Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎53v] (109/312)

AFGHANISTAN.
According to the news we publish this morning
from India, there seems to be little doubt that,
if the tenour of the Ameer's language on receipt
of Lord Lytton's letter be reported aright, the
act of the Commandant of Ali Musjid was in
direct accordance with Shere Ali's commands.
Under these circumstances, the military autho
rities are to mass a sufficient number of
troops at the various frontier stations in order
to expedite the advance whenever circumstances
offer a favourable opportunity. The fact that
the Viceroy has directed the formation of his
camp at Lahore shows that he himself has no hope
of peace. This, it will be remembered, was the
course adopted by the Earl of Elgin during the
Umbeyla Expedition in 1863.
There can, as our Calcutta Correspondent
suggests, be no expectation that a campaign in ^
Afghanistan will prove a mere military promenade.
Our recollection of the last war points to the belief
that there will be constant exposure, great hard
ships, and sharp fighting. The march through the
Bolan, the Khojuk, and the Khyber passes were
beset with difficulties of no ordinary kind ; dearth
of forage and want of water told heavily on men
and animals. Indeed, the army of the Indus is re
ported to have lost no less than 20,000 camels
on the road between Ferozepore and Candahar.
Pood for the men was equally scarce, and the troops
were constantly on half and even quarter rations.
The casualty rolls in the skirmishes in the more
mountainous districts were exceedingly heavy.
Remembering these facts, it does not surprise us to
hear that the military authorities are determined
to render a successful issue absolutely certain by
the consolidation of large military resources. As
we have already pointed out, the attitude of the
border tribes constitutes a most important factor in
the question. The slightest check either on the
road to Cabul or in that country itself would with- j
out doubt raise a blaze from the Mahabun
to the Bolan—a blaze that would require
all our exertions to quell. At a moderate
computation, these tribes can put 100,000 fairly
armed men into the field, without artillery, it is
true, but all, or nearly all, armed with long range '
matchlocks, while many thousands are in possession
of British rifles. Lord Lytton has already made
overtures to the tribes of the Khyber Pass, and /
doubtless by this time the various political officers 1
are making negotiations with the various clans ■
down the border, in order to purchase their neutra- ■
lity during the forthcoming operations. The
Pathan, however, is notoriously faithless. It is
utterly impossible to rely on his promises, his
friendship, or his fidelity. He will enter into
engagements and bind himself by the most
solemn oaths to respect them ; but should he see
that the slightest advantage can be gained by
breaking his plighted words, he has no hesi
tation in doing so. Fortunately, the various I
political officers along the frontier are military
men, vereed in the school of war, as well as in the
wiles of Afghan diplomacy. They are not likely to
place implicit trust in any engagements they may
induce the Pathan tribes to enter into, and know
full well that, although his pocket may be full of
British gold, the Khyberi or Wazeeri would not
hesitate to attack our troops should he think he
could do so in safety. Knowing the character of
these men, it is not to be wondered at_ that we
learn the Indian Government is acting with great
circumspection and deliberation, for, in addition to
the number of troops necessary for the purpose of
[ bringing the Ameer to terms, it will be impera
tive to mobilize a force in order to maintain a free
1 communication through nearly 800 miles of rugged
mountainous country, inhabited by men whom a
mistake would convert at a moment into most for
midable foes. The remembrance of many acts of re
tributive justice on our part will tend to make these
various hill tribes very watchful over our movements
in order that they may seize the opportunity of re
taliating for loss of prestige incurred in their nume
rous encounters with our troops. The contingency of
hostility on the part, then, of these border tribes is
one that the Indian authorities are compelled to
guard against. Consequently it will be necessary to
avoid all appearance of hurry, and not endeavour
to move forward until a force is collected suffici
ently strong not only to coerce the A.meer, but to
overawe into quietude the frontier clans of the
Sufaid Koh and'th® Suleiman range. Although it
was with comparative ease that both Sir Claude
Wade and Sir George Pollock forced the Khy
ber Pass in the last Afghan war, yet more recent
experiences of border expeditions, as well as the
lessons to be learnt from the present operations in
Bosnia, show that it is no easy matter for discip
lined troops to sweep a determined, though undis
ciplined foe from their mountain fastnesses. Our
relations with many of these tribes has not been of
the most peaceful character. During the thirty
years we have held our present frontier line we
have been engaged in a like number of petty
wars with our neighbours. A roll of upwards
of three thousand killed and wounded on our
side speaks volumes for the dash and gallantry
of our opponents. It is, then, not to be wondered
at that the military authorities in India aro taking
every means in their power to mass such a number
of troops on the spot as will effectually remove all
chance of failure.
The north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India, stretching from
Abbottabad in Hazarah to Jacobabad in Scinde,
: gives us a line of defence of about 600 miles. To
guard this we have ten large military stations,
garrisoned, in round numbers, by 20,000 men. In
advance, again, of these cantonments are 90 lesser
fortified posts, placed so as to guard the entrance to
the chief passes in the mountains. In pushing for
ward through the range into Cabul it will be
essential that this line be not weakened,
else of a certainty the frontier tribes will
take advantage of the absence of the troops
to recommence their old tactics of levying
blackmail all down our border. The question,
then, before the Government of India is not only
to take effective measures to coerce the Ameer, but
also to provide against the very probable con
tingency of these border tribes aiding and abetting
Shere Ali by carrying war into our own country or
at any rate harassing our line of communications
after our advance.
The details of troops warned for service will be
read with interest by our military readers. The 17th
j Foot will renew its acquaintance with "Afghanistan,
Ghuznee, and Khelat," names which it carries em
blazoned on its colours. The numbers, however,must
be far from complete. A far stronger force of cavalry j
than our Correspondent enumerates will be neces- j
sary for the subjugation of Afghanistan. In the
campaign 1839-42 the Ameer's Horse was ever
hovering around our Infantry, and was a con
stant source of annoyance to General Elphinstone's
men. Profiting by past experience, it is probable
that this branch will be very considerably strength
ened. Nothing in the telegram we publish justi
fies the assertion that Sir Neville Chamberlain has
been relieved by his brother. Sir Neville's great
experience of mountain warfare, his long com
mand of the Punjaub frontier, his admirable plans
in the Bozdar, Kabul Khail, Mahsood Vaziri and
Umbeyla expeditions, all point him out, should his
health permit it, as the fittest man for this most
important appointment. He is one of the few
living Generals who has commanded an army in
the field, and no man in the service has earned a
better name for proficiency in hill tactics, while
his reputation for personal bravery is a byword
l in the mouth of every Pathan on the border.
This alone would carry great weight. Gene
ral Biddulph, who is spoken of as the com
mander of the Quettah column, is an officer
possessing exceptional talents. He first came to
notice at Woolwich for an act of gallantry in saving
the life of a brother cadet, and during the Crimean
war distinguished himself greatly. He has held
many high positions on the head-quarter Staff in '
India, and besides being a very popular Brigadier,
possesses the confidence of all who have served
under him. General Donald Stewart, who is
assigned to the command of the Reserve forces, is
an Indian officer who served with great distinc
tion in many border skirmishes under Sir
I Colin Campbell prior to the Mutiny, in that
campaign he acted in the Adjutant-General's
Department, was repeatedly mentioned in de
spatches, and;finally^rose to the postof Deputy-Adju
tant-General of the Indian Army. He commanded ■:
the Bengal Brigade in the Abyssinian War, and
subsequently was Chief Commissioner of the
Andaman Islands. For some time he has been
in command of a division in Bengal, and
left England last week to take up his
new appointment. As far then as leaders of the
expedition are concerned we see that we have men
schooled in hill warfare, men in the prime
of life on whom the nation can confi- j
dently ralv.. ^Thua on© element that insured j
fauure in the last war is wanting in the
coming one. Let us hope that the military leader
may combine in his person the chief political office.
Undivided command is absolutely necessay. If
the Generals are to be hampered by instructions,
such as caused the breach so early between
the soldiers and the civilians in 1839, it
is useless to anticipate prompt success. Every
precaution, it appears, is being taken by Lord I
Lvtton's Government to insure the successful issue
of the complications that have unfortunately arisen.
We trust they will not be led into any hasty measures :
by the tone of that portion of the English Press
which counsels prompt action. There are three
enemies to contend against: the Ameer's own forces, "■
the climate of Afghanistan, and the Border tribes
who inhabit the Suliman and Sufaid Koh, and,
fortunately, all three are being carefully provided
for in the plans of the Indian Government.