Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎40r] (81/312)

OUR ATTITUDE ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER.
F or many a day the newspapers have been melancholy reading;
to-day they are most melancholy. No Englishman—not even
the partisan whose thoughts do not always correspond with his
words—can go through the various London prints this morning
without feeling that his Government and his country are fast
becoming a laughing-stock to everybody who is not an English
man. And the worst of it is that it seems almost impossible
to mend matters now, except in a comparatively unimportant
particular. The ludicrous bounce of the ministerial press, the
Who's-afraid swagger, the studied gratuitous assumption of
Mr. Bob ^Acres' part in the face of a grinning world—this
sort of thing might be avoided at any rate. The truth is that
the country has been placed in a position of extreme difficulty,
a difficulty at once painful, humiliating, and even ridiculous ; and
it can only be made more humiliating, more ridiculous, by an
affectation of sublime serenity. Let us look at a few of the
various news items, as they are sometimes called, which are
telegraphed this morning. According to the reports from India,
numerous additional regiments have been warned to prepare for
active service ; the Quetta garrison is to be strongly reinforced ;
here and there troops are to be concentrated, in one place as many
as 15,000 men; everywhere formidable preparation. But "it is
imperative that time should be given for negotiations with the
hill tribes, who are independent of Cabul, but would throw their
whole weight into the scale against us if we attempt to advance
without having made arrangements with them for their neutrality."
For, although the temper of the Ameer has been known for years,
and though the intrigue of Russia at Cabul has been known for
months, and though for weeks it has appeared most probable
that the one and the other would combine to put upon us open
insult and defiance, no arrangements with these hill tribes was
attempted till yesterday. (Again, masterly inactivity of the most
impressive order.) For this reason, and for others of an equally
substantial character, "it is believed that no immediate advance will
take place," says one report. Says another : " Notwithstanding the
prompt military measures taken by the authorities, it is believed
that the Government intend to await the course of events and to
observe the attitude adopted by the Ameer." Says a third : " The
Government will await for the present the possibility of a favourable
outcome of events, adopting an attitude of armed expectation."
Now, to await the possibility of a favourable outcome of events
(in Mr. Micawber's time it used to be called waiting for some
thing to turn up), meanwhile adopting an attitude of armed
expectation, is only to maintain on the frontier after S here
A li has delivered his ultimatum in the most offensive way
possible (to be sure, Major C avagnari was not actually murdered)
precisely the position we took up before the Ameer had come
to a decision. Of course there are explanations of such a course
as either judicious or necessary; though there are none that
can take from it its unfortunate appearance of hesitation to
accept a challenge till for the third time it is accompanied
by a blow, or of inability, months after the blow was
expected, to meet it promptly. Besides the circumstance that
the hill tribes have yet to be won to our own side (if they
are not already won to the other), it is alleged by some that
winter is too near to allow of an invasion : though, according
to others, there is time to move three weeks hence without
danger of the snows. But supposing that ,the first-mentioned
authorities are right, it remains that we are discovered in the
folly of having allowed the matter to drag on till the Ameer
could defy us with any amount of accompanying outrage—
leaving the Viceroy of India for six months in the absurd
position of holding forth one hand for an apology, while the
other is applied to the bruises inflicted on his honour. Indeed,
this is the attitude which he is recommended to adopt, as the
one suggested by every consideration of prudence and dignity.
All we can say is that we do not view it in that light. If
this same attitude is adopted compulsorily, so much the worse
for us that we have been reduced by our masterly inactivities
to anything so ludicrous, humiliating, and perilous. If it is
adopted voluntarily (and the ministerial organ assures us that
"we can choose our own way with the certainty of following
it at our will/), there is a kind of madness or of fa tality about it
lor which the political inquirer should seek an explanation if
he cannot find a cure.
If we ourselves had to look for the explanation, we should 1
turn to the wretched position of our Government with regard to
Russia and the whole Eastern Question. We should ask our
selves (supposing the attitude above described to be a voluntary
one) whether our Government does not feel that "precipitation " in
dealing with the Ameer might deprive them of a second oppor
tunity of ensuring peace with honour by some secret arrange
ment with the Russian Court. That Russia is S here A li's insti
gator and abettor nobo dy do ubts. She has still her agent at