Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎65r] (133/312)

1 RUSSIA AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA.
The various telegrams that have recently been pub-
; lished with reference to the anthorized Chinese Em- .
bassy to St. Petersburg call attention to the fact that
the Kuldja question, which was raised by the Chinese re-
conquest of the Tungan country and of Eastern Turke
stan, may be expected shortly to come on for discussion i'
, and solution. Although little understood in this country, I
\ this question is not without its importance, and bears a
; very significant aspect indeed when the future of the rela- v
\ tions between Russia and China in Central Asia is the |
matter in discussion. The overthrow of the Tungani, who 1
j had erected in the various cities of Hamil,Barkul, Guchen, I
I Urumtsi, and Manas a confederacy of no mean power, was :
j consummated with the capture of the last of these cities in |
i November, 1876. In the early spring of 1877 the first step I
i towards the resovery of Eastern Turkestan was taken by J
1 the defeat of Yakoob Beg outside Turfan and the occupa- I
tion of that city. Yakoob Beg died at Korla either in May |
or June; and In September following the Chinese com- I
| menced their forward movement against Kucha and the j
i western portion of Kashgaria. Suffice it here to say that |
j the movements of the Chinese Viceroy and General, Tso |
| Tsung Tang were crowned with complete success, and that H
| the capital, Kashgar, surrendered before Christmas, 1877,
i and that the remainder of the State had come to terms with
\ the Chinese long before the month of February in the pre
sent year. By these brilliant successes a Chinese army,
flushed with victory, found itself on the Russian frontier,
i and close to its old possession of Hi, or Kuldja, with
j only the Tian Shan, pierced here by several passes, inter- I
, vening. It was generally understood that this campaign in |
the north-west had only been undertaken for the express g
purpose of restoring all the lost possessions of China to the I
: Emperor ; and consequently, so long as Russia retained j
< possession of Hi, the task remained unaccomplished. In I
view of this fact, and admitting, as in face of recent events
it is impossible to deny, that the Chinese are not to be J-
" turned aside by danger or natural obstacles from I
attaining what they desire, it may be interesting to say !
• something of this Kuldja question,of which we shall shortly I
" be hearing so much. Whereas China crushed the Tungani j
: and the Atalik Ghazi alike by the exercise of force, it is I
; by diplomacy in the first place that she aspires to recover Hi, I
J the most prized of all her Central Asian possessions. It would |
be rash, however, to assert that, peaceful means failing, the
Chinese will decline to proceed to force, although it is pro-
' bable that they would postpone their action until Russia '
was embarrassed elsewhere. Of one thing we may bo quite
certain, and that is that the Chinese will never rest content
in Central Asia until they regain possession of Hi. We pur
pose, then, to trace back the history of the relations be-
> tween Russia and China in this portion of Asia in order
that the present difficulty may be correctly appreciated.
| Up to the year 1832 Russia and China were close neigh
bours from the Amoor to the Narym. They were also '
friendly neighbours. There are treaties between the two 1
Governments bearing on all points of intercourse from i
Manchuria to Hi. There are special treaties between the I
Viceroy of Hi and the Russian Government. The great
Treaty of Kuldja, ratified in 1851, threw open the
rich marts of 111 and Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) to |
the enterprise of Russian merchants. The Treaty of Pekin p
■ in 1860 more than ratified those provisions and emphasized p
the good understanding which had previously existed along It
the whole frontier. The ce»sion of the western portion of i
Hi to Russia, including as it did the important place of |
Vernoe, enabled Russian merchants to reap the fullest jj
benefit of their good understanding with China. When,!
: therefore, the Tungani revolt broke out in the country lying ]
between the Great Wall and the Pamir and Lake IssikKul, I
it was a great blow to Russian commerce to find that the I
friendly Chinese had been supplanted by fanatical, and con-
J sequently hostile, Mahomedans. Yet the Russians held
' aloof from those intestine disturbances, and slowly
1 proceeded with the absorption of Western Turkestan.
They preserved neutrality while the Atalik Ghazi
was subduing Altyshahr, the land of the six cities,
and while the Tungani were establishing a firm rule be- I
tween Kashgar and China. But in Kuldja the question I
was more intricate. There there were two rival elements 5
almost equal in strength and resources, and when the I
Chinese had been massacred the question arose which I
of the two factions was to ba supreme. These fac- i
tions were the Tungani and the Tarantchis. The former !
were of the same race as the Tungani in Kashgar and fur- I
ther east, and the latter were the descendants of old in- !
habitants of Kashgar, who had bean at various times com- j
pelled to settle in Hi by order of the Chinese. Between I
these in 1864-67 a bitter contest ensued, and although the j
former appear to have had the best of the fight- j
ing, a compromise was agreed upon between them. I
They elected a chief, a Tungan, we believe, named |
Abul Oghlan, and during some years this irregular |
sort of government existed in Hi. But it was only .
a veiled anarchy, and Russian merchants feared tcr
enter the province on account of the outspoken antipathies ;
of Abul Oghlan. All Russia's previous diplomatic arrange- ?
ments became a dead letter, and all Ignatieff's skill |
and tact of no avail in face of Tungan truculence.
It was impossible for Russian caravans to proceed
to Kuldja during the existence of such confusion,
and it was equally useless for them to think of reach
ing Chuguchak, where a sanguinary war had broken '
out between Kirghiz and Calmucks, resulting in
the triumph of the latter, who have ever since
retained possession of it . for China. But, although
Russia's trade languished, she, so occupied was she
in Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, still abstained
: from interference either in Knldja or Kashgar ; but in the
| year^870 the question assumed a more significant aspect
on account of the astonishing success of Yakobb' Beg.
When Kucha fell into his possession and the rulers of
Turfan and Urumtsi sent an humble embassage to the
■ conqueror, the Russians began to be nervous about the future
fate of Kuldja. This doubt increased when the Atalik
Ghazi fortified Ush Turfan, in the mountains, and began to
push his outposts closer in towards Kuldja. The Russians
bad held aloof when it was simply a question of commerce,
but Yakoob Beg's threatening attitude in 1870-71 acted
as a spur to their inclinations, and it was resolved to fore
stall their dangerous neighbour. In May, 1871, the
Russians crossed into Kuldja, and during the next month
General Kolpakovsky followed with the main army, |
some 2,000 strong. The Tungan-Tarantchi Government
offered little opposition, and Abul Oghlan surrendered to '
p| General Kolpakovsky on the 4th of July. The disappear-
/i ance of this hybrid rule in Kuldja was an unqualified bene
fit to all concerned. Seventy-five thousand slaves were
I released by order of the Russians, and commerce once more
j ventured to return in the rear of victory and good rule.
| In the proclamation Russia annexed Kuldja " in per- i
| petuity," and formed out of it the Government of Priilinsk ; j
f but this " in perpetuity " was explained at Pekin to i
I mean until the Chinese were strong enough to re
assert their sway. On several occasions that definition has
been repeated,and the Chinese have now naturally requested
| the Russians to be as good as their word. Russia has replied
j with a demand for compensation, and has fixed it at a
' figure which the Chinese declare to be exorbitant and to
exceed the total cost of the north-west campaign. It is
^ j to arrange this little difficulty that the Chinese have sent a
; special Embassy to St. Petersburg, and some time
will yet elapse before the discussion can ccme on
There is good reabon for believing that Russia is
: loth to surrender Kuldja, and that she regards the
J recent Chinese successes in Central Asia with dislike,
as tending to lower her own prestige, is not less clear.
J The retrocession of Kuldja would undermine Russian rule
-■ in the eastern part of Central Asia, according to the St.
I Petersburg Journal, and it would no doubt be highly in
convenient to abandon the admirable frontier Russia holds
| in the Tian Shan, so long as she retains Hi, The Russian I
; Press evidently consider that the peoples of Central Asia '
would construe such an act as a confession of weakness, and
that it would tend to revive all the old prestige that for
merly belonged to China. The Russian authorities in Cen- 1
tral Asia tra loth to surrender Kuldja for the same reasons,
as well as for the fact that Kuldja has become in their
hands a highly prosperous and productive region. But
whether the home Government will care to break its i;
plighted word is another matter, upon which we should
I not like to pass an opinion. But, unless it does, Russia will |
scarcely be able to foil the Chinese, who are greatly in j
earnest over this Central Asian question. And it should 1
bo remembered that China has at this very moment a
"disciplined force of close on 50,000 men in Kash-
. garia and Tungaria, a force, moreover, flushed with [
the success of two campaigns, and armed with breech-
iloading rifles and Krupp's artillery. The Russians [
would probably be able to ovefthrow this "ever vie-
jtorious " army if it came to the last appeal ; but it would I
require an effort, and that is exactly what Russia is unable
"at the present moment to make in Central Asia. In all pro
bability moderation will sway the counsels on both sides,
and some compromise will be suggested by which each will
secure its object or its equivalent as well as its honour.
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
THE AMEER AND T HE SULTAN
([by daily telegraph special wirb.j
[feom oub own cokkespondent.j
vienna, Monday Night.
This evening's Politische Correspondenz pub
lishes the following information from Constan
tinople :
" Schir Ali Khan, the secret envoy of the
Ameer of Afghanistan, is instructed to claim the
Sultan's intervention in the pending difficulty, in
order that England should not declare war against
Afghanistan. He is further to convince the
Sultan that an alliance with Russia is advisable
for the Mussulman race, and that the Ameer per-
: sonally is decided to conclude such an alliance,
j The Ameer wrote to the Sultan on the subject a
few months ago. The Sultan has sent a secret
embassy to Afghanistan to sound the Mussul
man population of Central Asia as regards a
Pan-Islamite league against England as well as
against. Russia."
[reuter's telegrams.]
paris, S ept, 30 (Evening).
Private advices received here state that the
British Charg^ d'Affaires at St. Petersburg has
p 4.«n it ^ 1 ",1 l"''Mi .i ^'■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ • -^ t jg
-ivon-113(1 nil j— •qinooi b o£l?f ■02ji> 'soiooj psq xis 'sjiioj ;•
-.red aaaqi ' jbq 'sua«w qnp ptrc p-reijiiq poof) •uopnoi ivan O
paum aiqtmoiqs'bj » 'x3t aq, tn sim i ^jltmoo n vk q
■0'a\ 'w«nbs
■XjnqsmooTa- 'jaaJis-wtJH 'ZT Pwi imuind—-spim oaii
- bjoui w fiutionpnoo joj noi^poramoooti xiaaa Suissossod put!
'as-tj ifioanua 'uiibj pub sp'tuiojs ajnstoid oatsus-jyo qjiai -j i
'x3t aq 'igxoh ^viohsmittoo ptre jnmvll 1
•peoj-tfua-anw '59T puts uostncqx—-asnoq onqnd ft
v ioj jnnq 'pang ijaAV 'juamaAuoo ptre 'Xtnooa 'aijjtit sasiinaij
•ajBjqSuojoxn ptio.1 niBui ui psKjimtng -qiiiora lad ogtf i
'uutj ;nauiuia uw japan ptaq 'asaOH SNIAi pmt H3aa ' T :
n^q-mg ng—ip 'SQNUOJ aarHaMilH S K TOHlL i
•nnnj-TMia-otmr 'hot 'a-nsturt nnu nosniojrr—•n.onaajsui .maa m « )
! RUSSIA AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA.
The various telegrams that have recently been pub
lished with reference to the authorized Chinese Em
bassy to St. Petersburg call attention to the fact that
the Kuldja question, which was raised by the Chinese re-
conquest of the Tungan country and of Eastern Turke
stan, may be expected shortly to come on for discussion
and solution. Although little understood in this country,
this question is not without its importance, and bears a
very significant aspect indeed when the future of the rela
tions between Russia and China in Central Asia is the
matter in discussion. The overthrow of the Tungani, who
had erected in the various cities of Hamil.Barkul, Guchen,
Urumtsi, and Manas a confederacy of no mean power, was
consummated with the capture of the last of these cities in
November, 1876. In the early spring of 1877 the first step
towards the recovery of Eastern Turkestan was taken by
the defeat of Yakoob Beg outside Turfan and the occupa
tion of that city. Yakoob Beg died at Korla either in May
or June; and in September following the Chinese com
menced their forward movement against Kucha and the
western portion of Kashgaria. Suffice it here to say that
the movements of the Chinese Viceroy and General, Tso
Tsung Tang were crowned with, complete success, and that
the capital, Kashgar, surrendered before Christmas, 1877,
and that the remainder of the State had come to terms with
the Chinese long before the month ot February in the pre
sent year. By these brilliant successes a Chinese army,
flushed with victory, found itself on the Russian frontier]
and close to' its old possession of Hi, or Kuldja, with
only the Tian Shan, pierced here by several passes, inter
vening. It was generally understood that this campaign in
the north-west had only been undertaken for the express
purpose of restoring all the lost possessions of China to the
Emperor ; and consequently, to long as Russia retained
possession of Hi, the task remained unaccomplished. In
view of this fact, and admitting, as in face of recent events
it is impossible to deny, that the Chinese are not to be
turned aside by danger or natural obstacles from
attaining what they desire, it may be interesting to say
something of this Kuldja question,of which we shall shortly
be hearing so much. Whereas China crushed the Tungani
and the Atalik Ghazi alike by the exercise of force, it is
by diplomacy in the first place that she aspires to recover Hi,
the most prized of all her Central Asian possessions. It would
be rash, however, to assert that, peaceful means failing, the
Chinese will decline to proceed to force, although it is pro
bable that they would postpone their action until Russia
was embarrassed elsewhere. Of one thing we may be quite
certain, and that is that the Chinese will never rest content
in Central Asia until they regain possession of III. We pur
pose, then, to trace back the history of the relations be
tween Russia and China in this portion of Asia in order
that the present difticulty may be correctly appreciated.
Up to the year 18S2 Russia and China were close neigh
bours from the Amoor to the Narym. They were also
friendly neighbours. There are treaties between the two
Governments bearing on all points of intercourse from
Manchuria to Hi. There are special treaties between the
Viceroy of Hi and the Russian Government. The great
Treaty of Kuldja, ratified in 1851, threw open the
rich marts of Hi and Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) to
the enterprise of Russian merchants. The Treaty of Pekin
in 1860 more than ratified those provisions and emphasized
the good understanding which had previously existed along
the whole frontier. The cession of the western portion of
Hi to Russia, including as it did the important place of
Vernoe, enabled Russian merchants to reap the fullest
benefit of their good understanding with China. When,
therefore, the Tungaui revolt broke out in the country lying
between the Great Wall and the Pamir and Lake IssikKul,
it was a great blow to Russian commerce to find that the
friendly Chinese had been supplanted by fanatical, and con
sequently hostile, Mahomedans. Yet the Russians held
aloof from those intestine disturbances, and slowly
proceeded with the absorption of Western Turkestan.
They preserved neutrality while the Atalik Ghazi
was subduing Altyshahr, the land of the six cities,
and while the Tungani were establishing a firm rule be
tween Kashgar and China. But in Kuldja the question
was more intricate. There there were two rival elements
almost equal in strength and resources, and when the
Chinese had been massacred the question arose which
of the two factions was to be supreme. These fac
tions were the Tungani and the Tarantchis. The former
were of the same race as the Tungani in Kashgar and fur
ther east, and the latter were the descendants of old in
habitants of Kashgar, who had been at various times com
pelled to settle in Hi by order of the Chinese. Between
these in 1864-67 a bitter contest ensued, and although the
former appear to have had the best of the fight
ing, a compromise was agreed upon between them.
They elected a chief, a Tungan, we believe, named
Abul Oghlan, and during some years this irregular
■ort of government existed in Hi. But it was only
a veiled anarchy, and Russian merchants feared tcr-
enter the province on account of the outspoken antipathies
of Abul Oghlan. All Russia's previous diplomatic arrange
ments became a dead letter, and all Ignatieff's skill
and tact of no avail in face of Tungan truculence.
It was impossible for Russian caravans to proceed
to Kuldja during the existence of such confusion,
and it was equally useless for them to think of reach
ing Chuguchak, where a sanguinary war had broken
out between Kirghiz and Calmucks, resulting in
the triumph of the latter, who have ever since
retained possession of it for China. But, although
Russia's trade languished, she, so occupied was she
in Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, still abstained
from interference either in Kaldja or Kashgar ; but in the
year 1870 t he qu estion assumed a. more significant aspect
on account of
When Kucha fell into his possession and the rulers of
r Turfan and Urumtsi sent an humble embassage to the
f conqueror, the Russians began to be nervous about the future
I fate of Kuldja. This doubt increased when the Atalik
Ghazi fortified Ush Turfan, in the mountains, and began to
push his outposts closer in towards Kuldja. The Russians
had held aloof when it was simply a question of commerce,
but Yakoob Beg's threatening attitude in 1870-71 acted
as a spur to their inclinations, and it was resolved to fore
stall their dangerous neighbour. In May, 1871, the
Russians crossed into Kuldja, and during the next month
General Kolpakovsky followed with the main army,
some 2,000 strong. The Tungan-Tarantchi Government
offered little opposition, and Abul Oghlan surrendered to
General Kolpakovsky on the 4th of July. The disappear-
, ance of this hybrid rule in Kuldja was an unqualified bene
fit to all concerned. Seventy-five thousand slaves were
released by order of the Russians, and commerce once more
ventured to return in the rear of victory and good rule.
In the proclamation Russia annexed Kuldja " in per
petuity," and formed out of it the Government of Priilinsk ;
but this " in perpetuity" was explained at Pekin to
mean until the Chinese were strong enough to re
assert their sway. On several occasions that definition has
been repeated,and the Chinese have now naturally requested
the Russians to be as good as their word. Russia has replied
with a demand for compensation, and has fixed it at a
figure which the Chinese declare to be exorbitant and to
exceed the total cost of the north-west campaign. It is
to arrange this little difficulty that the Chinese have sent a
special Embassy to St. Petersburg, and some time
will yet elapse before the discussion can come on
There is good reabon for believing that Russia is
loth to surrender Kuldja, and that she regards the
recent Chinese successes in Central Asia with dislike,
as tending to lower her own prestige, is not less clear.
The retrocession of Kuldja would undermine Russian rule
in the eastern part of Central Asia, according to the St.
Petersburg Journal, and it would no doubt be highly in
convenient to abandon the admirable frontier Russia holds
in the Tian Shan, so long as she retains Hi, The Russian |
1 Press evidently consider that the peoples of Central Asia ^
would construe such an act as a confession of weakness, and §£1'*
that it would tend to revive all the old prestige that for- iK
merly belonged to China. The Russian authorities in Cen- He
tral Asia tre loth to surrender Kuldja for the same reasons,! HI
as well as for the fact that Kuldja has become in their K
hands a highly prosperous and productive region. But |||
whether the home Government will care to break its Bj
plighted word is another matter, upon which we should M
not like to pass an opinion. But, unless it does, Russia will j
scarcely be able to foil the Chinese, who are greatly in gi
earnest over this Central Asian question. .And it should j al
be remembered that China has at this very moment a l
disciplined force of close on 50,000 men in Kash- lis
garia and Tungaria, a force, moreover, flushed with m
the success of two campaigns, and armed with breech- H
loading rifles and Krupp's artillery. The Russians ; ^
would probably be able to ovefthrow this "ever vie-i H
torious " army if it came to the last appeal ; but it would
require an effort, and that is exactly what Russia is unable H
at the present moment to make in Central Asia. In all pro- p
bability moderation will sway the counsels on both sides, 1
and some compromise will be suggested by which each will i|
secure its object or its equivalent as well as its honour. ! 18
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
THE AMEER AND THE SULTAN
[BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE.J
[feom oue own corbespondent.j
VIENNA, Monday Night.
This evening 's Politische Correspondenz pub
lishes the following information from Constan
tinople :
" Sehir Ali Khan, the secret envoy of the
Ameer of Afghanistan, is instructed to claim the
Sultan's intervention in the pending difficulty, in
order that England should not declare war against
Afghanistan. He is further to convince the
Sultan that an alliance with Russia is advisable
; for the Mussulman race, and that the Ameer per-
: sonally is decided to conclude such an alliance,
j The Ameer wrote to the Sultan on the subject a
few months ago. The Sultan has sent a secret
embassy to Afghanistan to sound the Mussul
man population of Central Asia as regards a
Pan-Islamite league against England as well as
against. Russia."
[reuter's telegrams.]
PARIS, Sept. 30 (Evening).
Private advices received here state that the
British Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg has
presented to the Imperial Chancellery a note
from the English Cabinet inquiring in what way
the Russian Government proposed to reconcile
General Stolieteff's mission to Cabul with its
previous engagements, by which Russia agreed i
to renounce all political influence in Afghanis
tan.
The reply to this note was to the effect that
Russia was always disposed to respect existing
engagements, and that the mission of General
Stolieteff, although decided upon at a time
and under circumstances which now no longer
existed, was merely intended as an act of courtesy
to the Ameer of Afghanistan.
BELGRADE, Sept. 30.
The news which has been received here of the
complications in Afghanistan excites great inte
rest and appears to have decidedly strengthened
Russian influence in Servia.