Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎89r] (181/312)

TIMES, OCTOBER 5 ;
AFG HANISTAN .
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
gi r> _I had hoped to see in The Times this taorning that \
some one of equal Indian experience and weight of cha- j
racter with Lord Lawrence had entered his protest against I
the policy started by his lordship in his letter to The Times
of " coming to terms with the Ameer " on the ground that
our dealings with Afghanistan are not as between civilized
nations ; and as I see that, already, a public meeting at
Birmingham has been discussing the question in the spirit
I of this policy, P may be allowed, perhaps (as one of the
people of England to whom Lord Lawrence appeals) to
express my regret that his letter was written, for I fear
i that its plausibility will mislead people at home who are
ignorant of the Asiatic character.
While admitting the gravity of the offence committed by
| the Ameer, Lord Lawrence urges that " we should not bear
I hard with him on this account." This reads well, but
what is its true bearing with reference to our relations
with our subject races in India ? I submit, with great
I respect to Lord Lawrence, that no one knows better than
he does the degree of appreciation in which the art of /
insult is used as a political weapon by all eastern poten-
1 tates, and that their finesse in this line far surpasses that •
' of civilized nations ; and it is the manner in which such |
affronts are resented or submitted to that affords the index .
' of power to their minds. There may be, as Lord Lawrence
l contends, no real dishonour to us in coming to terms with
! this Prince (although I look upon the threat to shoot ■
■ Major Cavagnari at Ali Musjid as a reflex of the Mac-i
naghten tragedy, and significant enough of the length i
! he meant to go;; but the issue is not confined to Afghan. 1
; man and England, but extends to the subject races of j
India, by whom the Christian-like standard of policy sug- l
► ' gested by Lord Lawrence is not understood at all. Two I
ij hundred and forty millions of people within our frontiers,
i and innumerable races without, are waiting to judge from j
ii their own standpoint how we deal with this mortal j|
' affront ; and I claim support for our policy on the score !
i of the safety of our Empire alone ; and in coonexion with ii
I this permanent object I express my fervent hope that the
I passes into Afghanistan, once they are traversed by our j
alms, may remain for ever in our possession, whatever may !
- | be our ultimate policy with respect to that country itself, f
I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
[ October 4. W. M'MUHDO, General. |
| OUR NOBTH-WEST FRONTIER IN INDIA. \
<8>
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—In continuation of my letter of the 19th inst, in
The Times, and as a war with Afghanistan appears pro-
' bable, I now offer further extracts from the writings of
fthe late General Jacob :—
" There are but two great roads into our Indian Empire
from the north-west—but two roads, in fact, by which it
iis possible for a modern army to march. One of these,
the Boian, lies through an entirely friendly country. The
Khelat territory extends to Pesheen, 40 miles beyond the
M head of the (Bolan) pass, in the tableland of Afghanistan,
: s and is inhabited by Belooch and Brahooee tribes, who are
II of an entirely different race from the Afghans. The road
- ^ through the Bolan is, even at present, generally good, and
; sufficiently easy for an army to proceed by it with all its
I artillery, stores, &c. This road is also the shortest from
■ Herat to British India, and is the natural outlet to the
I ocean of the commerce of a very large portion of Central
8S Asia. From the foot of the Bolan, one continuous and
■ ; almost dead-level plain extends for nearly 600 miles
- through Kutchee and Scinde to the sea. The only other
gfeat road, the Khyber (pass), is very differently circum
stanced. The people are unfriendly and barb rous, the
| country is far more difficult, and the distance is greater,
|..;i while there is already a strong division of our army
at Peshawur, so that we are tolerably well secured in
1 that quarter—quite sufficiently secured, indeed, under
^ ; the arrangements contemplated by me, because from
Quettah we could operate on the flank and rear of
, ■: any army attempting to proceed towards the Khyber
'Pass; so that, with a British force at Quettah, the
j other road would be shut to an invader, inasmuch as we
i' 1 could reach Herat itself before an invading army could
j even arrive at Cabul. Such a position would form the
■ bastion of the front attacked, and nothing could, with
J hope of success, be attempted against us until this salient
were disposed of In any point of view, and
■ under any circumstances whatever, the arrangement on
H the frontier of India can never be wise or safe while, as at
I present, the undisturbed iranquillit of this vast Empire is
I dependent, not on its own mighty internal strength, hut on
I the forbe- ranee of our enemies or neighbours outside. 1 "
P The italics are General Jacob's, and the opinion of an
I officer so distinguished and so long employed on the north-
B west frontier of India should have great weight in favour
■ of Lord Lytton's policy. Yours truly,
F. A. E. DALRYMPLE, Bengal Civil Service.
| St. Boswells, N.B., Sept. 28.
DAILY NEWS,OCTOBER
T he meeting of the Cabinet to-day will bring >
Lord Beaconsfield face to face with some of his
colleagues whose sense of responsibility is per
haps greater than his, and who ara believed to
feel some doubts as to the further development of
his policy of adventure in Asia. But he has over
borne or beguiled their scruples before, and
there is little reason to look for greater
steadiness of purpose in these weak and
wavering minds now. In the meantime, the
English public are becoming somewhat im
patient for information in connection with the
Afghan difficulty. In the first place, they would
like to know what we are going to do; and in
the second place, when we are going to do it.
The present suspense is intolerable and mis
chievous. Parliament is not sitting; and the
various indications of public opinion are just
now the only restraint on the dramatic ambitions
of Lord Beaconsheld. But, with the present
Ministerial reticence, the public are but partially
cognizant of the facts of the case, and therefore are
only imperfectly qualified to act either as a check or
a stimulus in the matter. Are the different
columns to move or not before the advent of
winter ? If they are to move at once the imme
diate announcement of our intention would pro
duce a wholesome moral effect on both the Afghans
and the people of India. There would be no in
discretion in an open statement of our pur
pose, for we need not disclose how we intend to
accomplish our object. If it be decided that no
movement is to take place before the spring, it
would be wise to declare as much at once', in order
to show that our resolution is the result of calm
deliberation. If we observe a mysterious silence,
collect troops with great ostentation, and
in the end do nothing, we shall create
an impression of weakness. It is sug
gested that we shall bring pressure to bear upon
the Ameer, massing troops at the mouths of the
passes, and keeping them there " standing at
" ease " for six months. We can hardly see how
such pressure will influence our foe. He must have
pretty well made up his mind before turning back
our mission that the result would be war, and the
mere report that our troops are ready to commence
operations in March or April will scarcely shake
his nerves. On the contrary,'it will cause him to
brace himself up, and make preparations for a
vigorous struggle. It will give him a pretext for
proclaiming a holy war, and calling upon
all the tribes to sink internal differences,
and gird on their swords for battle with
the infidel English who are once more
about to attempt to impose their de
tested yoke on the warlike and freebom Afghans.
It will give him time to obtain succour from
Bokhara, and, if not troops, yet officers, money,
arms, and advice from Russia. It will give him
time to stir up intrigues among our feudatories
in India, and thus create a peril far greater than
any Central Asian difficulty. We know on what
very slender foundation Orientals build up an
edifice of vaunting arrogance. If we require
more than a few weeks' preparation before we
attempt to chastise the insolence of Afghanistan, |
the Ameer will be able with some plausibility to
spread far and wide the boast that the British,
cowed by their disasters in 1841-42, and awed by
Russian power, dare not venture to resent the
insult which has been inflicted upon them.
Let us now examine some of the arguments
adduced by those who are the apologists of delay.
It is urged that the example of the most successful
of our Generals in India teaches us that we should
not attempt to move until we have assured our
selves almost absolutely against the chance of
failure, or even a temporary check. It seems to
be forgotten that audacity is often, especially
with Orientals, who are easily impressed, thetruest
wisdom, and that promptitude of action frequently
diminishes the strength of the foe. It scarcely
requires to be a passed master in the art of war
to understand that what we might accomplish to
day with 10,000 men it would need more than
double that number to do six months hence.
We may also point to the fact that
by keeping a large force mobilised during
the winter we shall add in no slight
degree to the financial burdens already too great
for India to bear, But, it is alleged, between ns
and Afghanistan proper there is a fringe of hostile
mountain tribes, and that we must be prepared to