Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎94v] (192/312)

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^ The Indian army is thus organised at present on a very expen
CONDITIONS OF AN ADVANCE ON CABUL. sive and far from efficient pattern. By pressing on every available
_ , -n • .. nian tbe front, and leaving the country unguarded for the:
npHE Calcutta OorVespondent of the Daily News naively com- time, the Bengal army may be made to furnish perhaps thirty
_L plains that the Indian Government continues its habit of thousand fighting men, natives and Europeans, for service on the
acting first and talking afterwards, so that the newspapers have to frontier. This is ample for the purpose in hand, and is quite as
deal either \vith accomplished facts or vague forecasts. If the flux large a force as transport can be supplied for in the difficult i
of information now being telegraphed to Europe every day is the country which is to become the scene of operations. And there |
result of secresy, we may well wonder what would happen under ig^ after all, but little risk in leaving the country without garrisons i
a leaky Government. Happily telegrams will be of less value for a time. The Spectator''s forebodings about a Mahratta rising j
to an enemy in Central Asia than they would be to a more j may be safely dismissed from the mind. The attitude of the
civilized adversary; and, still more fortunately, the sort of in- people of India will, no doubt, be one of expectation in the first
formation with which the papers are now being filled contains instance; the internal danger would eome afterwards, if we suffered
little that can be turned to useful account. The strength of an reverses in Afghanistan; but it has to be remembered that, during the i
assembling force, and the^names of its leaders, are facts which in; crisis of the last Afghan war, when India was bare of troops, and j
any case it would be impossible to conceal.^ The difference when the overthrow of the Mahratta empire was still rankling in the
between success and failure in a campaign will probably turn recollection of the Mahrattas, no rising took place. What is more [
mainly on the capacity of the commander and his staff, the temper remarkable, the Sikhs, through whose country we had to advance
of the troops, and the state of the supplies ; and these are just the in order to reach the entrance to the passes into Afghanistan, did
facts which will never be divulged. A general may be known toll not take advantage of the opportunity afforded for destroying the
be incompetent by all those immediately about him; but, if army thus separated from its base by manv hundred miles. Of
he is personally popular, they will keep the secret, and course it does not follow that things will turn out now exactly as
try, as the phrase goes, to pull him through. No one ever ventures they did then; but common sense dictates that we need not go out
to say that an army about to take the field is not perfect as to spirit of our way to conjure up every possible danger as a reason for in-
and discipline. For example, has any one dared to whisper in public, action. And although the native troops can be augmented only by
what is nevertheless perfectly well known, that all the regiments the slow process of recruiting 1 , the European portion of the army
which formed the late Indian contingent at Malta were not very may be reinforced at once. Whatever other measures may be
fine specimens of troops ? The condition of the equipment and necessary, not a day should be lost in sending out troops from
commissariat will always, with a respectable staff, be a secret England; and, if sent at once, they will arrive at the very best
known only to few, and scrupulously kept from newspaper corre- season of the year. Hall'-a-dozen battalions of infantry, with three
spondents. As regards the present case, we probably never or four batteries, and perhaps a regiment of dragoons, sent out at
had to deal with one in which the line of action to be taken would once to take the place, at the most important points, of the troops
be determined more distinctly by certain ruling conditions which which have been moved to the frontier, will effectually prevent
can be known only to the Government of India and its immediate any internal trouble while the war is going on, and the Govern-
advisers; and it would be amusing to note the assumption of ment will be inexcusable if so much of precaution is not taken,
certainty with which some of our contemporaries lay down the law; Given the thirty thousand men available for active service, howl
about the coming war, were it not that the tone of the press suggests | may they be most effectively employed? Every consideration;
a, doubt whether it will not soon become impossible for a points to the advantage of striking a blow at once. We know|
British ^ general to lead an army to success, under the glare what sort of resistance we are likely to meet if we invade Afghan-
of publicity given to all his proceedings. For the present, istan now; but the operation might become vastly more difficult j
indeed, correspondents have not got to the point of lay- if the Ameer is allowed time to prepare for our coming, especially!
iug bare all the shortcomings of our leading officers on the if he gets the assistance of Russian officers; nor can we expect
scene of action. But it is evident that the Viceroy is to receive that India will be free from excitement till we have put ourselves j
no mercy if he does not do exactly what each paper suggests, right with him. And, at first sight, there would appear to be no par-
Difficult though the task of decision may be to those on the spot, ticular difficulty in getting to Cabul before the winter. The history
who have the facts to guide them, it is all plain sailing to certain of Pollock's successful advance, with a much smaller force than
writers for the press, although no two of them are agreed about is now available, shows that this would not be much of a military j
the subject. Our sprightly contemporary who from the recesses operation. But there are other considerations which will no doubt|
ll of Wellington Street tells us exactly what is passing in Shere Ali's carry weight with those who have to decide. The month of Sep-I
g mindis only one degree more absurd than several others. tember is one of the hottest,,and is quite the unhealthiest, in the year I
Widely as these authorities diff er—from the opinion expressed in the plains of Upper India, and a good deal of sickness may be saved [
in one quarter that we shall be indelibly disgraced if we do not which would otherwise inevitably occur, if the movement of the
get to Cabul before Christmas, to the solemn nonsense of last troops to the frontier is delayed till colder weather sets in. Yet, if
Monday's Times, that in war no risks must be run—they are, one they are to go through the Kyber before Christmas,, not an hour is to I
and all, agreed about the yastness and completeness of our military he lost. Of course sickness must, if necessary, be faced, and some oft
resources in India. Yet it is ^exactly on this point that there is just our most successful Indian campaigns have been carried out at thel
cause for anxiety. The Indian army resembles the British in that, worst seasons. Not to mention Plassey,. Assaye was fought in Sep-1
while enormously expensive and immensely over-officered in the tember, and, during the Mutiny the troops were under canvas andi
higher grades, it wants men, who are, after all, a very necessary on the move during the whole year, with, it must be added, terri- i
ingredient in an army. Happily the two cases are_ so far different ble loss in consequence. A more serious question by far is that I
that while at home we have not even got to the point of suggesting of carriage. We at home, who have had no experience of thel
a practicable plan for getting men, in India no difficulty will be wants of an army in the field since the beginning of the century—;
felt on that head. The North and North-west of India offer an un- for the efforts we made to feed the Crimean army encamped half- ■
limited supply of excellent material for soldiers ; but then it must a-dozen miles from the shore do not count for anything—can;
take time to train recruits, and the Indian Government might reason- hardly form a conception of what is involved in the way of carriage i
ably wish to delay advancing till the rank and file of the native for an Indian army. We must not, indeed, estimate the needs ofl
army should be brought up to a respectable strength. Never more the case by what used to be allowed. The enormous multiplica-;
than a small army relatively to the extent of territory it has to tion of camp followers permitted thirty or forty years ago was j
guard, the Indian army has of late years been largely reduced, and merely one of the many indications visible of the general state of
is now but little more than a congeries of skeleton cadres, but cadres indiscipline and inefficiency into which, the Indian army had
which, under the long-service system in force, there are no reserves been suffered to fall. We have improved in this respect;
immediately available to fill. The country which before the since the days of the Mutiny, and it must be remembered |
Mutiny was garrisoned by the seventy-four regiments of Bengal that the brigade which was destroyed at Cabul, with its
Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. , each eleven hundred strong, besides numerous contingents host of camp followers, was living in a fancied security, the I
and so-called irregular troops, is now barely occupied by forty-five officers and soldiers having their wives and families with them, |
weak battalions, mustering about seven hundred men each of aU and business generally being carried on as if it had been stationed!
ranks. A large part of this force is of course not available for in the most peaceful part of India. Still, when the greatest!
service beyond the frontier, but must be left to garrison various i ,1 i c T
important points within oux own territories; but aW one-kalf of X ? ^ !af56 rt
it is stationed westward of the Jnmna, and therefore within ° ^ t T ' d-re to the,
four hundred miles of the frontier. ' There are also five ' , • I1
regiments of Ghoorkas at different points of the Lower W 1 , 11 * 1
Himalaya, and therefore ueai at hind, spleudid troops, 1
and the well-lmowu Punjab froutier force of ten regiments i Wni"? SS,. ! ^ A Tt " en T ^ ^ officers' servants,
Al+n^f-W tW SVA nf fnW™ ir, hos P ltal orderlies, and the like. In India officers find their own
Altogether there are sixty battalions of infantry in the Bensral ,-n .•/> -
army and the North of India, occupying the great plain, fifteen ^ artificers are native mechanics; and the
hundred miles in extent, from Calcutta to Peshawur, or as far as If W 19 1Q . tlie way These a 1 help to
from London to Constantinople, of which perhaps by running ^ ^ the excessive number of camp followers is
thino -s wrv fin«. tW. V™ rJd* .Sl.vL a J. dl L e to the muc h better care taken of the soldier in India
things very fine, thirty battalions might be made available for ser- tC' L ZZrS % T ™Ken oi tne somier in India
vice beyond the frontier, or about twenty thousand native infantry. undpr in Wtkn l 61 ®. been grilling
. J ,, , rn , . , . , , Y under m Cyprus would be thought unfit in India even for Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. ;
the greater part of it of excelknt quality. This number might be the sick soldier must be carried in a comfortable litter, each
doubled or trebM in six months by recruiting, but the young requ i r i n „ four bearers aild the whole iug of f ndi
soldier would not be thoroughly efficient for some months longer. warfare assumes that there shall al be a h suffici of th ;
, The number of European infantry battalions in India has been to prevent of our wolmded from ^ left on the fie f d> Th ;
I largely increased since the Mutiny, fifty-two being now stationed every horse a man to SC0Qr the line c of maIch ri ht and l ft
: there as against twenty-two before the Mutiny 5 but the establish- to cut gl . agS; for no stores of foraf , e are to be had . F ® r all th '
ment of these also has been greatly reduced. The British cavalry camp foifowers food must be carried, and food again for the men
regiments also have been increased from four to nine; but whereas
a dragoon regiment on the Indian establishment used to muster
nearly seven hundred sabres, it is now actually weaker than one at
home. In this matter Indian interests have been entirely subordi
nated to the- supposed interests of the British army. For India,
where it takes time to make good losses in its European troops, strong
cadres, which can still be respectable bodies after some considerable
who drive the carts and camels on which this food is carried. |
Thus each additional follower creates a new burden, and the > -
baggage of an Indian army, with all care taken, becomes an I
enormous drag on its movements, the first nucleus arising from the ;;
need of taking care of the British soldier, and bringing him up to 1
the fighting point in good trim. It is easy to understand, there- L -
fore, that the question whether it is possible to go to Cabul before S
stress of campaigning, give a much better organisation than sma 1 the winter will depend, not on the power of moving up the troons
cadres with their expensive staff and attendant charges for colonels in time, but on whether the needful supplies can be collected
commandant ; but the requirements of the _ Engbsh service de- j Supposing this to be satisfactorily accomplished, the next point to
tl:ie latter organisation, and so Indian interests have to give j be considered is the strategical difficulties which would have to be
^ ' encountered in undertaking an immediate campaign.