Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎88v] (180/312)

of rough rifles exists just outside our North-Western
frontier near P»shawur, and from time to time
many rifles have been stolen from us by the hill
tribes. The Ameer has also at different times
received from us a battery of guns and 18,000 stand
of arms. As to his capacity as a general, it is
difficult to gauge it, for he has never been pitted
against other than Afghan foes. He displayed,
however, at Umballa great intelligence and the
highest interest in all that related to the art of war.
On one occasion Major Knollys, the Deputy
Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Division,
had a private interview and a long conversation
with the Ameer. Apropos of the chestnut troop of
Horse Artillery then at Umballa, Major Knollys
related to the Ameer the wonderful exploit of that
troop under Norman Ramsay at Fuentes d'Onor.
The Ameer listened most attentively to the descrip
tion, and then eagerly discussed the exploit in a
manner which proved that he had reflected deeply
on all connected with the profession of a soldier
and the capacity of each arm of the service.
To return to the tactics of the Afghans, we would
call attention to the fact that they are utterly
regardless of their lines of communication being
threatened, for they have absolutely no line of
supply. They therefore only fear turning move
ments when they threaten to prevent them from
retreating in case of disaster. It is likewise as well
to remind our officers that the Afghans are addicted
to making night attacks. In harassing convoys
and troops paesing through defiles the Afghans are
unwearied, bold, and adroit. It will therefore be
necessary to adopt the procedure of General Pollock,
and both in advance and retreat to occupy the sides
of defiles with flanking parties. By adopting this
well-recognized rule of war General Pollock both
passed and repassed the Khyber Pass with very
slight loss ; by neglecting it General Nott suffered
numerous casualties. In many cases where con
siderable opposition is anticipated and the com
munications along the summit of the heights over
looking the defile are difficult, it may be advisable
to adopt the manoeuvre recommended by Marshal
Bugeaud. His plan was, before allowing the head
of the main column to enter a defile, to occupy the
nearest heights with echelons of sections, subdivi
sions, or larger bodies. As the main column ad
vanced it sent out additional echelons, and the
rear echelons successively descended to the road
and closed the column.
It will be as well to bear in mind that the
Afghans entertain an almost superstitious dread of
artillery quite out of proportion to the material
injury inflicted by the latter. Rockets likewise,
from their moral effect on semi-civilized and un
disciplined troops, may be employed with ad
vantage. They do not demand much transport,
and can accompany infantry over the most difficult
ground. They would be particularly telling on
Afghan horsemen. We now come to the question
of the best formation of attack to be adopted by our
infantry. They have been drilled with a view to
enable them to contend on the best possible terms
with a European adversary provided with breech-
loading arms of precision. Both the ground and the
foe will, however, in Afghanistan be of a very
different nature from those our troops are nor
mally trained to deal with. The Afghans may be
good but slow shots up to 300 yards. A few of
them may possess long-range rifles, but from a defi
ciency of ammunition and proper systematic teaching,
they will probably not be very deadly. Taken
altogether, we may assume that the fire of the
Afghans will not be very fatal at distances over
| 200 yards ; but that with the cold steel our enemies
will be dangerous from their dash and a physique
as a rule superior to that of the lads who make up
| the majority of our regiments. It would seem de-
| sirable, therefore, that we ought to discharge most of
our cartridge^ at distances not exceeding 400 yards,
and that when we charge we should do so in close
| order that we may reap the utmost advantages
| from our superior weapons and drill. In short, as
i the fire of the foe is infinitely less deadly than that
! of, say, the French during the Peninsular War, we
should revert to a certain extent to our old tactics
and formation. By that we mean that we should
! advance with skirmishers kept well in hand and
! supported by formed bodies in line, which at first
might have a pace between each file, but should at
the moment of delivering the assault close in until
; they are shoulder to shoulder. Finally, as the
i Afghans are incapable of manoeuvring, we should
| advance in echelon from one flank the other flank
occupying the attention of the enemy by a com-
j paratively distant fire.
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN ASIA.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The antagonism between Russia and Eng
land in Asia has been so much intensified during
the last three years, and our relations with her were
so much stretched during the latter part of the
campaign in Turkey, that little explanation is re
quired for any movements she may have made to
embarrass us on the Indian frontier. Two great
nations began a course of conquest in Asia at almost
the same period—the end of the 16th century.
Both the conquest of Siberia and that of India were
inaugurated by traders, and exactly the same
course has since been pursued on either side. Eng
lishmen and Russians have found themselves in
contact with barbarians, and, by a law as natural as
that of the survival of the fittest, the bar
barians have been brought under dominion step by
| step. ^ Short of a war and the crushing defeat of
one side or the other the process will go on till all
I the barbarians are absorbed and the boundaries of
I Russia and England meet in the East. Like the
Red Indians in America, the native races of Asia
feel themselves being gradually encircled and ap
proached on both sides by forces of enormous
power. They are as if in the famous mediaeval
chamber, the walls of which slowly advanced to
crush the unhappy prisoner. What wonder is it if
they run from side to side seeking any niche they
can find for protection, either in one "wall or the
other ? As long as this state of things exists there
will be jealousy between ourselves and Russia. It
appears to me that as soon as we touch, and the
i firmness of great Powers is substituted for the irri
tability of weak ones, we may live peacefully in
presence of each other—at least, as peacefully as
any other Continental Powers. We cannot turn
India into an island, agreeable as that process
might be to us.
Now it is a curious and suggestive fact that the
| Russians charge us with exactly the same crimes
which we ascribe to them, those crimes being ex
aggerations of real qualities, good or bad according
to which side of the shield we examine—namely, '
the pride, prejudice, passion, and fierceness of
Imperial nations. The Russians go further and
declare that it was the diabolical cunning of Eng
land which stirred up the Eastern Question lately. I
In fact, it is probable that if we had not interfered |
there would have been no war, Russian influence !
would have been paramount in Bulgaria and that |
of Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We should j
be foolish to forget that Austria was the first to stir i
up the mud in the East. From a Russian point of |
view, prejudiced of course like that of any other J
nation, England is the cause of the war and all the 1
suffering it entailed.
But your readers may be interested to know ;
that they had even more to accuse us of than i
our moral support of Turkey. One day in ]
Bulgaria—I think it was the day when Gourko's I
force captured the Shipka and we met young]
Skobeleff on the top of the pass—that brilliant \
and extraordinary young General said to me j
suddenly, " Have you any news from India ? " I
replied that the Russian postal authorities took I
care that I had no news from anywhere. His ■
answer was, " I cannot find out what has become of |
that column of 10,000 men that has been organized |
by your people to raise Central Asia against us."
Perhaps there was such an idea, perhaps there was 5
not. At any rate General Skobeleff believed it, I
which means that the Russian Government had in- |
formation to that effect. If so, is it to be wondered |
at that they tried to turn the tables on us ? Like j
the Indian Mutiny, the insolence of Shere Ali is I
probably but the tail of a storm which has passed, |
and the deep designs ascribed to Russia at present |
are baseless in fact. She will have quite enough I
to do for some time to come in binding up her ;
wounds and taking very bitter tonics. The final j
result is that we shall make another forward step, j
as we do almost annually somewhere, and " rectify I
our frontier " in India, as we have done quite j
lately in the Straits Settlements, Fiji Islands, |
and South Africa. If we claim the right
i to advance everywhere, and I do not see why
| we should not, is there any justice in deny
ing the same right to another Power for moral
j reasons ? Let us honestly say, " We cannot
| permit Russia to move beyond a certain point,"
and place our outposts there, or at least within reach
: of it ; but to treat the question from a moral point
of view is a little odd on the part of the most ag-
j gressive nation on earth.
As for the studies of the Russian Staff in Afghan
istan, you would probably find the same informa
tion in every war office of Europe, except that of
i England, where the intelligence duties of the Staff
cannot be more than half performed for want of
i means and a proper conviction of their importance.
I was once requested in the bureaux of the General
I Staff at Berlin to look over their list of native
troops in India, and say whether it was correct ;
that list came from the midst of other researches as
to our Asiatic power, such as would have given
most of us some very interesting information. Yet
we do not suppose that Germany has designs on
India. If we wish to check the advance of Russia
anywhere, we shall do so with all the more ease by
keeping our heads cool and our minds as far as
possible disabused of false impressions.
Yours obediently, C. B. BEACKENBURY.