Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎48r] (97/312)

A further advantage which may be expected j
to spring out of the necessity thus malignantly I
thrust upon us will be the permanent tran-'
quillity of our Indian frontier. While the Kus- j
sians in Asia were still far removed from that
border, " masterly inactivity " might have been
a proper policy ; but their advent at Khiva,
Samarcand, and the Amu Daria channel has
rendered Afghanistan immeasurably more.im
portant than it was. It must henceforward be
British or irrevocably pro-British, and this, in
some form or other, will Ino doubt result from
the steps we are forced to take. The. conse
quence will be that, instead of listening feebly
within the gateways of our Empire to every
footfall and voice of those who venture to
menace it, we shall stand where we ought to
stand, upon the outworks of our great natural
fortress, with clear ground for precaution and
action on all the approaches which lead to it.
On the score of mere moral effect alone, it will
be good for India and Asia to see the British
power planted outside the mountain ramparts
of its Eastern possessions, either actually or
by well-affected allies ; and this once achieved
wft shall have no more ignoble alarms at
Peshawur, or troubles with the hill-tribes
in reach of our influence. What has been
wrought on one side of Asia by the Anglo-
Turkish Convention will be repeated in a more
practical and active manner on the other,
and Russia, in seeking to hinder the work of
English civilisation, will find that she has but
accelerated its progress. There is not a single
source of peril from without which cannot
be better faced with assured frontier-posts be
yond the passes, while, with our strong bases
behind them, India will repose with a securer de
fence than she has ever known before. To remove
far away from the land the perpetual apprehen
sion of intrigue and change would be one of the
greatest benefits which we could bestow on her.
This can only be done when a Russian agent
can no more enler Cabul than he could inter
fere at Lahore or Delhi, and we may confi
dently trust that the first emissary of this
kind seen at the upper end of the Khyber
will be the last. From outside the passes our
power will visibly influence the country north
ward to the Oxus, and westward to Persia ; nor is
the Afghan nation so considerable or—apart
from its Ruler and a few Sirdars—so hard to
conciliate that it need give any greaf anxiety.
We think a new era of tranquillity might safely
be-.expected to set in from the date when our
advanced guards were thus known to be holding
the outer as well as the inner portals of India,
and rest is what India wants. If once the
Russian incubus could be removed, either by
such simple means or by sterner remedies, to a
distance, the peace and financial prosperity of
the Empire might be assured. For these and
other reasons, we are greatly inclined to be
lieve that Muscovite scheming and Afghan inso
lence have together planned an incident which,
intended for a blow, is capable of proving a
blessing, and that this " petard," which has ex
ploded too soon or too late, is more likely to
" hoist" its engineers than those against whom
it was directed.
S here A li's effrontery has, apparently, been
fruitful in a different kind of service. It has
revealed to the English friends and adherents of
Russia the disastrous results springing from their
conduct. Among the gentlemen who went out
of their way to aid the Ozar was Sir H enry
H avelock . He was a welcome personage
in the Russian camp before Plevna, and he
steadily gave all the support he could to the
cause of Muscovite aggression. From his In
dian experience and military education, a nobler
and less unpatriotic course might have been
expected; but he allowed his cooler judg
ment to be overborne by that sectarian fana
ticism which he calls his conscience, and
obeying its dictates he virtually aided the
enemies of his country. Events, however, have
opened his eyes, and; offering a lame apology for
his recent behaviour, he comes forward to rate
the Government for its " unwillingness to admit
the importance of the prisis," and, so impatient
has he grown that he fears lest the favourable
opportunity should slip from our hands. Indeed,
he goes much further, for he denounces those
divided counsels which he assisted to produce.
"This is not the moment," he writes, "for
Liberals and Conservatives to indulge in mutual
recriminations;" "this is the time to be united
and act, for beneficial action can only be ob
tained by prompt decision." What a pity it is
that such sound advice was not tendered in
1876, or even in 1877 I The drift and design
of Russian statecraft, alike on the Danube
and the Oxus, were just as plain to eyes not
blinded by religious hatred ; and an officer who
sets up for a judge of Anglo-Indian policy
should have been able to discern the scope of
Muscovite plans quite as well in September,
1876, as he seems to be in September, 1878. It
was the duty of every " Englishman " to justify
his right to the title, and it was as incumbent on
him to serve his country then as it is now/ Sir
H enry H avelock did not act on the opinion
we have expressed, and it is that fact which
gives the chief importance to his tardy emanci
pation from fanaticism. Like other converts,
he is now all zeal and impatience, and, though a
few phrases cannot obliterate remembrance of
the course he took, we may accept his fervid
advocacy of instant and united action
as some proof that the latest proceedings of his
former clients have helped to clear the vision of
his party as well as himself. The conversion of
I sectaries and cosmopolitans into Englishmen
and patriots—if it be a conversion—will not be
the least profit which an Empire threatened
with factions may derive from the insult offered
to Queen V ictoria's representative in the throat
Lof the Khvber Pass', ■
England and cabul.V
f BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE;] ,
[from our own CORRESrON dent. j
PARIS, F riday N ight.
Departing from. its accustomed tone, the
Temps of to-night, commenting on the Af
ghanistan question, says:
What ought to be the attitude of England with re
spect to Russia ? We are not contradicting our former
statements in saying that, after having so frequently
pointed out the movements of the Russians, we must
not ask the English to remain indifferent to them. We
are satisfied that what is taking place at this moment
has heen brought about by the fault of the Russians;
but how ? We have always said that the conduct of
the Russians could only be explained in two Ways,
either by negligence or a desire to bring about new
complicationa. It is precisely because of the possibility
of this being the case thai there has been negligence, or
that the Emperor has been barily served, that we may
ask the English not to go too oaickly to work.
Referring to the same subject the Journal ties
Dehats of to-night says there is no new aspect of
the question calling for special comment:
What we are anxious to know is what will be the ul
timate attitude of Russia ; but everything tends to the
belief that at a moment when they come out of a,war-
that has cost them so much they will hesitate
their strength with the intact forces and almost inex
haustible resources of England.
[reuter's telegrams.] *
SIMLA, S ept . -26.
Three thousand five hundred troops are to be
sent to reinforce the Quetta garrison, and a force
of 4,000 men will be assembled at Thai, at the
entrance of the Kuram Valley. A reserve force
of 6,000 men will be concentrated at Sukkur.
SIMLA, S ept. 27.
Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hussein Khan, the special
envoy sent by the Viceroy to Cabul, has returned
to Peshawur.
BOMBAY, S ept . 27.
Several papers designate Lieutenant-General
Crawford Chamberlain as the Commander-in-
Chief of the aflmy for Afghanistan.
BERLIN, S ept . 27.
Lord Augustus Loftus, the British Ambassa
dor at St. Petersburg, in passing through Ger- i
many on his return to the Russian capital,
had an interview with Prince Gortschakoff. It
is believed that the Afghanistan question will
not lead to any explanations between England j
and Russia. _ J
afghan subjects of the
AMEER.
THE TRUE STORY OF 1842.
Our telegrams will have informed our readers
that the Viceroy of India has determined to
; await the result upon the Ameer and his people
| of the armed demonstrations now being made
I before giving the signal for actual hostilities.
I This prudence becomes the more conspicuous and
more admirable when it is remembered with
what promptitude Lord Lytton has acted since
the momentous repulse of the British Mission at
the Fort of Ali Musjid. Three armies have
sprung up at as many gates of the Ameer's
kingdom, and from all the military stations
along the frontier line there has been a concen
tration of the materials of war towards the