Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎47v] (96/312)

therefore. General Abramoff ought to have been stopped
on the road to Cabul and recalled. If that was impose
sible, there can be n > question of the practicability of
his almost immediate recall on his arrival. The distance
of the Russian frontier from Cabul is about the same as
from London to Edinburgh, and although telegrrapnic
communication is not extended quite to the frontier, it
comes near it. Had there existed at St. Petersburg
any real desire to promote that friendly relationship
between the two empires which the Treaty
of Berlin was supposed to have made possible, the
Abramoff mission would never have reached Cabul, or,
if it had, would have been instantly recalled. But it
now appears that the Russian envoy is still at Cabul.
One other point to remember is that the setting out of
the mission was not heard of in this country till nearly
a fortnight after the break up of the Congress. No
question concerning it was asked in Parliament till
|. nearly a week of August had passed awav. Whether or
! not, it was planned as early as the Oxus expedition,
! therefore it was not carried out till the maintenance of
peace was assured."
The Economist says :—" lb is useless to disguise the
fact that the postponement of action till the spring may
be a misfortune of the first order. A waiting policy
will have three very bad results. It will give the rebuff
' the Government has received time to sink into the
native mind. The news of the Ameer's refusal to re-
, ceive the English mission is all over India by this time.
The Ameer is an object of envy to every native prince,
of admiration to every native below the rank of
prince. What he has done has been proclaimed oh
the housetop; but what will the housetop know
of what the Government of India are doing, so
long as their action is confined to moving troops from
place to place along the frontier ? Englishmen will re
main for six months under the imputation of having
submitted to an insult. Is that an imputation under
which they can safely live in India ? Secondly, Bussia
will have time to consider her policy—to choose between
persuading the Ameer to yield, and receive a mission
with such additions by'way of penalty as it is thought
expedient to inflict on him; and encouraging him to
resist by promises of indirect assistance. Either way,
the result will be mischievous. If the Au;eer yields it
will give Eussia an opportunity of suggesting that
it was through her mediation that England was
able to get what she wanted. If he defies us, the
rumour that he is helped by liusaia may serve to
strengthen the resistance offered to us, and to raise
the hopes of all among our Indian subjects who sympa
thise with that Yesislance. Thirdly, we cannott)e sure
of the course of events nearer home. It may not be as;
easy to throw our whole strength into the reduction of .
Afghanistan in April as it would be now, and though
- very much less than our whole strength may be sufficient'
for the purpose, neither the geograpay nor the history
of Afghanistan make it safe to underrate the resistance
we may meet with."
THE CASE AGAINST EUSSIA.
The Times says:—" We publish this morning a letter •
from a Dresden correspondent stating the case against
Eussia (in regard to Afghanistan) very strongly. We
are bidden to attach no importance to any disclaimers
she may be pleased to make. Her conduct, we are
xold, is to be judged by what she has done in other
cases, while her word is discredited beforehand by her
denials as to these. Shere Ali, our correspondent
urges, would hardly have ventured to defy England
without some promise of support from Eussiaj and
Eussia, we may therefore conclude, has given the
I promise, and will be found acting in' accord
ance'with it. We may hope that our correspondent
is a little hasty in his conclusions, and has gone
j beyond the known facts of the case before us. The
assumption that Eussia is determined at all hazards
to set aside the Berlin Treaty is an inference which
her general character does not warrant us in drawing.
We have already Deferred to this point, and we need not
further insist upon it. Eussia, we ought to bear in
mind, is not a Power from which we can expect friendly
treatment. She may not be sorry to see us involved in
a war with Afghanistan, and may yet have no thought
of lending active help to our adversary. We think it
more likely tha , while the prospect of a war with Eng
land was before her, she was busy with her efforts to
create a diversion in her own favour by acting on Shera
Ali, who was already not well disposed to us. The
train she has been laying has now gone off; but the ex
plosion has come at a wrong time and under circum
stances not looked for. We are at peace with Eussia,
and it is not to the interest of either party that our
j neutral relations should be disturbed."
DAILY TELEGRAPH,
1 LONDON, SA TURDA Y, SE PTEMBER 28.
According to a telegram from Simla, the gar
rison of Quetta is to be reinforced by 3,500
troops 4,000 men are to be assembled at Thull
at the entrance of the Kurrum Valley; and a
reserve force of 6,000 men will be concentrated
at Sukkur.
Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hussein Khan, the special
envoy sent by the Viceroy to the Ameer of
Cabul, has returned to Peshawur.
Jadim .
tenant-General. Crawford Chamberlain as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army for Afghan-
i istan.
j Last night's Russian St. Petersburg Journal
publishes a telegram from Vernoe, in Russian
! Turkestan, stating that if Kuldja were to be
i surrendered to China, Russian rule in the
Eastern part of Central Asia would be under
mined, the surrender would be another triumph
for England, and the Manchus would hold their
heads sti ll higber. [ '
I f the sudden crisis which has arisen tapon our
Indian frontier be dealt with at once judiciously
and courageously, as may be expected fitom the
Viceroy's known spirit and the loyal support Jhe
is sure to receive from Lord C kanbrook , it may
turn out, we think, after all, a fortunate occur- j
rence for the Empire. There is much reason to
believe that the explosion of the Russo-Afghan
plot has been, politically, an enormous blunder
on the part of its contrivers. In order to esti- !
mate the position correctly, we must bear in
mind both dates and circumstances; and a con
sideration of these, as well as of the distances
which have to be traversed between St. Peters
burg and Cabul, renders it probable that those
Muscovite journals were right which have de
clared the entire combination to be a counter-
stroke directed against our possible interven
tion in the Russo-Turkish War. If this be
the case, the orders sent to the Czar's agent e
at Cabul, and those upon which the leaders
of the Oxus expeditions are' acting, must have
been - transmitted long ago, and could not
well be cancelled. S hebe A li , in such a
contingency, is relying upon a policy the
mainsprings of which have been broken by
events, and it is not unlikely that he may find
himself disavowed and deserted just when his
arrogance has fatally exposed the full extent of I
the complicity between him and his tempters.
But the first result of such diplomatic treachery
on the part of Russia must be that the Central
Asian Courts would lose all faith in her, and
that our enemies among the Afghans would exe
crate her name. With the abortive plot at Cabul
she would have to abandon any collateral designs
she may have in Seistan and Balkh, and on the
Persian and Afghan frontiers; for no British
Government would ever allow half this nefarious
conspiracy to succeed, while its dupe alone was
punished. Yet, in the eyes of Teheran, Cabul,
and the Asiatic capitals, such a withdrawal would
be tantamount to a great military defeat, and
thus the disavowal of her malicious plans would
be a serious blow to Russia, and a correspond
ing advantage to Great Britain. If, on the
other hand, she should adopt the desperate
policy of backing up S here A li and pushing
forward the Oxus columns, with whatever di
versions may have been arranged from the side
of Persia and elsewhere, the struggle thus
forced upon us could come at no better time.
We were never stronger than now for the task of
safeguarding India once and for all from the ap
proach of Russia, and onr enemy was never
less prepared. Exhausted in a ruinous and
doubtful war, convulsed with internal discbn- j
tent, at her wits' end for money, and with no
possible alliances in Europe, the great aggressor
and peace-breaker of the world is more likely
to lose what she has gained in Asia than
to increase her advantages there. Events have
ranged Austrian interests definitely against her;
Germany has discharged the old debt of poli
tical gratitude, and will tolerate no revival of
the claim ; and, although Russian agents may
renew their intrigues at Constantinople, one |
Avorcl from England, should war break out, I
would re-arouse the spirit and replenish the re- j
sources of the Sultan. Imposing as are the vast
areas of Russian domination in Asia, and long as
is the list of savage kingdoms which she appears
| it a single Russian battalion joined hands with"
the Afghan Prince against us, an open powder-
barrel is not easier to fire than the train of
hatred and rebellion against the White Czar
which extends from Khokand to the Caspian. |
Millions of Asiatic Mussulmans whom she has'
" civilised," like the Yomuts, " in the Circassian
manner," want only arms, ammunition, and a
little money to set the Continent blazing behind
General K auffman's columns. " For five hun
dred thousand pounds," a great Anglo-Indian
authority has concisely said, " every Russian
throat in Central Asia can be cut and, while ;
that is a way of putting the matter which goes
far beyond our desire or our habits in warfare it
expresses a truth, and shows with what perfect
confidence we might accept either issue in the
answer which the Russian Government will have
to give us a s to its policy a t Cabul and along the i
i Oxns.