Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎65v] (134/312)

Private advices received at Paris from St.
Petersburg state, in answer to a note from the
English Cabinet, inquiring in ■what way the
Kussian Government proposes to reconcile Ge
neral Prince Stolietoff 's mission to Cabul with
its previous engagement to renounce all political
influence in Afghanistan, that that mission,
although decided upon at a time and under cir
cumstances now no longer existing, was merely
intended as an act of courtesy to the Ameer of
Afghanistan.
Last night's Politische Correspohdenz publishes
information from Constantinople to the effect
that Schir Ali Khan, the secret envoy of the
Ameer of Afghanistan, is instructed to claim
the Sultan's intervention in order that England
should not declare war against Afghanistan ;
further, to convince the Sultan that an alliance
with Russia is advisable for the Mussulman race,
and that the Ameer personally is decided to con
clude such an alliance. It is added that the
[ Sultan has sent a secret emissary to Afghanis
tan to sound the Mussulman population of Cen
tral Asia as regards a Pan-Islamite league against
England as well as Russia.
Great interest is stated to have been excited
at Belgrade by the news of the complications
which have arisen in regard to Afghanistan, and
Russian influence in Servia is said to have been
decidedly strengthened.
I t ought not to bo without shame and peni
tence that a body of Englishmen find themselves
directly summoned by Russian journals to re
new their campaign against the interests of their
own country. The Novoye Vremya "foresees
that the blow inflicted upon England's position
in Asia will enable the Liberal Opposition to
recommence its attacks upon the B eaconsfield
Administration." In these few words—obscure
as may be their source, and mistaken their defi
nition—lurks, we think, a severer condemnation i
of the course recently pursued by some among!
^ us than any which public reprobation at home
could infiict. The Muscovite journal, express
ing, no doubt, the opinion held by many of the
Czar's subjects, puts on one side all humani
tarian pretensions in the late agitation. It
probably feels that, if the barbarities committed
by Russians and Bulgarians were so calmly
regarded by our philanthropists, their emotion
about the original massacres cannot have been
very genuine. It equally leaves aside, as ex
hausted, all talk of sympathy with Russia as a
" holy " and " sisterly " Power. The St. Peters
burg newspaper goes straight to what it believes
to bo the " root of the matter," and says,
in effect, to its British friends, " Kbw is
your time again 1 The Afghan crisis is an ex
cellent opportunity for a fresh attack upon the
strongholds of office. Defame and embarrass
your Q ueen's Government; pick holes in all
they do ; depreciate and damage them day after
day, and you may, perhaps, recover—together
with our contemptuous gratitude and amid those
disasters to your country for which we pray—
the coveted command of administration for
which we suppose you ready to do all this and
more.'' Such is a fair paraphrase of the lan
guage which certain English statesmen have:
taught Russian writers to address to them, and |
we say again that nothing should more sharply i
open their eyes to the mischief wrought by
the easy treason of factiousness. No doubt this
time the Russian mot dordre will not be obeyed.
An instinct, stronger than vanity or rancour,
is teaching the leaders of our late pro-Russian
section that Ijjie country would not tolerate any
renewal of an anti-national agitation; The
danger is felt to be too real; the affront is re
cognised as too studied and defiant; and people
understand the Imperial bearings of this ques
tion better than they comprehended the confused
relations of the Eastern Question as seen from
the stand-points of Bulgaria and Batoum. Those
consequently who might secretly agree with the
Russian journal that the opportunity is tempt
ing for another anti-patriotic outcry are silent,
or else discuss minor matters in the situation,
such as the financial problems involved, or the
recent measures of LordLYTTON. But, indeed,
we would fain believe that a majority of the
small crowd who applauded the insane cry of
"Perish India!" have found themselves, after
all, too much Englishmen to feel like Russo-
Afghans, just as the majority of the nation,
early in the century, refused to be the tools of
Napoleonic ambition. More than one example of
such commendable repentance haa already been
afforded, and to those who are still hesitating,
anxiously waiting to see whether Lords B eacons-
field and L ytton will bring the country well
through this business, we would address a word of
warning. The English public man who should
show himself factious, or make his course in- the
j present crisis depend upon the successor disaster
[of our arms, might as wellTetiro at oncer 4 from
politics, i' or such a person there would be no
future in Parliamentary life ; for it is not now
a question of Turkey in Asia, but of England in
Asia, and the recollection of past misadventures
in this frontier region inspires the nation, not
with any feeling of pusillanimity, but with an
earnest desire to make an end of such perturba
tions, and grapple with the real evil, Russian
encroachments near our Indian confines.
Perhaps, however, during these days of pre
paration, it may be worth while to point out that
nothing in the policy of Lord L ytton lies open to
the charge of aggressiveness or rash activity. It,
has been no desire for territory, no renewed tra
ditions of the D alhousie period, which brought
on this grave situation. S iiere A lt Khjan had
experienced only favour and friendship at our
hands, and, indeed, owes his throne to British
support. The rifles with which his levies will
be armed were supplied by us ; his treasury has
been replenished with English gold; and the
Indian Government asked nothing more from
him than that he should perform his part as
an independent and loyal ruler of the gateway-
kingdom of the peninsula. The necessity for
securing this by means of a closer intercourse was
forced upon us entirely by Russian action. The
despatch of the Czar's agent to Cabul, contrary
to the clearest pledges, and the reports of what
had passed at his reception, and afterwards in
Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). , obliged the Viceroy to take immediate |
steps for a plain understanding, which might and !
would, however, have still proved amicable if
S iiere A li had not already yielded to the sug
gestion of the Muscovite Emissary. It is worth
remembering that one of the most violent of
the Russian journals admits all this, thereby
transferring to the Czar's Government complete
responsibility for what may ensue. " The Eng
lish," says the Rusld Mir, " intended to cement
a new and solemn alliance with the Ameer,
previous good relations with that potentate being,
in their opinion, disturbed by the appearance of
a Russian Embassy at Cabul. But, instead of
meeting them half-way, the Ameer, only an
Asiatic Khan, has been independent enough to
box the ears of the proud Englishman and to
shake the authority and prestige of the Indian
Empire." Thus even in Muscovite quarters it
is not pretended that we ever sought anything
beyond our frontiers except security for peace
and allegiance within them, while the appearance
of the Czar's agent at Cabul, with armed columns
behind him on the Oxus, was a palpable menace
to that security, and indubitably so intended.
Never, therefore, was there a clearer justification
for action than that which Lord L ytton can
show; and if our Empire, with its vast value
to civilisation and humanity, is to be defended
at all, everybody possessing the least spirit or
patriotism will agree that it must be defended
upon the Viceroys lines. We hope, therefore,
that such idle protests as Mr. L owe has recently
raised in print against what he styles " Imperial
ism," and such recapitulation of past calamities
elsewhere as seems designedly published in the
hope of inspiring fear and feebleness, may be the
only signs of obedience to the Russian journal's
invitation. This is no ordinary crisis. The tran
quillity and security of the Empire have been |
assailed under combinations which demand that i
unanimous support should be given to the Q ueen's
Representative. The flame lighted by this inso
lent defiance may spread we know not where. Cir
cumstances have abruptly revealed only one of
the political torpedoes laid outside our frontier
for the injury of English policy ; but others
may possibly explode in unsuspected places, and
one of the best means of preparation for what
may como \ipon us will be the old and noble
union which England was wont to present against
any' clear national danger. Thus far such a
united feeling is shown, and its effect is already
seen in the language of all the best organs among
the Continental press, which speak with respect
and admiration of the spirit exhibited throughout
the country. Jt is seen also in the guarded tone
adopted by the official and semi-official journals
of the Czar, which, although allowed to publish ill-
mannered comments upon the topic, are evidently
directed to abstain from any open challenge
of our power. The farthest licence at present
granted these writers is that they may hint at
the right and the intention of Russia to wage
" unofficial war " against us, " covering the rear "
of S here A li , as the Novoye Vremya says, and
" allowing Bojchariots, Khirgiz, and Turkomans,"
as another Russian newspaper observes, " to aid
and assist the Afghans in the impending war." It
is sufficiently certain, nevertheless, that no such