Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎90v] (184/312)

THE CABINET AND THE CEISIS.
The Times says 4 There can be no doubt that the
Cabinet ha? to-day a verv serious question before it. On
its judgment and decision will depend in the main the
future of our frontier policy in India. Several ques ious
.ire involved, atfy one of which might tax the wisdom of
the aolesh statesman, and the public cannot but be
anxious as to the condition of affairs in the East. For
the moment the course of Lord Lytton and the Indian
Government is clear. They have one thing to do,
and they are called upon to do it with promptitude
and energy. They have to lose no time in bringing
Shere AH to a sense ot his position, and to exact
reparation for the insult he has offered them.
Beyond that immediate issue they fcave no need to
| look for the moment, and their task, though by no 1
means a light one, is one from which we need not
fear that they will shrink. It is possible that they may
not be able immediately to take the decisive measures
! which have been somewhat prematurely attributed to
them. But we cannot blame Lord Lyttou and his mili-
: tary advisers for a delay which circumstances have
forced on them. Sir Neville Chamberlain was charged
with a peaceful mission, and the Indian Government;
would have laid itself op n to just blame if it had
despatched its envoy, bearing a me sage of peace, in tne
midst of hostile preparations and menacing movements
of troops and stores towards the Afghan frontier.
It is not long since Mr. Bright blamed the )
Government for arming the country just as it was j
preparing to enter a conference of peace. Lord
Lytton has even been blamed for sanding so large an
escort with Sir Neville Chamberlain. If he had
at the same time entered on warlike j r «pa-rationg
on a scale such as are now required, we should certainly
have been told that he had taken the most effective
steps for securing the failure of an ostensibly peacetul
mission. The situation is a serious one, but it is not
one which calls for instant war without adequate pre-
paration. Two or three weeks must elapse before the
troops now moving towards the frontier*are in a posi
tion to make a determined advance through the passes.
If in the meanwhile Shere Ali offers amends, he may
yet escape chastisement. If he should still prove in
tractable, there will be time, we, should hope, before the
winter to move in force upon Kandahar, the Khoorum
Valley, and Jellalabad, so as to secure a commanding
position for more decisive measures, should they prove
necessary, in the spring. For measures such as these
there can be no doubt that tne Government is already
preparing."
The Daily Telegraph asserts that" what we want is a
friendly Afghanistan, to be by and by rendered a auiet j
and thriving border-State, and this we mav hope to
have none the less because we must chasti-e Shere Ali
or receive his submission. It is an error to talk of the
country a? homogeneous; divisions and disaffection are
chronic among the Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. and clans, and we may
almost certainly hopa for a strong secesaior. of the
Ameer's chiefs in our favour as soon as they see we are
in earnest. About Candahar the population is widely
different in character from the Cabulees, and may, with
proper efforts on our part, welcome the arrival of the
Bri ish flag. The English leader who failed to secure
for us a considerable party and important chieftains
would be greatly wanting in skill. Nor are the
j Afghans at all unaware that what we desire is, not
| their rugged and snow-clad hills, bat a friendly people
| there and a faithful ruler. Furthermore, to such a
I nation so governed we can offer as much as Eussia can,
\ and with a far better prospect of profit to accrue. If
it be the case—as we have reason to believe—that Rus
sian agents have dangled before the eyes of Shere Ali
1 the loot of Lahore and Delhi, and the fee simole of the
Punjab down to the Jhelum, we could give a well dis
posed Afghan State such security of tenure as it could
obtain from none else. Briefly, it is a mistake to con
found the country with its rulin? Prince and clan in the
present crisis, and every feasible endeavour should, and
no doubt will, be made to detach popular support from
the side of this cruel and tyrannical intriguer. The
j Afghans, with many national, faults, have plenty of
| good points, nor could we want stouter frontier guards
when we have taken, in Pushtoo phrase,' the wind out
of their heads,' and shown them that one way or
another we will have no tampering wi h the gates of
India."
THE EXPENSES OF THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN.
The Standard ret; arks that " whatever may be the
resolutions at which the Cabinet will arrive to-day,
there is one which we hope does not admit of doubt. It
will be de3ided, we must assure ourselves, and the deci^
sion must bs promptly made public, that no part of the
cost of the Afghan war will be laid upon the Exchequer
of India. Upon this point a bold course is alone con
sistent at once with prudence and with justice. The
answer which the majority of Englishmen will give is,
we are happy to believe, not doubtful. 8ince such wars
are undertaken primarily for the maintenance of
Imperial interests and Imperial prestige, it is
the duty of the Imperial Parliament to make
provision for the necessary expeaditure. Nor
is the condition of Indian finance, even upon
the fairest showing, such as would encourage pru-
'l dent statesmen to depart from an established rule of
j policy at the presant moment, in order to charge the
I Indian Exchequer with the cost of an Afghan war. It
! is true that mischievous exaggeration with respefit to
1 the resources of India have been published with a singu
lar disregard for the wise and even decent reticence
becoming at a crisis like the present. But no fair-
minded observer of Indian affairs will deny that, after a
succession of famines and the heavy losses caused by the
depreciation of silver, the country requires some breath-
ing time before it is called upon to bear any new
burdens." ^
our
onca
THE FORCES OF INDIA.
The Daily News believes "it is not generally known
that India in times of peace has the services of well-
ni-h as many fighting soldiers of the British army as
we possess at home for the defence of tais country. A
force of between sixty-two and sixty-three thousa
men is necessary, it seams, to maintain our ^
East at the best of times, consequently considerable
inforcements of British troops will he called ^r in the
event of our being involved in war with the Afghans.
Either, therefore, we must withdraw soldiers
from the British establishment, or increase
standing army bv fresh enlistments, or _ by
more calling out the Reserves. Nominally
have nearly 100,000 men in the ranks at home, bu.
then the whole body of recruits for feeding the Indian
and Colonial armies, as well as the home force, ma p
a larsre proportion of this total. There are, ? ' S V '
non-efficients and time-expired m en, who ag^reduc
the number of actual fighting men m th e country 80
| that in reality there is not muca difference hatween the
I strength of the British Mid Inoian armies. We uaually
' maintain an artillery force twelve thousand strong in
India, for among our native troops a few batteries
only are to be found armed with mountain guns.
In fact, we only make u-!e of native artillery
at stations where, for sanitary reasons, we can
not well employ Europeans, since it has been found
the wisest course to keep so formidable an arm
almost exclusively in the hands of British soldiers.
| Fifteen batteries of horse artillery and forty-three of
field artillery are to be found m India at this moment,
! together with more thau a score of batteries and garri
son artillery. Tnis large artillery force is supplemented
by fifty battalions of the line, mustering something
like 48,000 bayonets, which share with native infantry
| regiments the duty of garrisoning the manv Indian
s'ations, and act as a leaven upon our vast native army.
Of Royal Engineers there are but a few hundreds
scatt red over our Indian dominions, for in roadmaking
and field-work the native sapper is all that is required.
Of British cavalry we always maintain a strong force in
India. At this moment there are nearly 4,500 sabres, or
nine regiments, stationed in the East, notwithstanding
the fact that our native troops are very strong in this
particular arm. In a word, India calls for the assistance
of twice as many British troops as are to be found in all
our colonies put toget her." —... _
THE " BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA."
The Spectator thinks " the justice of the proposal to
exemnt India from the expenses of the new Afghan
war is only superficial. We heartily wish we could
think o L herwise and agree wi h Mr. Fawcett, for
nothing would wake up Englishmen to the foolishness
of the policy upon which the Government has entered
like a heavy income tax imposed in consequence; but
the argument on the other side is irresistible. The
whole administration of India rests upon the theory
that the delegated Government there, being obeyed by
the people and wiser than the people, must be held in
all public transactions to represent the people. The
natives did not ask for railways, but still the Government /
2)
ENGLA ND AND CABUL.
MILITARY MEASURES.
PROBABLE ADVANCE TO
CANDAHAR.
MOVEMENTS OF THE
VICEROY.
iby oablrt ;
'■mid nojijsb j
raioj aaotna.msGiim-jxos '
99J ? 'sptI9 8 SCTrry rvtr; 1
••CtsuBA asnamunui ~
'SHasnOHX 'PQ 'STI "pmi
sxms o*rri ^
jiai j-i tl hi it jj sj-skoai
'Ai'S "PTscu-uoidmcufi 'gi pay"
"its -pboj-aspufj aajsniuiisaav 'ui o% c9t
wiivi XNvncmaw 'SNOAT
• 3/ixo sxjsare Hgnavj.s5r_nM.T7 -
ITIHS
^ V_^ox JL U v vL>La_UA\iL
'38 pnt) ;SP33T ttioiduren
-«atoal-taaajs-^tpna 't* iureqsnmuift 'wajls-mukr
^uopuoa 130i;s-pjojxo '/9 put! 99 '(p^imn) - qo pnB wvxw
-oy 'sjocudja^av 'sstih 'sm!a;awnuo t
•og> saoqs 's'jooff 'si.tma ' XJOTSOH ' SIIT ^ 'srerr
•^naurj-redon; .sinnox put!, sjfojj
•^aguiijtbcjaa -oaafj put- iiq^tr
•■juarajaudoa -tapjo loops s.uamsnnai)
•luamqatjaaa opmu-xptiah s,tiamonu3 ft
_ 'Xasmxs-aao.axo '/9 put! 99 -rr-rr
fgilngk jcfavja a s/o o wvx jh
! •Blino, Xnnamri'-i -SJSSnOIX 899apnh
•sjasnojjg sseja
•si^oojtdao
•s'4bo0j0ao ipouotd
•SIVOOldAQ ap^o
•rjcoomao piogaaisato
•siing ifniibosj
•siins tsunox
•sjing IBOtjsio
•sjfng paojxo
•e^ing sssufgna
•sjmg 3nm.rore
•einig ggajq
■khcicntx^rao hoji tt
ictjs st'o o
*s|}us ^ut^95(oi.lo
pJOJXO
•s^ing japoh
•^ms ssdJCL
•s^ius
'bo j
•e^iug
*8iing qsintids
tuicoy;
* joipg
•sj^suio^x
•s^boojoao
*9ioa
'aalinyioms
i „ 'poaojcklb
50a i; paSunqoxo spoo3 pae 'paoimutjiia SJapao nv 10
j nonuoaia jfaojonjsj^s v •5traui»just!oui-jias jot sonu
ustfa miM 's^aaqs uojqffBj puv 'sist[ aaud 's^vpr
-5IXVK jo g N^iarxxvj 'ao-JJ 'qimsntiai "OO pus K v A H
—•shgkqj.sno ahil kn oo tgoj j
„ „ „ -gl O) aajqi jo aifij a^ mo« ~
sqnioa pnn sxoq joj aioaisniora pa^oaqp ^guiooj a \ori3
4A >-xc rro^-v- -x -TJnn ^ tit rmTinr r,n r\i o m c-r oorr^ mmw j
■ ■ —- I
PPPPWBP
the cabinet and the crisis
The Times saysThere can be no doubt that the
j Cabmet has to-day a verv serioua question before it On
j its judgment and decision will depend in the main the
future of our frontier policy in India. Several ques ions
[ are involved aay one of which might tax the wisdom of
■ the aolesh statesman, and the public cannot but be
; anxious as to the condition of affairs in the East For
the moment the course of Lord Lytton and the Indian
Government is c ear. They have one thing to do.
and they are called upon to do it with promptitude
and energy. They have to lose no time in bringing
Shere Ah to a sense ot his position, and to exact
reparation tor the insult he has offered them.
: Beyond that immediate issue they have no need to
, look for the moment, and their task, thouo-h by no
means a light one, is one from which we need not
, f ear that tney will sannk. It is possible that they may
not be able immediately to take the decisive measures
I which nave been somewhat prematurely attributed to
I them. But we cannot blame Lord Lyttou and his mili-
I tary advisers for a delay which circumstances have
I forced on them. Sir Neville Chamberlain was charo-ed
with a peacefu! mission, and the Indian Government
would have laid itself op n to iust blame if it had
despatched its envoy, bearing a me sage of peace, in toe
midst of hostile preparations and menacing movements
ot troops and stores towards the Afghan frontier.
It is not long since Mr. Bright blamed the
Government for arming the country just as it was
preparing to enter a conference of peace. Lord
Lytton has even been blamed for sending so laro-e an
escort with Sir Neville Chamberlain. If he had
at the same time entered on warlike f reparations
on a scale such as are now required, we should certainly
have been told that he had taken the most effective
steps for securing the failure of an ostensibly peaceful
mission. The situation is a serious one, but it is not
one which calls for instant war without adequate pre
paration. Two or three weeks must elapse before the
troops now moving towards the frontier*are in a posi
tion to make a determined advance through the passes
If in the meanwhile Shere Ali offers amends, he may
yet escape chastisement. If he should still prove in
tractable, there will be time, we, should hope, before the
winter 10 move in force upon Kandahar, the E:hoorum
Valley, and Jellalabad, so as to secure a commanding
position for more decisive measures, should they prove
necessary, in the spring. For measures such as these
there can be no doubt that the Government is already
preparing."
The Daily Telegraph asserts thatwhat we want is a
friendly Afghanistan, to be by and by rendered a auiet i
and thriving border-State, and this we may hope to I
have none the less because we must chastise Shere All
or receive his submission. It is an error to talk of the
country a? homogeneous; divisions and disaffection are
chronic among the Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. and clans, and we may
almost certainly hop- for a strong secession of the
Ameer's chiefs in our favour as soon as they see we are
in earnest. About Candahar the population is widelv
different in character from the Cabulees, and may, with
proper efforts on our part, welcome the arrival of the
Bri ish flag. The English leader who failed to secure
for us a considerable party and important chieftains
would be greatly wanting in skill. Nor are the
Afghans at all unaware that what we desire i' not
their rugged and snow-clad hills, bat a friendly p'ople
there and a faithful ruler. Furthermore, to such a
nation so governed we can offer as much as Eussia can,
and with a far better prospect of profit to accrue. If
it be the case—as we have reason to believe—that Ens-
sian agents have dangled before the eyes of Shere Ali
1 the loot of Lahore and Delhi, and the fee simple of the
Punjab down to the Jhelum, we could give a'well dis
posed Afghan State such s?curity of tenure as it could
obtain from none else. Briefly, it is a mistake to con
found the country with its rulinp- Prince and clan in the
present crisis, and every feasible endeavour should, and
no doubt will, be made to detach popular support from
the side of this cruel and tyrannical intriguer. The
Afghans, with many national, faults, have plenty of
good points, nor could we want stouter frontier guards
when we have taken, in Pushtoo phrase,' the wind out
of their heads,' and shown them that ona way or
another we will have no tampering wi h the gates of
India."
THE EXPENSES OF THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN.
The Standard rec arks that " whatever may be the
resolutions at which the Cabinet will arrive to-day,
there is one which we hope does not admit of doubt. It
will be desided, we must assure ourselves, and the deci
sion must bs promptly made public, that no part of the
cost of the Afghan war will be laid upon the Exchequer
of India. Upon this point a bold course is alone con-
sistent at once with prudence and with justice. The
answer which the majority of Englishmen will give is
we are happy to believe, not doubtful. ISince such wars'
are undertaKen primarily for the maintenance of
Imperial interests and Imperial prestige, it is
the duty of the Imperial Parliament to make
provision for the necessary expenditure. Nor
is the_ condition of Indian finance, even upon
the fairest showing, such as would encourage pru
dent statesmen to depart from an established rule of
policy at the pres3tit moment, in order to charge the
Inaian Exchequer with the cost of an Afghan war. It
is true that mischievous exaggeration with respect to
the resources of India have been published with a singu
lar disregard for the wise and even decent reticence
becoming at a crisis like the present. But no fair-
minded observer of Indian affairs will deny that, after a
succession of famines and the heavy losses'caused by the
depreciation of silver, the country requires some breath
ing time before it is called upon to bear any new
burdens." J
THE FORCES OP INDIA.
The Daily News believes "it is not generally known
i that India in times of peace has the services of well-
nio-h as many fighting soldiers of the British army as
we possess at home for the defence of this country. A
force of between sixty-two and _ sixty-three thousand
men is necessary, it seams, to maintain our sway in the
East at the best of times, consequently considerable re
inforcements of British troops will be called for in the
event of our being involved in war with the Afghans.
Either, therefore, we must withdraw soldiers
from the British establishment, or increase our
standing army bv fresh enlistments, or by once
more callinfr out the Reserves. Nominally we
have nearly 100,000 men in the ranks at home, bu- ,
then the whole body of recruits for feeding the Indian j
! a nd Colonial armies, as well as the home force, make up
a larsje proportion of this total. There are, besides,
non-efficients and time-expired men, who again reduce
the number of actual fighting men in the country, so
i that in reality there is not much difference between the
1 strength of the British and Indian armies. We
maintain an artill?ry force twelve thousand strong in
India, for among our native troops a few batteries
only are to be found armed with mountain guns.
In fact, we only make u-:e of native artillery
at stations where, for sanitary reasons, we can
not well employ Europeans, since it has been found
the wisest course to keep so formidable an arm j
almost exclusively in the hands of British soldiers.
Fifteen batteries of horse artillery and forty-three of
field artillery are to be found in India at this moment,
together with more than a score of batteries and garri
son artillery. Tnis large artillery force is supplemented j
by fifty battalions of the line, mustering something
like 4G,.Q00 bayonets, which sbari with native infantry
regiments the duty of garrisoning the manv Indian
s'ations, and act as a leaven upon our vast native army.
Of Royal Engineers there are but a few hundreds
scatt-red over our Indian dominions, for in roadmaking
and field-work the native sapper is all that is required,
j Of British cavalry we always maintain a stron? force in
I India. At this moment there are nearly 4,500 sabres, or
nine regiments, stationed in the East, notwithstanding
the fact that our native troops are very strong in this
I particular arm. In a word, India calls for the assistance
' of twice as many British troops as are to be found in all
our colon ies p ut together."
THE " BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA."
The Spectator thinks " the justice of the proposal to
exemnt India from the expenses of the now Afghan
war is only supprficial. We heartily wish we could
think otherwise and agree wi h Mr. Fawcett, for
nothing would wake up Englishmen to the foolishness
of the policy upon which the Government has entered
like a heavy income tax imposed in consequence; but
the argument on the other side is irresistible. The
whole administration of India rests upon the theory
that the delegated Government there, beinvj obeyed by
the people and wiser than the people, must be held in
ali public transactions to represent the peoole. The
natives did not ask for railways, but still the Government /
ENGLA ND AND CABUL.
MILITARY MEASURES.
PEOBABLE ADVANCE TO
CANDAHAE.
MOVEMENTS OF THE
VICEROY.
[BY EASTERN COMPANY'S CABLE.]
[from our special correspondent.]
SIMLA, Oct. 4 (9.40 AJIL)
Every native regiment detailed for active
service has been augmented by 200 men, and
every troop of cavalry by sixteen sabres. Thia '
order does not affect the remainder of the native
army.
The concentration of troops on the frontier
goes on rapidly. The best Informed persons
think that the season is too far advanced for a
movement direct upon Cabul. The occupation
of the Kuram Valley and Candahar, imme
diately practicable, will probably compd the
Ameer to submit, or cause his deposition by his
own subjects.
Further operations against Cabul, if found
necessary, can be more easily effected in the
spring.
The Ameer is endeavouring to intimidate the
Khyberees, who escorted the Mission, by re
inforcing his troops in the Khyber Pass.
xm. ^ SIMLA, OCT. 4 (5.10 p.m.)
When the Government of India move down
to Calcutta, as usual, the Viceroy will probably
go into camp at Lahore, in order that he may be
m close communication with the Lieutenant-1
Governor of the Punjab. Lahore is the nearest
point both to Quetta and Kuram. Lord
Lytton will probably visit Calcutta for legisla
tive purposes later in the season.
Great indignation has been felt by the Anglo-
Indians at the letter published by Lord Law
rence. Telegraphed all over India, it has pro
duced an impression of the existence of weak
ness and timidity at home.
[BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE.]
[from our own correspondent.j
PARIS, Friday Night.
This morning's Nord, referring to the statement
made by a London paper that, whatever the action
taken by the Ameer of Afghanistan, the British
troops will be cantoned in a permanent manner
behind Candahar, remarks that, if the amende
honorable of Shere Ali is to take the form of the
cession of part of Afghanistan, it seems difficult,
indeed, to avoid a war. The Russian journal is
naturally highly satisfied with the letter of Lord
Lawrence, and enumerates all his arguments
with gusto. Nevertheless, the language held
by the English press gives no hope that
the resolutions that will bo taken in the
next Cabinet Council will modify the situation
in a pacific sense.