Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎53r] (108/312)

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LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1878.
Our relations with Afghanistan and the probable
course of the Indian Government with reference to
them are the great subjects to which all thoughts
in India are turned. Our telegraphic news from
Calcutta this morning leaves us little room to
expect that matters will be arranged peaceably. ;
"War is looked upon as almost certain, and the
Government is hastening on its military prepara
tions in prospect of it. Troops are being collected
from all sides and sent on to various points on the
North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. . There they will remain for
the present massed and in readiness to take the
offensive as soon as a forward movement has been
determined on. The A meer has still the choice of j?
submiesion open to him. Bis country is not yet in- ^
vaded, nor is it thought likely that it will be, in
force, until the winter has passed. Strong as the rea- ;
sons are for an immediate advance, and welcome as
the news would be that it had been tried and had
succeeded, the case for delay, as our Correspondent
states it, is too strong to be set aside. Before we
could move safely on Cabul with the troops just now
at our disposal, we must be assured of the good
will, or at least of the neutrality, of the hill tribes
that occupy the intervening passes. But we have as
yet no certainty of these. As far as they owe any
allegiance, it is to the A meer, and not to us. Their ]
past relations with us have been mostly hostilOj :
and the desire for revenge might combine now with
the lust of plunder to rouse them to active enmity. ; *
'ihe passage of our troops through their country
would, at the present moment, probably not be un- |
opposed, and if it were necessary for us to force j
our way, our invading columns would need to be
raised considerably beyond their actual strength.
The difficulty, moreover, of a winter campaign in
Afghanistan is so great that it could not be
lightly undertaken, nor without the chance of
8Qme advantage sufficient to counterbalance it. If t
we wait for the return of spring, we shall be diifer-
ently placed in every way. The weather will
then be favourable to us, and there will have been
time given either to conciliate the hill tribes or j
if this is not to be done, to get ready a force which ;
will overcome the resistance they can offer us. We '
cannot afford to begin war until we see our way
clear before us. We must run no risks that we ean
avoid. Our aim must be not only to succeed in the
end, but to leave no possibility open for interme
diate failure. On a question between the instant
and the deferred invasion of Afghanistan we
must accept th<5 judgment of the military autho- y
rities of India. They alone can know the whole ■
case, and, whatever may be the issue, it is with
them that the responsibility will rest. There are t
plenty of ardent spirits in this country^
»nd, no doubt, in India too, who will _
chafe at the idea that we must wait some
months longer before we move on Afghan
istan. We trust, however, that if the Indian Go
vernment is convinced of the wisdom of delay, it
will not suffer itself to be forced on by the pressure :
of less patient, less well-informed, and less respon- |
eible critics.
An invasion of Afghanistan will, our Corre
spondent reminds us, be no military march over.
We must expect hard fighting before our business
will be done. r ihe result can be in no doubt, but
the resistance we are likely to encounter will be so
great that there must be ample preparations on
our part for meeting it. War, if war we are
to have, will be a troublesome and a costly
affair. It promises, nevertheless, to be well
worth its cost in the end. We may even
be glad at the opportunity now granted us of
settling our relations with Afghanistan. We are so
clearly in the right that we shall have no scruple
about striking, if strike we must, very hard indeed.
We hold at present a frontier line which needs to
be guarded by a long succession of forts a,nd
by a permanent body of some thirty-five
thousand men. We may look to the result of
a war with Afghanistan as a cure for this standing
evil. We shall hardly be content to leave matters
as they are when war is over. We shall take up a
new line of defence, more easy to be held, and
giving us a command over regions where it is
necessary that our influence should be main
tained. If we cannot obtain this peaceably and w®
could hardly expect to do so in any case we may, j
after all, find some permanent advantage from a war j
which we have yet done our utmost to avoid. Everfj
now, we are told, the Indian Government is anxious &
not to act with harshness. If the A meer will i-
comply with the demands we have been making
upon him, we shall be willing even now to bold
our hand. But we have both gone too far for
a return to our former position. We must have
security against foreign intrigue in Afghanistan^
nor can any mere verbal explanation satisfy
us as to th is. An apology on the part of
the A meer and a continued presence of Russian
envoys at Cabul would be a termination we could
not accept. Some material guarantee for the supre
macy of our influence in Afghanistan we are entitled
to demand, and we shall very shortly be in
a position to make our demand felt. We may not
always be as well placed for war as we are ;
now. We can give our full attention to the
matter, and we have already done so much in the
way of military preparation that we shall not be will
ing to allow these efforts to be wasted. An insecure
peace would be an alternative which we should re
fuse to take. It would amount merely to a putting
off of the inevitable struggle, and this to a time not
within our own choice, and possibly not as favour
able to us as the present time is.
Whether the insolent conduct of S here A li has
or has not been instigated by Russia is more than
we can say certainly. We will forgive her freely if
she has rendered us this service, whatever may
have been the motive that has prompted her to it. ^
Nor can we rouse ourselves even to the mildest ^
anger at any Russian exultation over the prospect >
of trouble to England. If Russia really
thinks we shall break our teeth upon Afghan
istan, she may be as jubilant as she pleases
over the as yet unaccomplished | fact. But
when Russian journals ^o on further to talk of the
help S here A li may expect from Russian subjects,
they are on less safe ground. The argument that
as England gave assistance to Turkey in the late
war, so may Russia giv e assistance by and by to Af
ghanistan, is not as conclusive as they may think it.
Sound as a matter of inference, it has no weight if
the assumption on which it proceeds is untrue, and
this it is unquestionably. England not only
gave no active atssistance to Turkey, but
prohibited such assistance from being given
by English subjects, and took what care
she could to see that the prohibition was
obeyed. We should not permit an opposite
course on the part of Russia, nor have we any :
belief that she intends to follow it. But j
we cannot be surprised if some of our countrymen
are minded to bo less charitable, and if we hear in
some quarters loud counter-threats of what England
will do if Russia directly or indirectly interferes
with her in Afghanistan. If such feelings are
aroused and such words used, it will be to
a portion of the Russian Press that this
mischievous excitement must be debited.
As for the notion of the Novoye Vremya that
parties in England will be divided on the
Afghan question, and that the attacks of the
Parliamentary Opposition on Lord B eaconsfield's
Ministry will be renewed—to the advantage,
we presume, of some other interest than
England's—this we may dismiss as foolish
rather than malicious. If anything could
unite all parties, it would be the oc
currence of a war in which English credit
and English interests were felt to be alike con
cerned, and it is such a war as this on the brink
of which we are now standing.
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
SIMLA, S ept . 29.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived here.
ST. PETERSBURG, S ept . 28.
With reference to the telegrams and articles published
by the English papers ascribing the stoppage of the British
Mission to the counsel of Russia, it is pointed out in official
quarters that when the first news of the event arrived here
the Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs had no more
precise information on the subject than the public I
generally. It is added that the belief expressed by
these papers of Russian complicity in the matter v
may have arisen from the following considerations
During the Russo-Turkish war various reports were j
received to the effect that England was making at
tempts to create difficulties for Russia in Central Asia.
The English Mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth to Kashgar
was avowedly undertaken with this purpose, and even in
Bokhara it was alleged that English agents were at work.
In order to counteract the effect of these movements,
Russia took various measures, and contemplated sending
several expeditions to reconnoitre the neighbouring terri
tories. However, as soon as the Berlin Congress held out
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LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 187a
Our relations with Afghanistan and the probable
course of the Indian Government with reference to
them are the great subjects to which all thoughts
in India are turned. Our telegraphic news from
Calcutta this morning leaves us little room to
expect that matters will be arranged peaceably.
War is looked upon as almost certain, and the
Government is hastening on its military prepara
tions in prospect of it. Troops are being collected
from all sides and sent on to various points on the
North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. . There they will remain for
the present massed and in readiness to take the
offensive as soon as a forward movement has been
determined on. The A meer has still the choice of
submission open to him. Bis country is not yet in
vaded, nor is it thought likely that it will be, in
force, until the winter has passed. Strong as the rea
sons are for an immediate advance, and welcome as
the news would be that it had been tried and had
succeeded, the case for delay, as our Correspondent
states it, is too strong to be set aside. Before we
could move safely on Oabul with the troops just now
at our disposal, we must be assured of the good
will, or at least of the neutrality, of the hill tribes
that occupy the intervening passes. But we have as
yet no certainty of these. As far as they owe any
allegiance, it is to the A meer , and not to us. Their
past relations with us have been mostly hostilCj
and the desire for revenge might combine now with
the lust of plunder to rouse them to active enmity, j
r i he passage of our troops through their country
would, at the present moment, probably not be un- {
opposed, and if it were necessary for us to force
our way, our invading columns would need to be
raised considerably beyond their actual strength.
The difficulty, moreover, of a winter campaign in
Afghanistan is so great that it could not be
lightly undertaken, nor without the chance of
egme advantage sufficient to counterbalance it. If
we wait for the return of spring, we shall be differ
ently placed in every way. The weather will
then be favourable to us, and there will have been
time given either to conciliate the hill tribes or )
if this is not to be done, to get ready a force which
will overcome the resistance they can offer us. We
. cannot afford to begin war until we see our way
clear before us. We must run no risks that we «an
avoid. Our aim must be not only to succeed in the
end, but to leave no possibility open for interme
diate failure. On a question between the instant
and the deferred invasion of Afghanistan we
must accept th<S judgment of the military autho- \
rities of India. They alone can know the whole
case, and, whatever may be the issue, it is with
them that the responsibility will rest. There are
plenty of ardent spirits in this country^
and, no doubt, in India too, who will
chafe at the idea that we must wait some
months longer before we move on Afghan
istan. We trust, however, that if the Indian Go
vernment is convinced of the wisdom of delay, it
will not suffer itself to be forced on by the pressure
of less patient, less well-informed, and less respon
sible critics.
An invasion of Afghanistan will, our Corre
spondent reminds us, be no military march over.
We must expect hard fighting before our business
will be done. Ihe result can be in no doubt, but
the resistance we are likely to encounter will be so
great that there must be ample preparations on
our part for meeting it. War, if war we are
to have, will be a troublesome and a costly
affair. It promises, nevertheless, to be well
worth its cost in the end. We may even
be glad at the opportunity now granted us of
settling our relations with Afghanistan. We are so
clearly in the right that we shall have no scruple
about striking, if strike we must, very hard indeed.
We hold at present a frontier line which needs to
be guarded by a long succession of forts and
by a permanent body of some thirty-five
thousand men. We may look to the result of
a war with Afghanistan as a cure for this standing
evil. We shall hardly be content to leave matters
as they are when war is over. We shall take up a
new line of defence, more easy to be held, and
giving us a command over regions where it is
necessary that our influence should be main
tained. If we cannot obtain this peaceably and w© |
could hardly expect to do so ih any case—we may, ,
after all, find some permanent advantage from a war |
which we have yet done our utmost to avoid. Islven']•
now, we are told, the Indian Government is anxious /
not to act with harshness. If the A meer will L
comply with the demands we have been making
upon him, we shall be willing even now to bold
our hand. But we have both gone too far for
a return to our former position. We must have
security against foreign intrigue in Afghanistan^
nor can any mere verbal explanation satisfy
us as to th is. An apology on the part of
the A meer and a continued presence of Russian
envoys at Cabul would be a termination we could
not accept. Some material guarantee for the supre
macy of our influence in Afghanistan we are entitled
to demand, and we shall very shortly be in
a position to make our demand felt. We may not
always be as well placed for war as we are
now. We can give our full attention to the
matter, and we have already done so much in the
way of military preparation that we shall not be will
ing to allow these efforts to be wasted. An insecure
peace would be an alternative which we should re
fuse to take. It would amount merely to a putting
off of the inevitable struggle, and this to a time not
within our own choice, and possibly not as favour
able to us as the present time is.
Whether the insolent conduct of S here A li has
or has not been instigated by Russia is more than
we can say certainly. We will forgive her freely if J-
she has rendered us this service, whatever may
have been the motive that has prompted her to it. ■
Nor can we rouse ourselves even to the mildest
anger at any Russian exultation over the prospect !
of trouble to England. If Russia really
thinks we shall break our teeth upon Afghan
istan, she may be as jubilant as she pleases
over the as yet unaccomplished f fact. But
when Russian journals ^o on further to talk of the
help S here A li may expect from Russian subjects,
they are on less safe ground. The argument that
as England gave assistance to Turkey in the late
war. so may Russia giv e assistance by and by to Af
ghanistan, is not as conclusive as they may think it.
Sound as a matter of inference, it has no weight if
the assumption on which it proceeds is untrue, and
| this it is unquestionably. England not only
gave no active assistance to Turkey, but
prohibited such assistance from being given
by English subjects, and took what care
she could to see that the prohibition was
obeyed. We should not permit an opposite
course on the part of Russia, nor have we any
belief that she intends to follow it. But
we cannot be surprised if some of our countrymen
are minded to be less charitable, and if we hear in ]
some quarters loud counter-threats of what England
will do if Russia directly or indirectly interferes
with her in Afghanistan. If such feelings are
aroused and such words used, it will be to
a portion of the Russian Press that this
mischievous excitement must be debited,
As for the notion of the Novoye Vremya that
parties in England will be divided on the
Afghan question, and that the attacks of the
Parliamentary Opposition on Lord B eaconsfield's
Ministry will be renewed—to the advantage,
we presume, of some other interest than
England's—this we may dismiss as foolish
rather than malicious. If anything could
unite all parties, it would be the oc
currence of a war in which English credit
and English interests were felt to be alike con
cerned, and it is such a war as this on the brink
of which we are now standing.
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
SIMLA, S ept . 29.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived here.
ST. PETERSBtJRG, S ept. 28.
With reference to the telegrams and articles published
by the English papers ascribing the stoppage of the British
Mission to the counsel of Russia, it is pointed out in official
quarters that when the first news of the event arrived here
the Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs had no more
precise information on the subject than the public
generally. It is added that the belief expressed by
I these papers of Russian complicity in the matter
may have arisen from the following considerations :—
During the Russo-Turkish war various reports were j
received to the effect that England was making at
tempts to create difficulties for Russia in Central Asia.
The English Mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth to Kashgar
was avowedly undertaken with this purpose, and even in
Bokhara it was alleged that English agents were at work-
in order to counteract the effect of these movements,
Russia took various measures, and contemplated sending
several expeditions to reconnoitre the neighbouring terri
tories. However, as soon as the Berlin Congress held out
the prospect of bringing about a peaceful solution of the
question, all these measures were countermanded. In
any case, it is added, the assumption that the Russian
j Government had any part in the decision of Shere Ali to j
i reject the Anglo-Indian Mission is groundless. Such con-
I jectures are merely the outcome of the antagonism which
existed between England and Russia during the late war.