Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎91r] (185/312)

DAILY TELEGRAPH, SATURDAY, OCTOBER
Her Majesty's Ministers, who, as we an
nounced on Thursday morning, will assembl#
in Cabinet Council to-day, have undoubtedly
important topics for consideration in this their
first reunion after the Session. The main sub
ject of their discussions is, however, as we stated
in making that announcement, neither novel nof
unprovided for. Indeed, with a vast Empire lik®
that which her most gracious Majesty rules, U
would be highly unbecoming in its public mea
to show themselves unprepared for auy Im-
i perial duty which may arise. A perfectly well-
understood difficulty has come to a head in a
manner which was so far to be expected that i*
wasone of two alternative necessities. Our in
telligence from India as to the prompt move
ments of the troops has shown that the Vice
roy's Government was not taken by surprise^
while Lord Beaconsfjeld's Cabinet, thoroughly
aware of the possibilities of the crisis, and
agreed upon a contingent course of action, wer#
able to proceed with deliberation. It is ex
tremely illogical to conclude from this, as soma
do, that the discourtesy of the Ameer wag
reckoned upon and provoked. In political affairg
consequences are often foreseen which can
not on that account be avoided, and in tho
present case the slightest consideration of fact#
must show that, whatever' Shere Ali Khan:
might do, the demand of free passage for th#
British Mission was obligatory; Since June
last the approach of a Russian envoy to Cabu!
had been stage by stage reported at Simla ; and
his arrival as well as the effect of his arrival, ia
gross contravention of the pledge* given by
Prince Gortschakofp , was duly announced.
On the other hand, the letters addressed by th<i
Viceroy to the Ameer were leceiving no notice,
a studied rudeness notorious and intolerable.
Obviously the next step necessarily was to insist,
| as patiently as might be, on direct intercourse
with the Afghan Prince upon these serious
topics. This course was taken, with representa
tions of a firm but still friendly tone, and with
provision for the personal security of the British
Mission which only those who know nothing of
the hill passes and the population of Afghanistan
would call disproportioned. It is impossible for
any who urge immediate coercive action to find
fault with those inevitable proceedings which
led to the affront put upon the Eng lish
flag. In this sense, therefore, the crisis was .
foreseen, while that it was provided for is
partly shown already by events, and will be
more completely proved by the development of
the policy arranged between the Home Govern
ment and the Viceroy. Our telegraphic de
spatch from Simla, published this morning,
indicates the military measures in preparation.
The native regiments detailed for active ser
vice are each to be augmented by two hun
dred men, while sixteen sabres will be added
to every troop of cavalry; and the concen
tration of these reinforced corps upon the point#
designated on the frontier is rapidly progress
ing. It is apparently the opinion of the best
military authorities that the season is too late
for a direct attack upon Cabul; but the pro
visional demonstrations, which we pointed ou#.
as desirable on tho first intelligence of this diffi
culty, are likely to be made ; and British columns
will, probably, without delay secure the Kurrum
Valley and other commanding approaches, whil®
an advance is pushed to occupy Candahar. Ii
is thought not at all impossible that these preli
minary movements may compel the submission
of the Ameer, or, by arousing division of opinion
among his Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , bring about his deposition.
If no such result occurs, the positions taken up
will facilitate further action of a decisive cha
racter In the spring, and the anxiety of Siieri
Ali is already indicated by his efforts to intimi
date the Khyber tribes who escorted our Missioa i
and are now negotiating with us for furthe® I
The policy initiated by such friendly dealing#
is, undoubtedly, the right course to adopt
We have no quarrel ,th the Afghan people,
and desire to have none. At least half of theii
clans were well disposed to us in the days of thost
badly-c®nducted expeditions which render the
name of Afghanistan ill-omened; and with any
thing like proper management we might the*
have established an enduring amity with thii
warlike people. We should in that case havt
had their undoubted fighting power at oui
service against any aggressor, and while the
Afghan army, judiciously watched and influ-
enced, would have made Herat, Balkh, and
the Oxus safe, it would have been perfectly
feasible gradually to disarm the predatory hill
men, with the happy results of quiet along the
frontier and the increase of trade and industry.
The very best remedy for a turbulent laud ui
general disarmament. Some who were in
Bombay at the time of the Indian Mutiny
in 1857 may recollect a notable and salu
tary spectacle which was to be witnessed in
the arsenal-yard of that city. Ifc was no
thing less than a little mountain of weapons
taken away from the unquiet classes of the
Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. . Tens of thousands of matchlocks
and muskets, long bladed Mahratta swords and
crooked Mohammedan scimetars, daggers of all
kinds and shapes, spears, lances, knives, war
axes, maces, and camel-guns, lay rusting peace
ably together in that vast pile of mischievous
; metal which had been swiftly and silently con
fiscated from a hundred districts, and was
subsequently, we believe, sold as old iron for
exportation to this country. The real cure
for the lawlessness of the frontier lies in such
a measure, for the passion to " carry irons,"
which Thucydides noted as characteristic of
barbarism, breeds wars, blood-feuds, and pil
lage, but dies away when the means of mis-
ehief and the dread of it have disappeared.
What we want, let it be repeated, is a friendly
Afghanistan, to be by and by rendered a quiet
and thriving border-state, and this we may
Lope to have none the less because we must
chastise Suere Ali or receive his submission.
It is an error to talk of the country as homoge
neous ; divisions and disaffection are chronic
among the Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. and clans, and we may
almost certainly hope for a strong secession
of the Ameers chiefs in our favour as soon
as they see we are in earnest. About Can
dahar the population is widely different in cha
racter from the Cabulees, and may, with proper
efforts on our part, welcome the arrival of the
British flag. The English leader who failed
to secure for us a considerable party and im
portant chieftains would be greatly wanting in
skill. Nor are the Afghans at all unaware
that what we desire is, not their rugged and
snow-clad hills, but a friendly people there
and a faithful ruler. Furthermore, to such a
nation so governed we can offer as much as
Russia can. and with a far better prospect of
profit to accrue. If it be the case—as we have
reason to believe—that Russian agents have
dangled before the eyes of Shere Ali the loot
©f Lahore and Delhi, and the fee-simple of the
Punjab down to the Jhelum, we could give a
well-disposed Afghan State such security of
tenure as it could obtain from none else. Briefly,
it is a mistake to confound the countrv with
its ruling Prince and clan in the present
crisis, and every feasible endeavour should,
and no doubt will, be made to detach popular
support from the side of this cruel and tyranni
cal intriguer. The Afghans, with many na
tional faults, have plenty of good points, nor
could we want stouter frontier guards when we
have taken, in Pushtoo phrase, " the wind out
of their heads," and shown them that one way
or another we will have no tampering with the
gates of India.
AC the same time the problem before her
Majesty's Ministers is much larger than this, for
otherwise it would be a matter of administration
belonging especially to the Indian Government
-Tiipj-ui J3A\og ptIB ttiTcf THIAr^sp'HnM^ -xfii'a i-j-T ,A jt '
•pTiuqs 'asnoh paqoiqop v 'aoqo^oo jo puo uio.i; sqinoui x'ts ' y'
'UM .01 JO a ajiui 8Ay uiinrAV 'qrifnSLOTn.'T aq Oil J
'M'S 'uaajfl-iuvn
-PJAV 'onBT-ni.rej 'aSimoo piBtpJO l 15 jad -sgT T?f
♦uoitos no-idtuo .ifi jtjas: ^SaojtJAjasuoD 'uapitiSf 'sbS
• s / d ' ai oav ) 'Xiajinos ptre noqoqpt 'niooi Snjssajp pnt? mtjq 'scuooj
>3q 9a.iq; pnB 'Suiutp 'SniMtijp euiospmin TfOKSTCI T
•iscra no ri g gumi.mio 'q?rrT9iv?Tn.>T en oiL
"O'S 'laa.ns-iiuquaptjaT 'fgj 's.noooafT -sjssore '/Q "g 'A
fBajppV—•Iticnai injaxeo v oj unuaj Auq v 'gqauoui aojin.u
•q? Snunp 'pawpo 'sasjoxj Jnoj joj Saifqujs 'spnno.t3 o.ms
•Bald sojov fs -uouvTS avojjbh woij sajuu aaaqi 'JTONIwaiSa'T
b—s3[ot!d oavi jo aainqstp mqiiAv tt
»Sni;nnq ejtqspjofljaH—QgHSINrHfLT 'vXSnf oq Ollj
'M. 'looiis
-jTiDSaa'lsans-JtDiMiBAV'g'noag satnBf mw ssaippy—'laans
-reau "ssaooB ^uamaAtioD qii.u 'paiqSu-noAs. pnt! T
•noypouniioo 'jnauiae'BCl no 'SKOOJT^TJTVAV 'xfll on ru L
. ,, -qaimuaajo 'pvoj-qojainaajo
y 'Aanucaj pajjiv—'Ji^aomnoJt ao 'ja^ojqxiMBd 'aaSuoiuasaaqo
•■1800.13 V JOJ ajqcjiug 'ggy quafj. -asnoq SuqiOAVp qua y
-u13aiioo qiiaa 'agtmojj •ijzo 'JQJTS 'xai; oq
•pBajsnpf) asug; 'sjuaSy pnBi"'aSpnH put; aou.tTi
*0^ 8qiIX 'm;? inaH'POAiasaj si Snnooqs aqx "sStit
^IinqmjBj paB 'saifenoo oaii 'asnoq ujapom nvms « ijitav 'ssb.i 8
ijb saaob 8z qayqAi jo 'sqjov ost jo whvjl iBjidcaB 'rioij y
-y-tg pBajsntjQ isvh jo anrn n uiqiiAi eq" Oklj
. . , "ureqaaa-T
TMtoi-g.naan?) 'ott 'aipnart 'JIV—'OTS? /ino eOTj.T •nov nuair
VwnBijna 8pi« pus 'napjBg 'siirooa uaAag -aKj-mtiq^oaj n: T
; *v r i r r i a paqo^ap-miog joi .iadns 'qtos -xo xr'it oq o J i
"niBq^aa,! 'OAOJS
•mtaqnaia'o 'a^Oiqoioo -j oj sjBjnonjBd jaqunj joj X[(Jdv—-ju j .!
punoja AIOI DHB asB8i SUOT; 'Qlf^sou^ wyinaji -Macqpun
$tto.ij snapjBS pooo "Iliq-isaioj jo !).iBd qsaq m 'agnoii t
pamooj-aum paqoBjop 'aTQg jo x^n oq o^|j
,. "noponnp uinqdoio 'aaanon
AaAJBH *J 'iVl oi Xtddy—*e? inai pnuojn -mrv soi . t ' t
casja gbgr 8sorf> jj
DAILY TELEGRAPH, SATURDAY, OCTOBER
Her Majesty's Ministers, who, as we an
nounced on Thursday morning, will assembl#
in Cabinet Council to-day, have undoubtedly
important topics for consideration in this their
first reunion after the Session, The mam sub
ject of their discussions is, however, as we stated
in making that announcement, neither novel nof
unprovided for. Indeed, with a vast Empire like
that which her most gracious Majesty rules, it
would be highly unbecoming in its public mea
to show themselves unprepared for any Im
perial duty which may arise. A perfectly well-
understood difficulty has come to a head in a
manner which was so far to be expected that it
wasone of two alternative necessities. Our in
telligence from India as to the prompt move
ments of the troops has shown that the Vice
roy's Grovernment was not taken by surprise^
while Lord BeaConsfjeld's Cabinet, thoroughly
aware of the possibilities of the crisis, and
agreed upon a contingent course of action, wero
able to proceed with deliberation. It is ex
tremely illogical to conclude from this, as soma
do, that the discourtesy of the Ameer wag
reckoned upon and provoked. In political affairs
consequences are often foreseen which can
not on that account be avoided, and in the
present case the slightest consideration of facte
must show that, whatever Shere Ali Khan
might do, the demand of free passage for the
British Mission was obligatory; Since June
last the approach of a Russian envoy to Cabu!
had been stage by stage reported at Simla ; and
his arrival as well as the effect of his arrival, in
gross contravention of the pledged given by
Prince Gortschakoff , was duly announced.
On the other hand, the letters addressed by th«
Viceroy to the Ameer were, ieceiving no notice,
a studied rudeness notorious and intolerable.
Obviously the next step necessarily was to insist,
as patiently as might be, on direct intercourse
with the Afghan Prince upon these serious
topics. This course was taken, with representa
tions of a firm but still friendly tone, aud with
provision for the personal security of the British
Mission which only those who know nothing of
the hill passes and the population of Afghanistan
would call disproportioned. It is impossible for
any who urge immediate coercive action to find
fault with those inevitable proceedings which
led to the affront put upon the English
flag. In this sense, therefore, the crisis was
foreseen, while that it was provided for is
partly shown already by events, and will be
more completely proved by the development of
the policy arranged between the Home Govern
ment and the Viceroy. Our telegraphic de
spatch from Simla, published this morning,
indicates the military measures in preparation.
The native regiments detailed for active ser
vice are each to be augmented by two hun
dred men, while sixteen sabres will be added
to every troop of cavalry; and the concen
tration of these reinforced corps upon the point#
I designated on the frontier is rapidly progress-
l ing. It is apparently the opinion of the best
military authorities that the season is too late
for a direct attack upon Cabul; but the pro
visional demonstrations, which we pointed out.
as desirable on the first intelligence of this diffi
culty, are likely to be made ; and British columns
will, probably, without delay secure the Kurrum
Valley and other commatiding approaches, while
an advance is pushed to occupy Candahar. It
is thought not at all impossible that these preli
minary movements may compel the submission
of the Ameer, or, by arousing division of opinion
among his- Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , bring about his deposition.
If no such result occurs, the positions taken up
will facilitate further action of a decisive cha
racter In the spring, and the anxiety of Siieri
Ali is already indicated by his efforts to intimi
date the Khyber tribes who escorted our Missioa
and are now negotiating with us for furthet
services.
The policy initiated by such friendly dealing#
is, undoubtedly, the right course to adopt
We have no quarrel ,th the Afghan people,
and desire to have none. At least half of theii
clans were well disposed to us in the days of thosi
badly-cenducted expeditions which render th«
name of Afghanistan ill-omened; and with any
thing like proper management we might then
have established an enduring amity with thii
warlike people. We should in that case have
had their undoubted fighting power at oui
service against any aggressor, and while the
Afghan army, judiciously watched and influ-
enced, would have m ade Herat, Balkh, and
the Ozus safe, it would have been perfectly
feasible gradually to disarm the predatory hill
men, with the happy results of quiet along the
frontier and the increase of trade and industry.
The very best remedy for a turbulent land is
general disarmament. Some who were in
Bombay at the time of the Indian Mutiny
in 1857 may recollect a notable and salu
tary spectacle which was to be witnessed in
the arsenal-yard of that city. It was no-1
thing loss than a little mountain of weapons
taken away from the unquiet classes of the
Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. . Tens of thousands of matchlocks ;
and muskets, long bladed Mahratta swords and
crooked Mohammedan scimetars, daggers of all
kinds and shapes, spears, lances, knives, war
axes, maces, and camel-guns, lay rusting peace
ably together in that vast pile of mischievous
metal which had been swiftly and silently con
fiscated from a hundred districts, and was
subsequently, we believe, sold as old iron for
exportation to this country. T^he real cure
for the lawlessness of the frontier lies in such
% measure, for the passion to carry irons,"
which Tiiucydides noted as characteristic of j
barbarism, breeds wars, blood-feuds, and pil
lage, but dies away when the means of mis
chief and the dread of it have disappeared.
What we want, let it be repeated, is a friendly
Afghanistan, to be by and by rendered a quiet
and thriving border-state, and this we may
hope to have none the less because we must
chastise Suere Ali or receive his submission.
It is an error to talk of the country as homoge
neous ; divisions and disaffection are chronic
among the Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. and clans, and we may
almost certainly hope for a strong s
of the Ameers chiefs in our favour as soon
«s they see we are in earnest. About Can
dahar the population is widely different in cha
racter from the Cabulees, and may, with proper
efforts on our part, welcome the arrival of the
British flag. The English leader who failed
to secure for us a considerable party and im
portant chieftains would be greatly wanting in
Bkill. Nor are the Afghans at all unaware
that what we desire is, not their rugged and
snow-clad hills, but a friendly people there
and a faithful ruler. Furthermore, to such a
nation so governed we can offer as much as
Russia can. and with a far better prospect of
profit to accrue. If it be the case—as we have
reason to believe—that Russian agents have
dangled before the eyes of Shere Ali the loot
of Lahore and Delhi, and the fee-simple of the
.Punjab down to the Jhelum, we could give a
well-disposed Afghan State such security of
tenure as it could obtain from none else. Briefly,
, it is a mistake to confound the country with
its ruling Prince and clan in the present
crisis, and every feasible endeavour should,
and no doubt will, be made to detach popular
support from the side of this cruel and tyranni
cal intriguer. The Afghans, with many na- I
tional faults, have plenty of good points, nor'
, could we want stouter frontier guards when we
, have taken, in Pushtoo phrase, " the wind out
j of their heads," and shown them that one way
; or another we will have no tampering with the
gates of India.
At the same time the problem before her
Majesty's Ministers is much larger than this, for
otherwise it would be a matter of administration
belonging especially to the Indian Government,
and sure to be sufficiently well dealt with by Lord
Lytton . It is not, however, without good cause
that the declaration was recently made which
stamped all future Indian policy with the com
mon seal of the Empire's interest, and it will
be, no doubt, from this point of vi^w, rather
than on mere departmental grounds, that
Lord Beaconsfield will consult his colleagues i
to-day upon the conduct of the Afghan 1
Prince and the first fruits of the Russian
breach of faith. If any reasonable man could
doubt the mischievous craft underlying the
falseness which the Czar's Government has'
once again manifested, the Muscovite semi- 1
official organs must enlighten him, for they 1
iRppear to have obtained the fullest libertv on
condition that it be used to vilify England' and i
sxcite disaffection in India. They also point 1
-out with glee the utility of this diversion on our
frontier in regard to many unsettled questions
sn Turkey and the still-debated Anglo-Ottoman
Convention, and announce, in noisy chorus, the
intention of their Government to carry on " un
official war " with us when we are once engaged
snaking, if possible, an Asiatic Servia of Afgha-
mstan. These manifestations, with the reply of
Prince Gortsciiakoff to our request for expla
nations touching the coincidence of his Cabul
Mission with the defiance of Shere Ali
must be noted now from a comprehensive point
of view, nor may we entirely disregard the ques
tion whether the damaging and costly recurrence
o± these frontier alarms could not be more
sheaply disposed of once for all by a firm and
irenchant re80 lution rather than by waiting and
Beatating with many chances of losing certain
Bbvious advantages which now present them
selves. It cannot be too plainly understood that
there is nothing m Afghanistan, or its resources,
to disturb our Indian tranquillity ; we can dis
pose of any trouble there quickly enough. What
darkens the gates of India with a disquieting
ehadow and forbids our undivided attention to
the welfare of its people, is this calculating ap-
P l 0a t\ 0 l RuS f an arm8 to thQ border regions,
which halts and makes compacts when we chal-
ienge it, and as soon as we accept the deceitful
pledge, creeps nearer to the line where it would
impossible to abstain from action.