Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎94r] (191/312)

V/ THE COST OF THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN.
\ Whatever may be the resolutions at which the Cabinet
, ' . > will arrive to-day, there is (says the Standard) one which it
\ hopes does not admit of doubt. It will be decided, we
must assure ourselves, and the decision must be promptly
made public, that no part of the cost of the Afghan war
will be laid upon the Exchequer of India, Upon this
point a bold course is alone consistent at once with prudence
and with justice. Some half-hearted politicians and see
saw journalists, who are afraid to know their own minds,
may busy themselves in finding out precedents for one course
or the other, and striking a balance between them.
But it becomes statesmen who have the courage of their
opinions, and Englishmen, irrespective of party, who desire
to maintain a truly " Imperial" policy, to judge the
present situation apart from obsolete examples and changed
conditions. The question before us is a simple one, and
must be answered frankly. It is this : Do the circum
stances out of which the war against the Ameer of Cabul
has arisen justify us in imposing the burden of its cost upon
the people of India ? The problem is not a very compli
cated one, nor does it require any elaborate knowledge of
Indian affairs for its elucidation. There are two elements
to be taken into consideration—the political origin of the
war upon which we are embarking, and the capacity
of India to yield the resources needed for carrying
on that war. The Cabinet will, of course, weigh those
matters well; but it is impossible to believe that they
can come to any other conclusion than that the war is
essentially an Imperial war, and that India is unable to pay
for it without the risk of a strain sufficient to disorganise
her whole financial system. No fair-minded observer of
Indian affairs will deny that, after a succession of famines
and the heavy losses caused by the depreciation of silver,
the country requires some breathing time before it is called
upon to bear any new burdens. In case of a war demand
ing large pecuniary contributions from the Indian people,
the means of raising the cost by an increase of taxation
would be scarcely available. Indeed, it would be more than
difficult—it would be well nigh impossible—to draw from
India the additional taxation which would be needed to
meet the charge, even for interest, upon the cost of an
Afghan war, if that cost amounted to ten or twenty
millions. The necessity of taking the burden on our own
shoulders is clear, and the sooner we realise it the better for
our self-respect.
The Times cannot doubt that the serious financial ques
tion involved will receive the close attention of the Cabinet.
It is a subordinate question for the moment, for no nation
which respects itself and its honour can afford to say that
it shrinks from the cost of a necessary war ; but it is none
the less an important one. Lord Lawrence assures us that
the expenses of a war will ruin the finances of India. But
it will rest with Parliament to determine whether the
finances of India shall be charged with such expenses, and,
if so, in what proportion. It is clear that the Afghan
question, whatever its issue, is partly an Imperial, partly
an Indian one. But it is an Imperial question simply and
solely because it is an Indian question first. It is in the
interests of India that wo have entered into relations with
Afghanistan, and if we have to go to war it will be in the
interest of India that we do so. But for India we should
have no more interest in Afghanistan than we have in the
moon ; and if we are forced into a war which is none of our
seeking, it is only just that India, whose security is endan
gered, should bear a portion at least of the cost. What
portion it should bear, if any, it will be for the Govern
ment in the first place to suggest, and for Parliament
to decide. We shall do well to be generous in the
matter, no doubt. India is poor; if some authori
ties are to be trusted, it is yearly growing poorer,
and many parts of it have , lately been devastated
by famine. But constant alarm and disturbance, such
as we are threatened with through the hostility of Afgha
nistan, would be as disastrous to India as famine or even
war itself, and the cost of a wa,r which restored its tran
quillity might prove, after all, to be not the greatest
disaster that it could suffer. In view of the condition of
Indian finance, we trust the Government will think it right
to recommend Parliament to undertake a share of the
expenses of such operations as may prove to be necessary in
Afghanistan ; but, if so, it will be rather as an act of gene
rosity towards a suffering country than one of strict justice.
India must be defended, and it is our task to defend it ;
but it would certainly not be just in principle to relieve
India of the whole burden of measures acknowledged to be
necessary for its defence.
THE AEGEAN DIEEIOULTY.
TH® Mgli autliority of Lord Lawrence will probalbly
disturb the apparent unammity whicli prevailed in
[England as to the necessity of invading Afghanistan. Lord
Lawrence's judgment is entitled to respect, even when his
I arguments are not convincing; but it is remarkable that
he seems neither to recognize the change of circumstances
which arises from the reception of a Russian Envoy at
Cabul nor the possible share of Russia in the recent policy
of the Ameer. It may have been prudent to tolerate the
sullen isolation of a semi-barbarous ruler as long as it was
indiscriminate or impartial, and nevertheless to resent his
ostentatious preference of a rival Power, If the enterprise is
undertaken, the mode of prosecution must be determined
exclusively by professional judgment. Mr. Eawcett, in a
letter to the Daily News, raises the important question
whether the cost of the war is to be borne by the English
or the Indian Treasury. The late Lord Derby, when the
government of India was transferred from the Company
to the Crown, stated that the expense of wars beyond the
Indian frontier, undertaken for English objects, would not
be paid out of Indian revenues; but, as might be ex
pected, no definition was attempted of Imperial or of
Indian interests. The expense of the subsequent Persian
war was divided between the English and the Indian Govern
ments, Mr. Eawcett relies on a vague declaration, attri
buted to the Viceroy, that he had, before he left England,
arranged with the Secretary of State the due subordina
tion of his measures to the policy of the Government at
home. It was proper that the two Governments should act
in concert; but it may perhaps have been intended that
any military operations which might be necessary in India
should be considered as local in their character. The expense
of the last Afghan war was borne by the Company, although
the Directors steadily opposed the warlike enterprise which
was undertaken by Lord Auckland at the instigation of Lord
Palmerston. On that, as on other occasions, the pacific
inclinations of the Company were overruled by the
Ministers of the Crown acting through the Board of Con-
trol, Mr, Eawcett fails to show that the punishment of
the Ameer s insolence is not a duty primarily devolving
on the Indian Government, The share of Russia in the
transaction has not been officially ascertained ; nor is it
possible at present to determine how far the incitement of
trouble in Afghanistan was, as some Russian newspapers
assert, intended to react on the mode of executing the
Berlin .treaty. The strongest part of Mr, Eawcett's argu
ment is founded on the financial necessities of the Indian
Government; yet it is impossible to maintain a vast Em
pire, garrisoned by a powerful army, if means cannot be
j found for prosecuting a frontier war. The money must in
the first instance be raised by loan, and the payment of in-
| terest with or without a sinking fund would not impose on
the taxpayers an intolerable burden. It may be a question
whether England ought not to bear a portion of the ex-
: pense, if the Government is satisfied with the proofs of the
baleful activity of Russian intrigue, which was stimulated
by the antagonism which prevailed before, if not after,
the Treaty of Berlin, A check to the menacing encroach
ments of Russia in Central Asia would be an advantage
to England as well as to India. But for the war between
Russia and Turkey, no Envoy might perhaps have been de
spatched to Cabul for the purpose of inflaming the enmity
of Shere Ali against England.
I The militar y preparations which must for some time
| past have been deemed contingently necessary appear to
proceed with commendable promptitude. Two forces,
numbering together twelve thousand men, are to be dis
tributed between Quettah and the nearer end of the
Bolan Pass. It is not yet known whether a more direct
advance on Cabul will be made from Peshawur through
' the Khyber, The Yiceroy and his advisers prudently
; abstain from any public announcement of the time
j or the plan of the impending campaign. Some military
writers strongly urge an immediate advance, in the belief
I that both Cabul and Candahar might be occupied before
! the winter sets in in December. The political advantages
of an early invasion are so obvious that, if the movement
lis postponed, the delay may confidently be attributed to
'reasons of military prudence, A Correspondent of the
I Times who is generally well informed positively assertsr
that a winter campaign would be rash or impracticable, I
I His opinions are entitled to much weight, if they are
founded on a knowledge of the policy which is in favour]
at headquarters. The intention of the Yiceroy to transfer
lthe seat of government to Mooltan during the winter is
compatible with the design either of an autumn '
or a spring campaign. If no decisive movement is to
jbe made at present, questions will hereafter arise as to
the expediency of having hurried on the quarrel with :
the Ameer at a moment when it was impossible to resent a '
Iprobable act of contumacy. The appointment of a Com-
|mander-in-Chief will soon be announced; and it may bo;
. hoped that in the conduct of the war he will be allowed a |
'large discretion. The names of the principal subordinate!
officers appear to command confidence in India; nor is I
there reason to apprehend a repetition of the disgraceful
favouritism which prevailed during the former Afghani
war, and beyond the days of the Crimea, It is unlucky, ||
but perhaps unavoidable, that generals of competent rank ||
have passed the age of sixty. Respect rather than con- i|
fidence is suggested by the statement that a brave officer li
first rose to distinction forty years ago.
The former Afghan war was declared in a proclamation by
Lord Auckland, dated October i, 1838, and it began in the
following spring. Then, as now, the war originated in
! jealousy of Russian intrigues ; but the quarrel was unnc- |
cessarily forced on Dost Mahommed ; whereas his son has \
wantonly offered a gross affront to the Indian Government, |!
jThe Persians, who have long been instruments of Russian i;
laggression, besieged Herat in the early part of 1838 ; and,
on the obstinate refusal of Lord Auckland to protect the !■
Afghan ruler against the threatened encroachments of t
: Russia and Persia, the Ameer announced his intention of
making terms with the invader; but, before a rupture
had taken place, the siege of Herat was raised through
the efforts of Eldred Pottinger, then a lieutenant in the
Indian army, who undertook the conduct of the defence.
It would have been easy to make terms with Dost
Mahommed ; but unfortunately Lord Auckland, under the
direction of Lord Palmerston, or nominally of Sir Joii.n
Hobhousb, had determined to restore Shah Soojah, a
legitimist pretender to the throne of Afghanistan.
With some opposition from the highlanders in the passes,
and under the commissariat difficulties which are
common in wild countries, the invading army marched
without serious opposition by the Bolan Pass and by
Quettah, Candahar, and Ghuznee to Cabul, A circuitous,
route was preferred, because the Punjaub and the Afghani
territory of Peshawur were then in possession of RunjeetI
Singh, The chiefs of Scinde, though also nominally inde-'