zone, and the English and Russian Cabinets were endeavouring to arrive
at an understanding which should fix the limit over which the influence of
each Government should be recognized. England was prepared to exclude
herself from all points north of the Oxus. The territory of Dost
Mohammed had extended to that river ; and though Badakshan and
Wakhan were the last provinces to come under Shere Ali's rule, the
English Cabinet maintained the Ameer's right to those two districts.
Russia, however, put forward a claim to both on the part of Bokhara
and Khokand. But, plainly, she adopted that course on her own
behalf; for the Bokharian Ambassadors then in St. Petersburg intimated
to Mr. Forsyth that Bokhara had no power whatever over Badakshan.
Russia's object in endeavouring to withhold those provinces from Afghan
istan was evident. An examination of the successive steps in Russia's
advance across Asia will show that, where the selection was possible, the
Russian commanders have always preferred a mountain to a river frontier.
When these negotiations were afoot Russia had neared the Oxus, her
influence extended to that river, and the idea was already present to her
generals that the Hindoo Koosh would be the preferable frontier. Sir
Henry Rawlinson gives another reason for Russia's patronage of the claims
of the khanates to the Afghan territory. He points out that the high road
of trade between Western and Central Asia had always passed through
Badakshan and Wakhan to Yarkund and Kashgar; and that it was Russia's
aim to prevent such an important route coming into the hands of a State
under English influence. It is amusing to see how skilfully Russian
diplomatists laboured to veil this contemplated advance towards India
under the guise of anxiety for the rights of Bokhara and Khokand.
Foiled by the arguments of Mr. Forsyth and Sir A. Buchanan, they
temporized by proposing that the negotiations should be deferred until
a report had been presented on this subject by General Kaufmann.
The British Cabinet frequently and persistently asked for the production
of that report, but different pleas for delay were made year after year. At
length Lord Granville, in a despatch dated October 17, 1872, endeavoured
to bring the question to a settlement. He proposed that the northern
boundary of Afghanistan should include Badakshan and Wakhan, and
that the line of frontier should begin in the north-east at Wood's Lake
and extend along the Oxus to Khoja Saleh. Travelling westward from
that place, he proposed that the frontier should touch Andkoi, which
would be its extreme point to the north-west, and include Shibberjan,
Seripol, Maimenat, and Aksha. Roughly speaking, the proposed limit of
the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of Afghanistan extended from Khoja Saleh on the
Oxus to a point on the Persian frontier a few miles south of Sarrakhs.
The Russian reply to this despatch admitted all that Lord Granville sug
gested from Khoja Saleh westwards; but Prince Gortschakoff continued
to raise objections to those portions of the north-east boundary which
included Badakshan and Wakhan. The October despatch of Lord Gran
ville had also the effect of drawing forth the long-expected report of
General Kaufmann. The document is full of detail, but it suggests no
new points that deserve special notice.
Shortly after this exchange of ideas Count Schouvaloff unexpectedly
arrived in London. On the 8th of January he had an interview with Lord
Granville, and the various points of difference between the two Cabinets
were considered. The leading subjects of discussion were the boun
daries of Afghanistan and the proposed expedition to Khiva, about which
the English Government had been making some pressing inquiries. It is
not too much to say that the main object of Count Schouvaloff's mission
was to obtain English approval of that expedition, and that his instructions
were to offer in return for that approval an acceptance of the British
demand in regard to the Afghan frontier. On the 31st of January Prince
Gortschakoff, assured of the success of the Schouvaloff mission, finally
surrendered on the question of Badakshan and Wakhan, taking care,
however, to represent his concession as " an act of courtesy," and as also
involving a responsibility on our part " to induce Shere Ali to maintain a
peaceful attitude," and give up "all measures of aggression or further
conquest."
We now propose to deal with the engagements which Russia made and
broke respecting Khiva. That khanate had come under discussion when
the negotiations were progressing about the Duke of Argyll's proposal to
make the Oxus the limit of Russian influence. Baron Briinnow pointed
cut as an objection that the proposed boundary would include a portion
of the Khivan territory, and that Russia would thus be prevented from
chastising the ruler of that country for outrages inflicted upon Russian
subjects. Lord Clarendon admitted the right of the Czar to punish
the Khan " on his own territory," adding this important proviso, "that
England would rely on the honour of Russia as soon as she had obtained
October 8, 1878.]
PALL MALL GAZETTE.
9
the rails > 4he effect of so employing it was to render it qtfite useless
for its original purpose as a common road, so that another embankment is
now in course of construction, to which the rails are to be transferred,
when the road may be allowed to revert to its original use. Meanwhile
nearly ten years have elapsed since the company's line was completed to
Lahore, giving through communication from Calcutta and Bombay with
that place. Yet only 100 miles of theState line have been opened, and
on the greater part of the remaining distance to the frontier, about 170
miles, scajfeijriDegmning has been made.
Hie various trade returns at the present time are not very cheerful
reading. Iron, for instance, is " quiet" at all the centres. At Barnsley,
"while the make of pig is fully maintained it moves off but slowly, though
prices have reached a very low point." At Barrow-in-Furness prices are
easier. At Birmingham the downward tendency in iron has been " very
marked of late," and -the iron wire trade is very depressed, while metal
rollers report business dull. In Darlington and South Shropshire we find
the same story; while at Sheffield it appeal's " the heavy t^des are
becoming worse, and every few weeks men are being discharged Trotn
the large works." In the cotton trade affairs are no better. In Man
chester it is stated " the inquiry for India and China shirtings has been
limited to offers at prices too low for acceptance. The heavier goods
are neglected and weak,And so as to wool. At Bradford, Halifax,
Huddersfield, and Leicester, we are told the same tale of slow demand,
falling prices, and general depression. The Leeds market seems a little
better, but this^is merely for a temporary cause. In short, wherever we
look we see that " times are bad," and they are getting no better as winter
approaj^s; and we are afraid that the causes of this long-continued
depn^sion are deep.
OUR TRUE POSITION WITH REGARD TO RUSSIA.
T o-dav's telegrams confirm our interpretation of yesterday's confused
news from the frontier. Shere Ali is forcing the fighting, with the only
result, so far, of throwing the Khyberees into our arms. It is not
improbable that by this time the conflict has actually begun. If so, and
if the first movements of our troops prove successful, we shall hear that
they are only a part of a settled plan of immediate action. In the event
of a check, the explanation will be otherwise.
Next we have to note that the intimate connection between Russian
diplomacy in general and the Afghan war in particular, and the use that
may be made of our Indian difficulties at St. Petersburg and Constanti
nople, are gradually coming into recognition even where the wish to
deny these things is greatest. It is admitted that some of the Russian
journals (all Russians, it would have been nearer the truth to say) seem to
think that the time is near for the fulfilment of the prophecy that the Cos
sack and the sepoy Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. will meet on the banks of the Oxus. Note is taken of
the warning that if we are too successful in Afghanistan it will be necessary
for the protection of the Czar's interests to send a Russian force to occupy
Merv and Balk; and " then the fiction of a neutral country intervening
between the Russian and British sentinel will cease to exist." Nothing
is said about the Russian intimation that " by properly calculating our
means of harming England in India we may incline her to assume a
milder policy regarding the Balkan peninsula;" nor is any notice taken
of the assurances repeated every day that at all events we may look
for the same sort of unofficial warfare on the side of the Afghans
which proved so extremely troublesome to the Turks in Servia. But it is
admitted that the Russians do threaten, in the event of an upset in
Afghanistan, to restore peace there by the methods which have been found
effective to the north of the Oxus, and that, " whatever may happen,
Russia will never permit the incorporation of Afghanistan by the English."
But what is the comment upon all this? It is said to be "idle
vapouring." The truth is, it is idle vapouring to say so. This must be
allowed: that when they who threaten have it in their power to carry their
threats into execution, and when also they have good or sufficient reasons
of their own for carrying out their threats, it is mere folly to disregard the
warning. Now it is quite certain that the Russians can, if they please,
work heavily against us in Afghanistan with arms, with money, with
military advice, with diplomatic promises to any extent; the only doubt
is as to how far they have already bestowed on the Ameer these succours
and encouragements. And we take it to be certain that should any one
of the events occur to which our Government look forward as happy ones
■—t'.e. the death of the Ameer, or his deposition, or his complete defeat—
the Russians will find that the security of their Central Asian territory
demands an advance in arms. More, we anticipate that such an advance
will be made as soon as the conflict becomes serious, or any considerable
change in the state of affairs in Afghanistan appears imminent. Let
us never forget that the Russians have everything at stake in those parts,
and that they have long had a candidate of their own in hand to succeed
Shere Ali, should anything happen to him or to his hold on power. It
is the merest stupidity, if it is nothing worse, to teach the country
that the Russian threats are idle vapour. There is much in them that is
truly formidable; and it is because we feel them to be formidable, and
know that the Russians are well aware of their advantages, and believe that
our own Government cannot be dull to the tremendous risks which their
own misconduct of affairs has brought upon them, that we expect that
attempt at a " solution " which we still predict. Our Ministers will try nego
tiations with Prince Gortschakoff, who is quite ready to be " squared " once
more. They are under extreme temptation to do so, and they have already
proved that it is a sort of temptation they are not very capable of resisting.
They had their chance of paralyzing all Russian attempts to worry us in
India a few months ago ; they had not courage enough to take it; thereby
they gave our enemies the whip hand not only on the Indian frontier but
in Constantinople; and now we must bear the consequences. There is
no escape from them, in one ill shape or another, except by a course
of action indefinitely more risky than that which our Government declined
—bragging.
THE TROUBLES OF A LITTLE KINGDOM.
M ons, Oct. 3.
I n Belgium, as in France, the question which most preoccupies the minds
of people who think on politics is the quarrel between the Clerical party
and the Government of the day. The Belgians in their sleepier fashion are
quite as excited on this subject as the French; and though they are not
ready with such heroic schemes of legislation, yet it would not be surprising
if in some practical way they brought the quarrel to an end sooner than
their noisier neighbours. It must strike every one who visits Belgium at
this moment that the Roman Catholics committed a great mistake when
they allowed themselves to be politically embrigaded for a permanent party
strife with the Liberals. The late M. Van der Weyerused to say that it
was always easy to see when the Belgian Liberals were in power, for then
every Government official went to mass ; but nowadays the Liberals will
neither go to mass nor accomplish any of the other rites of religion. They
have got beyond the point of caring whether they are called infidels. They
pride themselves on a strong-mindedness which rejects all the teachings
and observances of the Church as superstitious, and the consequence is that
social relations between neighbours are seriously affected. In this town
of Mons—which is rather a favourable spot for studying Belgian politics—
there are plenty of excellent Hainauters who refuse to associate with
Liberals, from the belief that the wives of these latter, joined in
civil wedlock only, are no wives at all, and that the unbaptized
children of such unions are little reprobates whose contact would defile
other boys and girls. Two local journals, conducted with much
spirit, exchange views on the subject of purgatory and its probable inhabi
tants with surprising frankness; and every time there is an election for
some municipal office the arguments used by the candidates on both sides
abound in allusions to spiritual things such as would be deemed very odd
elsewhere. No French Radical has yet ventured, as one of the Liberal
members for Mons did at the late election, to issue in his address a
ponderous statement of his " seventy-two reasons " for disbelieving in the
Christian dogmas. In a neighbouring constituency a candidate had to
defend himself against the charge of having sent his children to a Jesuits'
school, and he challenged his detractors, as he called them, to prove that
he had at any time within the last twenty years set foot within a church.
If this goes on candidates wi!l be pledging themselves to their electors to
be buried according to civil rites.
Among the warm-blooded French populations such religious wrangling
as this would lead to blows; but these beer-drinking Belgians are a sober-
minded people, who have found out that the tongue is the handiest weapon
after all. They have made each other uncomfortable, but they will not
fight nor attempt persecution; and, from all we can see, the quarrel
will eventually be smoothed away, for this reason—that neither
party feels disposed to proceed from words to deeds. It is said
that M. Malou, the ex-Premier, rather rejoiced in the defeat which
the Catholics suffered at the late elections, being afraid that if his party
bad triumphed he should have been egged on by the Jesuits to go much
further than it behoves any prudent Belgian to venture. On the other
hand, M. Frere-Orban, the present Premier, is the last man to propose
anti-Clerical laws; nor would M. Roland Jacquemyns, the enfant terrible
of the Liberal party (and a fervid philo-Russian, by the way), be inclined to
do so now that he has been pacified by a seat in the Cabinet. The Belgians
seem to have arranged their party divisions on religious grounds, because
under the judicious rule of Leopold I. religion was the only thing they
could find to dispute about; but, considering how wretched the female
portion of the community are made by these dissensions, and considering
that some questions vitally affecting the future of the country are
coming to the front, it would not be strange if Belgian politics shortly
took a new departure. Prince Bismarck's plan for drawing Belgium into
a military confederacy with Germany—in other words, for putting the
army of the small and peaceful State at the disposal of the big and
aggressive one—has by no means been shelved yet. It has a warm sup
porter in M. Jacquemyns, who is a Liberal of the newest-fangled type;
insomuch that he wrote a pamphlet last year to prove that England
was the real disturber of peace in the East, and that all would go
well if her ambition could be curbed and if Russia were suffered
to fulfil her civilizing mission unchecked. This ingenious gentleman
has a dozen backers in the Belgian Parliament, whose importance is pretty
much what that of the Irish Home Rulers would be if the two parties in
the House of Commons were so evenly balanced that the Home Rule
vote would turn the scale in all great divisions. These Belgian neo-Liberals,
or Federalists as they style themselves, are believed, however, to have
some very powerful friends at Court; and this fact, aided by the blatant
encouragements they receive from too-evidently subsidized newspapers, is
likely to make them more and more influential unless the patriotism of the
majority of Belgians takes alarm. Here another danger presents _ itself;
for many who see what ruin the Federalists are planning can imagine no
other remedy but universal suffrage, which genuine Liberals dread, as
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