Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎39v] (80/312)

J udging from the publication in the Indian
newspapers of his letters to S hers A li rela
tive to Sir N eville CiAMBEiiLAiN's mission,
it would seem that the Indian Viceroy is
anxious to pnt in a favourable li^yht' the
diplomatic action to which the A meer's inso
lence is a rejoinder. Unless we are to suppose
that these documents have come to light through
some such surreptitious agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. as that which
gave the SALlsBtrRY-SunotrvALOFP agreement to
the world, we must presume that they have beerv" 1
published with Lord L yxton's permission. It
is natural that Lord L ytton and his advisers
should wish to produce the impression that
they are in no way to blame for the hostile atti
tude which the Afghan ruler has thought fit to
adopt, and should endeavour to do this by
making public a specimen of the manner in which
j they have approached him. The two letters
which have been published, however, whether
by design or by inadvertence, do not
afford sufficient ground for an estimate
jof the wisdom or unwisdom of Lord
L ytton's dealings with S here A li . Taken by
themselves, they cannot be said to err on the side
of over-courtesy, , even according to Western
standards of polite address. When you propose to
enter another man's house, it is customary to go 1
through the form of asking permission. Lord j
L yttok would seem to have observed no such
ceremony in hii communication to the A meer.
He simply intimated that from " authentic in-
" telligence which he had lately received as to the
" course of recent events at Cabul and in the
"countries bordering on Afghanistan," it had
become " necessary " for him to discuss with the
A meer " matters of importance which concern
" the interests of India and Afghanistan." He did
not affect to inquire whether the A meer was
willing to enter upon such a conference, but in
formed him, without further ceremony, th^t he
had resolved to send an Envoy " immediately " to
" converse personally with his Highness regarding
these urgent affairs," and requested him to make
provision for the Envoy's " safe conduct and
" suitable accommodation according to his
"dignity." A letter so worded is not calcu
lated to flatter the dignify of an Oriental
potentate accustomed to a style from his
nominal equals which in the West would
denote subserviency. It is, in fact, such a missive
as a landlord might address to a refractory tenant
as his last word before resortinsr to legal pro
ceedings. The subsequent communication, des
patched on the news of the death of the A meer' s son
and designated heir, announcing that, important
and urgent aa was the business which Sir N eville
C hamberlain was charged to transact, his visit
would be delayed "for a short time," " till the
"usual period of mourning had elapsed," was
not couched in terms likely to soothe wounded
susceptibilities.
It would be rash to say that the studiously
abrupt and imperious tone of the V iceroy's
demand for a personal interview between his Envoy
and the A meer was net justiliable. It may
have been the wisest tone to adopt in the circum
stances. It is quite conceivable that our relation
with the angry A mekr had reached such a pc£at
that a conciliatory tone would have been ittfein-
te^reted. Before we can form an opinion we
must know more of the circumstances than has
yet been vouchsafed to the English public. It
may not be expedient to publish more at
present, but till fuller revelations have been
made the significance of this fragment cannot be
appreciated. This much, at least, we know —that
the statement by which the publication of Lo-^
L ytton's letters has been accompanied, that
" a most courteous and friendly letter" fr
V iceroy to the A mefr in 1876 " has n p to i
" day remained totally unanswered," '^yno means
represents all that has passed sinc^ Igye affect in <>•
the relations between the Indian fs overnmpnt and
that of Afghanistan. Sir LEy IS P elly's mission
has intervened since that^ ^ atp> as well ag the
occupation of Quettah. ^ letter aUuded to may
have concernod that but we should like
to know something more about it than that it wag
projected " wit^ ft view of discussing and im-
*' proving relations between the British
Goverr-iifent and Afghanistan." The fact.that
Lord t JV tton's letter was "courteous and
" throws no light upon his frontier
poWy. It would be of more interest to know bv
what means he proposed to improve our relations
with. Afghanistan. The AM'iiE'R refused to treat
with Sir L ewis P elly personally, hut he
sent an envoy to confer with him at
Peshawur. TV hat -rfere the proposals which
Sir L ewis P ellx then communicated ? Were
they, as ha^ W>n altered in an apparently
inspired communication from Calcutta, the same
as thoa^ of which Sir N eville C hamberlain
was ihe accredited bearer? And were they, as
been asserted by the same authority, to tis®
| effect that the A meer should allow British troops
to occupy certain points in his territory, and
should admit a British Kesident with a sufficient
military guard to Cabul ?
! Answers to these questions wtrnM be more to
the purpose than references to unreciprocated
courtesies of an earlier date. The A meer has
made no secret of his grudge against, the English
ever since his Envoy fatfed to get what he wanted
from Lord. M ayo at Simla. The barring of the
way to Sir N eville C hamberlain is Ihe most
flagrant instance of this ill-will, bu'v 'it is by no
means the first. He has allowed n* Englishman
to enter his territory for five yaar*. He refused
to )et. Mr. F orsyth's party'through Cabal
tf>n their way back from Kf^hgaix He even inter
fered temporarily with, passage of our wative
agents through hifj, ierritorfes. S here A li's
•defiant jealousy for some time been a
known factor Indian politics; the question
has been it was to be met ? The policy
of Lor^ X ytton's predecessor was to leave him
a ^Q<fit^iIl he should coxne to his senses, and recog-
ftjse for himself that; his true interest lay in cor-
! dial alliance with, the English. The ground of
that policy and the secret of its strength lay in the
assumption that we had no desine to extend our pre
sent frontier, and that S here . A li or his successor
on the Afghan throne would feel the neces^itr of
cultivating friendly relationsfwith us if ho- desired
to avoid absorption by the advancing power of
Eussia. But since Lord L ytton went to fill the
Viceregal office this policy h^s been departed from.
It is true it has been both offtoially and semi-officially
, denied that there has fc*jen any change in our
[frontier policy since Lord L ytton's appointment.
' When the Governioeut vrore challenged last yT ; ar
to declare whs^ was the meaning of the ^ccu-
r pation of Quettah and Sir L ewis P elly's nego-
i tiations at Peshawur, Sir S tafford N ^thcote
| aaid that " he had always 1 maintained Che opinion
that the oest way to prepare agains',; anv danger
" to India was not to advance outside our own
" frontier to meet it, but to "jWagthen ourselves
" wel1 ^ Wr borders." This Vent forth as the
opinion of the Governm .^t Lor d G eorge
H amilton and Lord S alisbury , in the House ot
Lords, were also understood to say that no
change of policy had been determined
upon, though their language was more ambiguous*
The U nder- S ecretary , in particular, made use ol
a significant expression to the effect that the affairs
of Afghanistan were now to be regarded more as
Imperial than as Indian questions. The public
were also in possession of a despatch of Lord
j L ytton's , in -which he referred to a conversation
which he had with Lord S alisbury before quitting
England, and stated that he had then agreed to
treat Afghan affairs in accordance with a schemii
of Imperial policy. The Imperial trumpet-.
note was industriously sounded by a certain
! section of the Government. There would oi
course have been no want of Imperial spirit ia
' keeping within our own borders, if it was tha
i wisest course ; but has that policy been honestly
adhered to by our romantic Imperialists ? If th«
version given of Sir L ewis P elly's mission isj
correct, the country has reason to complain that i4
has not only been kept in the dark, but that th»
answers of her M ajesty's Ministers last year were
l misleading. The inspired organs through which
! the Indian Government has been half-concealing
and halt'-revealing its frontier policy endeavour
to represent S here A li's refusal of oar English
Envoy as.an isolated act of defiance. In forget-
fulness Of former communications and of official
utterances, we are now told that this insult lifts
Afghan affairs within the range of Imperial
politics. They have been, by the avowal of
; the present V iceroy and the late Under-
i Secretary lor India, within that range for soma
! time, though the result is so far the reverse of!
satisfactory that it is considered judicious tc#
conceal the fact.