Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎82v] (168/312)

ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
BERLIN, O ct . 3.
The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Berlin
National Zeitung takes an unfavourable estimate of
the British military strength in India
" The European Army in India numbers 64 ,000,
the Native force 128,000. The 64 ,000 Jiuropeans \
being required to keep down 230,000,000 of mostly |
hostile subjects, few, if any, can be employed
abroad. As to the native forces, they are very un
trustworthy, being kept together only by rigorous | j
discipline. . . • Owing, moreover, to the lack 1
of officers, thes3 forces cannot be increased. By
the side of and opposed to the 192,000 English troops j
we have 264,000 men forming the contingents
of the various semi-independent Princes. Hitherto
prevented from united action by differences of race
and state, these forces are likely to gather round •
Afghanistan as a common centre in case of war.
Add to this that the Wahabites on the north
western border, who can send about 50,000 men |
into the field, are hostile to England, and that a
portion of the native forces may be expected to
mutiny, and the result must be very doubtful. But j
will there be war at all ? Accustomed to show a |
bold front, England, as a rule, fights only if she has |
others to fall back upon. Wherever firmness is
shown the Englishman yields, and as the Afghans , \
are sure to hold out, having no commercial interest,
to compromise, it is very problematic whether the j
English, with no allies to fight for them in the pre
sent instance, will really have recaurse to main
force. By occupying Quetta and demanding ad-
mission to a country which has never tolerated
their presence the English have provoked dip
lomatic defeat.They have done this at a moment when | j
all India awaits speedy liberation from the English ■.
yoke. In these circumstances, the affront sustained
is no doubt painfully felt ; but to be worsted by
the Afghans in the field would be still more dis- j
agreeable. However, let Englishmen take care of
their own affairs as best they may, wo Russians ,
have nothing to do with these Afghan squabbles
for the present."
The above fairly reflects the tone of Russian i
public opinion at this juncture.
The Russian Press, too, begins to speak out. The |
St. Petersburg Golos says that England, having [
allowed Messrs. Baker, Kemball, and others to fight n
for Turkey, Russia will not prevent her officers,'
volunteers, and ammunition merchants going to |
and fighting for Afghanistan. This would be a '
semi-official war no doubt ; but semi-official hostili
ties a'e far preferable to direct and official rupture, [j
which is not to be apprehended.
The Journal de bt. Fetershourg begs to inquire
whether The Times newspaper really expects the ^
Russian Government to ask England's permission I
before sending an Embassy to Afghanistan or any :
other country.
Herman Vambery, the well-known authority on
Turkestan affairs, in a letter to the Allgemeine
Zeitung, expects that England will defeat Shere Ali
with the assistance of the Beloochees, Heratees, |
Afridis, &c. The same writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. also asserts that a
Russo-Persian alliance has been concluded.
T he A meer and the S ultan .—The Whitehall I
Review publishes as authentic the following letter from
the Ameer of Afghanistan to the Sultan of Turkey "The
bearer of the august instructions of your Highness has |
arrived in Afghanistan, and your devoted servant is deeply i
touched at the benevolenc« of the sentiments with which |
you regard him, as well as the step you have taken in i
sending him an Ambassador Extraordinary. I thank your
Highness warmly. I also hasten to inform you that I pray !
| the Almighty God to protect your precious existence, and
! to watch over the health of your sacred person. In my
prayers I ask that the light of Islam may enlighten the ;
world, and as the residence of your Highness is regarded—
and rightly so—as the principal centre of Mussulmans on -
| the entire surface of the terrestrial, I pray to God to |
i guard it against the invasions of the enemy. The Am- |
I bassador cf your Highness has communicated to me your i
views respecting the English. The object of the letter sent
by me with the consent of your Highness was to obtain in- |
j formation respecting the events of Europe. In this I have g
not met with any great difficulties, from information :
which 1 procured from different sources I concluded that
the Russians had approached the residence of your High- ■
ness, while the English, after more than once affirming \
their goodwill towards you, had remained neutral up to the "
present, and followed the policy they resolved to adopt at
the outset. As all the world knows iliat a long friendship •
unites the Ottoman and English nations, I cannot avoid |
expressing some regret that the English should abstain ^
from supporting you precisely when you most require their |
aid. Knowing that for some time past the English ?
willingly desert the bond of friendship and candour, my >
efforts are constantly directed to holding them at a dis- |
tance. I consider that the Russians possess as much energy '
as the English, and they always surpass them when it is a
question of good faith. I am positively unable to afford i
the slightesr confidence to English promises. I know well
that your Highness did not appro\ e of what I said in my |;
last, that the friendship of the English was only a word—a I
word w ritten on i ce : but now your Highness has been able |
9tt !I pa^I^oi eq; '■ noijsojj; ioj
jpitmno sputn 9qq. put? sragaossigd
jaoj jguiug^s fltejTC T^'Wl xreflv —"g 'XOO
rSarajoui siq^ aqq. ui paAuae •uo^scg uiojj
enrj naxn^^q^ pne.waj^ uiojj
1 nug; aaim^s aurj fsaoi^ oqj—-g MOQ <r IOOd[H3[An
•nopuoi mojj Smujom sn^ sumoq oq^ qguojq^ psssBd
Ai8 ]s[ joj osjt! suiq; joqouy eq:).
JOI .T^niTtaia anrn- miOTiEM ana I
/A ~
We trust that the report which our Correspon
dent at Kazauli telegraphs to us may prove to be
true, and that the movement upon Cabul is to be j
immediate. So clear and strong are the reasons
which recommend prompt action that nothing
short of the physical obstacles which would render
such a movement impossible ought to be allowed
to overrule them. It is understood that the
Cabinet will meet to-morrow, but if the officious
explanations of those who undertake to speak for
the Government be correct, there will not ba
much occasion for deliberation on the part of our
statesmen. The Cabinet Council will, according
to the assurance* thus given, only have to dis
cuss some prospective development of the
frontier policy in India, inasmuch as the
present situation has been neither unexpected
l nor unprepared for. Of course it would be unfair
to take every utterance of this kind as really re
presenting the views of her Majesty's Ministers, |
or even representing what some of them might
wish to have reported to the public as their views.
It is natural, too, that neither the Ministers them- j
selves nor their volunteer spokesmen should be j
quite willing to admit that a crisis has arisen for j
which they were not fully prepared. " Were you
"not taken by surprise at Waterloo?" aa in-
-tuisitiva and inconsiderate per soa onca asked of |
the Duke of WbllingtostT 41 No," was the reply,
" but I am now." Men to whom the question
might be addressed with less impertinence^ would
| probably be found as unwilling as wellington
to admit that they were taken by surprise. But
if we regard as at all authoritative and literal the
assertion we have referred to, it must raise strange
doubts and suspicions in every mind. Was all
i this, then, really expected and prepared for—the
I refusal of the Ameek to receive the mission, the
manner of the refusal,which almost amounted to an
attack upon our Envoy, and the consequent neces
sity for warlike preparation? Let us see what I
follows, if we assume the question to be answered |
is the affirmative and on authority. It would |
evidently follow that our Government sent a 1
1 mission to Sheeb Ali which they knew that for
some reason or other he would not receive. It
was peremptory in its terms; its language
hardly " ept within the confines of courtesy. The
i Ameer was xrot asked to come into council with
us. He was merely informed that we had deter- |
mined on entering his capital and having a con- |
ference with him. Our mission approached him |
in a form particularly likely to offend if he was in
a humour to be offended, and tempt to resistance
if he was in a condition to resist. It came in
armed force, and yet was not an army capable of
clearing a path for itself. Was the form of the
mission a part of the preparation intended to
bring about the result which we are now officiously
assured was not unexpected ? I3it,then, tobeunder-
stood that the Government so acted as to force on,
j or at least draw on, the very crisis which we may
presume will end in the occupation of Cabul ?
It will be owned that those who undertake to
interpret between the Government and the public
have put the former in what seems to be an awk-
i ward dilemma. If the Government "saw everything
"andforesaw everything," why did they send
towards Shere Ali's capital a mission which they
knew Shere Ali would not receive—unless indeed
that they were anxious for the refusal, in order
to make it the occasion for the further action
which is now promised ? We have already ex- *
plained why we cannot agree with Lord Lmv-
RENCEin thinking that shere Ali ' S lack of courtesy
might be safely passed over without any armed
intervention on our part. But we cannot imagine
anything more monstrous than a policy which
planned to bring about such an act of discourtesy on
the assumption that it would have t© be punished by
an armed intervention. Virtuous indignation
without stint has been lavished upon the First
napoleon because it is certain that he sometimes
put upon the sovereigns of weak States exactions
which he knew they would not bear, in order
that their refusal might give him an excuse for
military intervention. Such a policy seems to be
as little in keeping with the spirit of the present
day as the sacking of towns or the execution of
captives. Yet we do not see how anything less
than this could fairly be inferred from the state-
; ment we have alluded to—that is if the statement
j were to be taken as authoritative, a highly important
| qualification. We are not by any means disposed
ENGLAND AN D AFGHANISTAN.
BERLIN, O ct . 3.
The St. Petersburg correspondent of tbe Berlin ;
National Zeitung takes an unfavourable estimate of |
the British military strength in India :—
" The European Army in India numbers 64,000, :
the Native force 128,000. The 64,000 Jiuropeans |
being required to keep down 230,000,000 of mcstly
hostile subjects, few, if any, can be employed |
abroad. As to the native forces, they are very un
trustworthy, being kept together only by rigorous |
discipline. . . • Owini*, moreover, to the lack I
of officers, theso forces cannot be increased. By ^
the side of and opposed to the 192,000 English troops
we have 204,000 men forming the contingents
of the various semi-independent Princes. Hitherto
prevented from united action by differences of race! -
and state, these forces are likely to gather round ;
Afghanistan as a common centre in cass of war. |
Add to this that the Wahabites on the north
western border, who can send about 50,000 men
into the field, are hostile to England, and that a
portion of the native forces may be expected to j |
mutiny, and the result must be very doubtful. But | j
will there be war at all ? Accustomed to show a !
bold front, England, as a rule, fights only if she has
others to fall back upon. Wherever firmness is
shown the Engliehman yields, and as the Afghans |
are sure to hold out, having no commercial interest i
to compromise, it is very problematic whether the i
English, with no allies to fight for them in the pre
sent instance, will really have recourse to^ main
force. By occupying Quetta and demanding ad
mission to a country which has never tolerated j
their presence the English have provoked dip
lomatic defeat.They have done this at a moment when ;
all India awaits speedy liberation from the English
yoke. In these circumstances, the affront sustained i
is no doubt painfully felt ; but to be worsted by
the Afghans in the field would be still more dis
agreeable. However, let Englishmen take care of
their own aifairs as best they may, we Russians I
have nothing to do with these Afghan squabbles \
for the present."
The above fairly reflects the tone of Russian |
public opinion at this juncture.
The Russian Press, too, begins to speak out. The ;
St. Petersburg Golos says that England, having [
allowed Messrs. Baker, Kemball, and others to fight!
for Turkey, Russia will not prevent her officers, j
volunteers, and ammunition merchants going to |
and fighting for Afghanistan. This would be a I
semi-official war no doubt ; but semi-official hostili
ties a 1 e far preferable to direct and official rupture, |
which is not to be apprehended.
The Journal de M. Fetershourg begs to inquire
whether The limes newspaper really expects the
Russian Government to ask England's permission |
before sending an Embassy to Afghanistan or any j
other country.
Herman Vambery, the well-known authority on 7
Turkestan affairs, in a letter to the Allgemeine
Zeitung, expects that England will defeat Shere Ali |
with the assistance of the Beloochees, Heratees, |
Afridis, &c. The same writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. also asserts that a ;
Russo-Persian alliance has been concluded.
T he A meeb and the S ultan .—The Whitehall i
Review publishes as authentic the following letter from :
the Ameer of Afghanistan to the Sultan of Turkey "The
bearer of the august instructions of your Highness has
arrived in Afghanistan, and your devoted servant is deeply
touched at the benevolencfi of the sentiments with which i
you regard him, as well as the step you have taken in i
sending him an Ambassador Extraordinary. I thank your
Highness warmly. I also hasten to inform you that I pray
the Almighty God to protect your precious existence, and
to watch over the health of your sacred person. In my
prayers I ask that the light of Islam may enlighten the
world, and as the residence of your Highness is regarded—
and rightly so—as the principal centre of Mussulmans on ,
the entire surface of the terrestrial, I pray to God to !
guard it against the invasions of the enemy. The Am
bassador tf your Highness has communicated to me your
views respecting the English. The object of the letter sent
by me with the consent of your Highness was to obtain in- '
formation respecting the events of Europe. In this I have ;
not met with any great difficulties, from information
which i procured from different sources I concluded that
the Russians had approached the residence of your High
ness, while the English, after more _ than once affirming
their goodwill towards you, had remained neutral up to the
present, and followed the policy they resolved to adopt at
the outset. As all the world knows ihet a long irienctship
unites the Ottoman and English nations, I cannot avoid
expressing some regret that the English should abstain
from supporting you precisely when you most require their
aid. Knowing that for some time past the English
willingly desert the bond of friendship and candour, my
efforts are constantly directed to holding them at a dis
tance. I consider that the Russians possess as much energy
as the English, and they always surpass them when it is a
question of good faith. I am positively unable to afford
the slightest confidence to English promises. I know well
that your Highness did not appro\ e of what I said in my
last, that the friendship of the English was only a word—a
word written on ice : but now your Highness has been able
j to convince yourself by your own experience how little
! reliance there is to be placed in their friendship, and you
l see that the English always abandon their friends in their
misfortune to their fate. I, therefore, no longer doubt
that you will grant the necessary attention to my humble
opinion of the English. If their conduct were conformable
| to justice, ali difficulties on my side would be removed
I without the least doubt; but, confident in their power,
they have always acted in an arrogant and disdainful
manner. Through the several interviews I have had with
-J the Russian Envoy, who has been here some time, I have
acquired the conviction that in every case the Russians are
more honourable and sincere than the English. Thus it is
that I consider it my duty to-entreat your Highness to
reject all alliance with England, and to come to an
understanding with the Russians. May God grant the
Ottoman arms numberless victories, and make all the
Mussulmans victorious I—G hib A li .—Dated, 10 Moharren,
1295 (January 19, 1878)."
W e trust that the report which our Correapon-
dent at Kazauli telegraphs to as may prove to be
true, and that the movement upon Cabnl is to be j
immediate. So clear and strong are the reasons
which recommend prompt action that nothing
short of the physical obstacles which would render
such a movement impossible ought to be allowed
to overrule them. It is understood that the
Cabinet will meet to-morrow, but if the officious
explanations of those who undertake to speak for
the Government be correct, there will not ba
much occasion for deliberation on the part of our
statesmen. The Cabinet Council will, according
to tbe assurances thus given, only have to dis
cuss some prospective development of the
frontier policy in India, inasmuch as the
present situation has been neither unexpected
I nor unprepared for. Of course it would be unfair
to take every utterance of this kind as really re-
presenting the views of her M ajesty's Ministers,
or even representing what some of them might
wish to have reported to the public as their views.
It is natural, too, that neither the Ministers them- ;
selves nor their volunteer spokesmen should be j
quite willing to admit that a crisis has arisen for j
which they were not fully prepared. "Were you
"not taken by surprise at Waterloo?" aa in-
nuisitiva and inconsiderate per son once asked of 1- :
the Duie of WelmngtonT "No," was tbe reply,
" but I am now." Men to whom the question
might be addressed with less impertinence^ would
probably be found as unwilling bo W ellington
to admit that they were taken by surprise. But
if we regard as at all authoritative and literal the
i assertion we have referred to, it must raise strange
doubts and suspicions in every mind. Was all
i this, then, really expected and prepared for—the
1 refusal of tbe A meek to receive the mission, the
manner of the refusal,which almost amounted to an
attack upon our Envoy, and the consequent neces- ;
sity for warlike preparation? Let us see what j
follows, if we assume the question to be answered ',
is the affirmative and on authority. It would ,
evidently follow that our Government sent a j
1 mission to SnERB A li which they knew that for
some reason or other he would not receive. It
was peremptory in its terms; its language
hardly ' ept within the confines of courtesy. The
A meer was not asked to come into council with
| us. He was merely informed that we had deter
mined on entering his capital and having a con
ference with him. Our mission approached him
in a form particularly likely to offend if he was in
a humour to be offended, and tempt to resistance j
if he was in a condition to resist. It came in j
armed force, and yet was not an army capable of
clearing a path for itself. Was the form of the j
mission a part of the preparation intended to ;
bring about the result which we are now officiously
assured was not unexpected ? Isit, then, to be under
stood that the Government so acted as to force on,
j or at least draw on, the very crisis which we may
presume will end in the occupation of Cabul ?
It will be owned that those-who undertake to
interpret between the Government and the public
have put the former in what seems to be an awk
ward dilemma. If the Government "saw everything
"andforesaw everything," why did they send
towards S here A li's capital a mission which they
knew S here A li would not receive—unless indeed
that they were anxious for the refusal, in order
to make it the occasion for the further action
which is now promised ? We have already ex
plained why we cannot agree with Lord L aw
rence in thinkingthat S here A li 'slack of courtesy
might be safely passed over without any armed
intervention on our part. But we cannot imagine
anything more monstrous than a policy which
planned to bring about such an act of discourtesy on
the assumption that it would have t© be punished by
an armed intervention. Virtuous indignation
without stint has been lavished upon the First
N apoleon because it is certain that he sometimes
put upon the sovereigns of weak States exactions
which he knew they would not bear, in order
that their refusal might give him aa excuse for
military intervention. Such a policy seems to be
as little in keeping with the spirit of the present
day as the sacking of towns or tbe execution of
captives. Yet we do not see how anything less
; than this could fairly be inferred from the state-
; ment we have alluded to—that is if the statement
| were to betaken as authoritative, ahighlyimportant
j qualification. We are not by any means disposed