Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎83r] (169/312)

to attach too much importance to it, and it would
be rashness itself to found any serious impeach
ment of the Ministry on such a statement.
But it is evident that we have not such warrant
for the principles of the Government's Asiatic
policy as would be found in the common sense and
the moral responsibility of a whole Cabinet.
Ten or a dozen men of fair abilities, and with a
serious sense of their responsibility to the country,
would not be likely at any time to rush into a
policy of unscrupulous adventure. But we have
had too many proofs of the fact that the Prims
Minister acts independently of the great majority
of his colleagues when he thinks fit. He
has always one or two companions who are de
voted to him and his policy, whatever it may be.
Diomede , in the " Iliad," more than once declares
that the campaign would be much better managed
if its direction were left altogether in the hands
of his faithful friend Sthenelus and himself, and
the other princes and chiefs took no further part in
it. Lord Beaconsfiei/d is the Diomede of the
Cabinet, with the important difference, we pre
sume, that he has his way, and Diomede had not.
Lord Beaconspiedd and his Stheneltjs of the
hour have made many an important stroke of
policy. We are not, therefore, to assume that some
political plan never could have been adopted
because it is not a plan that ten or twelve Ministers
fairly consulted in good time would have been
likely to accept.
Nothing could be less satisfactory than the
position in which the country finds itself placed.
The less likelihood we see of England's being able
with safety to her influence in the East to pass
over Shere Ali's conduct unpunished the less is
there to approve of the statesmanship which,
unintentionally or not, has brought us to such a
pass. Fox once indignantly inveighed against a
policy which, as he declared, compelled him to
vote for the prosecution of a war, and for the
censure of the Ministers who had brought the war
about. Many Englishmen, perhaps even the
majority of Englishmen, will find themselves in
the same painful condition with regard to
the intervention in Afghanistan. They will find
that they cannot help giving their countenance
and support to the intervention, and that they are
at the same time well inclined to voce the Ministry
deserving of censure for the policy which renders
intervention necessary. We are always told that
this Afghan move is part of a whole scheme of
policy in Alia, for some new development of
which wo are advised to be already on the look-out.
But the country certainly did not expect anything
of the kind, and we are convinced would never have
sanctioned a policy of renewedintervention in Cabul
if it had only been allowed to know in time that
such a scheme was in preparation. We are told
by one set of supporters of the Government that if
the country did not know it was the fault of the
country's representatives; that if Ministers had
been more closely pressed and more sharply cross-
examined a year back, and if questioners had in
sisted on finding out the real meaning
which ambiguous words were employed to
conceal, they • might have got to know
the actual intentions of the Government. Another
set of supporters ask whether it is really
supposed that a Government entrusted with the
affairs of an Empire like ours could publish in ad
vance their plans on Eastern policy. To a certain
extent one explanation confutes the other. If the
Government wore bound to keep their plans a
secret from Parliament, cross-examination would
have bfseu of no yse; if they were not so bound,
it ou^ht to have been unnecessary. But
in any pase the policy which prepares
a* occasion for warlike intervention, and
only lets out the secret when the country has
no longer any real freedom of choice left to it, may
suit Imperial schemes and ambitions, but will
never become naturalised in the home of consti
tutional government. Even if we were to acquit
her Majesty's Ministers of having deliberately
provoked this particular crisis, we cannot but
blame the crooked and subterranean policy which
allowed it to come as a surprise upon the
country.
LONDON, FRIDAY, OCT. 4,
A special telegram from our Correspondent at
Kasaulie announces that the movement against i
Cabul will take place immediately.
What the North German Gazette's Bt. Peters
burg correspondent styles the rivalry between
England and Russia in Asia is none of our seek
ing. If tob carried British rule to the foot of
the North*-western mountains, our position in
the Peshawur Plain and in Sind did not in the
least degree threaten the Muscovite Empire.
Ranges of lofty hills, vast trackless deserts, in
land seas, subject to the Czar, separated the
Punjab from the nearest settlements east of
the Ural hills and the mouths of the
Volga. Over those extensive regions we
exercised so little influence that our tra
velling officers were murdered in Bokhara,
and slight gratitude was exhibited when Pot-
TlNGftii saved Herat from the Russians. The
great jBovements of Russia southward, under
taken with vigour after the Crimean War, were
developed with the object of creating a condi
tion Of things which should give her a base
whence she could disturb our rule, and, if pos
sible, weaken if not thwart our policy in
Europe. The Generals sent to Turkestan tho
roughly comprehend the secret purpose of their
employers, which was' to gain ground and
political influence, so that the acquired
Eastern forces might come into full play
in the event of another convulsion in
the West. The audacity exhibited by clever
soldiers like Tcheknaieff, Romanopfski , and
Kauffman was covered by the plausible des
patches of Prince Gortschakoff , by showy
pledges and promises, never intended to be re
deemed or kept, and even by special missions
tendering as security the honour of a Czar.' By !
these processes, continuous action following fast
upon solemn declarations that no more terri
tories would be absorbed, Russia came down to i
the Oxus, seated herself in the Attrek Valley, j
and approached daily closer to the confines of I
Afghanistan. No doubt she was powerfully j
aided by the conduct and prevailing temper
| of English parties, some of whom actually I
encouraged her to proceed, while others affected,
if they did not feel, a profound indifference to
facts and consequences. If they were startled for I
a moment, they were easily lulled to sleep, and, I
presuming on English disbelief as well as!
English sympathy, the Russians, boldly disre-
garding feeble protests, treated Central Asia as
their destined prize—not as an end, not for
itself, but as a mean^ and stepping-stone to
wards open and secret manoeuvres against j
our power. The whole militant course of Russia,
from 1852 to 1877, has been directed upon the j
British Empire ; and we repeat that until this ■
largest of contemporary facts, so far as we ;
are concerned, is frankly recognised, we shall
always fail to adopt a sound, becoming, and
just policy.
Elsewhere we publish a summarised view of
the advance of the Russian sway over the j
Asiatic Continent, which, if it contains nothing
novel for those who have watched her progress,
may convey information both useful and sur
prising to less constant observers of contem
porary events. If the statements of this sum
mary be followed with a good map, be the :
same " big " or little, the gigantic area of these I
j conquests and the extraordinary rapidity of I
j its absorption will strike even the least expe- !
I rienced in geographical science. But in these
j very facts lies the proof of two generalisations
which explain at once the facility of the pro
digious acquisitions thus made and the absence
of contentment which Russia shows in moving
beyond them, It is practically a wilderness
through which she has pushed her way, a
vast, inclement, inhospitable, unpeopled world
1 for the most part, which, though interspersed j
with oases of fertility—in ancient times seats j
of flourishing communities—is mainly steppe,,
and upland, bare desert or rugged hill, fit i
only for the semi-savage tribes who roam about
these regions. Thus, hitherto, her conquests
have been easy, being gained over nomads in
capable of cohesion, or barbarous Princes with
out resources or scientific arms. For the same
reason the possession of such enormous expanses
has never repaid the Czars. The most profitable
portion of the Russian dominions south of
Siberia burdens the Government of St. Peters
burg, as our statement shows. With a heivy de
ficit ; and the system of monopoly in trade, which
the aggressors everywhere establish, with their
necessary subordination of everything to military
considerations, forbids the hope of much im
provement. They have made a huge parade-