Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎36r] (72/312)

THE INDIAN CRISIS.
THE CONTEMPLATED OPEEA-
TIONS.
RISING ON THE PERSIAN FRONTIER.
' (B y E astbrn T eleguaph.)
(from our special coerkspondent.)
BOMBAY, T hursday.
It ia believed that no imiriodiate advance will
take place on tiie part of the fifteen thousand men
now assembling near Thull, under General
Chamberlain. It is imperative that time should
be given for negotiations with the hill tribes, who
are independent of Cabul, but would throw their
whole weight into the scale against us if we attempt
to advance without having made arrangements with
them for their neutrality.
No such consideration will militate to prevent
an advance from Quetta upon Candahar. Large
stores of provisions are already collected at Quetta,
and an advance may be looked for in that direction
as soon as sufficient troops are there collected. The
1 Passes between Candahar and Quetta are, however,
formidable, and Candahar itself naturally strong ;
the advance must, thereiore, be made in consider
able force.
I (PwEUTEE'3 T ELEGEAM.)
SIMLA, S EPT . 26.
Notwithstanding the prompt military measures
taken by the authorities it is believed that the
Government intend to await the course of events,
and to observe the attittule adop ed by the Ameer
Shere Ali, before undertaking the actual invasion
of Afghanistan.
A serious outbreak has occurred in Seistan, on
the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan.
1 iBv feUBMABlNE T e LKGKAPH. )
(from oob own corrkspondrnt.)
\ PARIS, Thubsdat.
The Dtbats, the JRSpublique, and the Temps con
tinue to make the Afghan difficulty the theme of
their remarks.
The Dibats, quoting The Standard, states that
k its observations are particularly valuable as con
veying the feelings which are common to all
i Englishmen, and which lead them to the opinion
that Russia is behind the Ameer at Cabul. It
adds : " The Russians have not, perhaps, sufficiently
calculated to what degree public opinion is excited
in England by these latter events. English pride
has always been considerable, but it is now greater
than ever. It is extremely sensitive, and the
slightest appearance of o fie nee is resented as a grave
insult. But besides the question of amour propre,
i there is. the question of interest. Afghanistan is
j now but a frontier between Russia and England,
and the question is which of the two Powers shall
in a given time command the political influences and
the strategic positions which combine to make up
that frontier." The Dbbats thinks it likely that
England will rest content with inflicting condign
punishment on Shere Ali and take possession of the
Passes which command the entrance to the country,
| when she would in reality be mistress of the whole
1 country. The Dibats hopes Russia will not take
part in the war, but evidently thinks that con
tingency possible.
The Mpublique regards the conflict between
England and Russia for mastery in Central Asia
i inevitable. It forbears expressing an opinion, but
thinks the Russian position very strong, that posi
tion, in its opinion, enabling them to reach with
comparative ease the Gulf of Oman.
The Temps alone anticipates an amicable adjust
ment of the difficulty.
The Bombay Gazette remarks that at the
i close of the diplomatic negotiations of 1873, the main
1 object of wh.ch was to fix the northern boundary of
I Afghanistan and thus set a limit to the Russian advance,
it cannot be forgotten that after Prince Gortschakotf had
; volunteered a declaration that Hussia c nsidered Afghanis- ■
tan beyond her own sphere of action, but would hold Eng
land responsible for keeping the Ameer in order an 1 pre
venting: Afghan raids across the Oxus, Mr. Gladstone
got up in the House of Commons and' said England
would undertake no responsibility for the actions of the
Ameer; and so the proposed bargain fell through, leaving
.Russia at liberty to take her own way in Central Asia.
Last year, again, there were futile negotiations, in the
course of which the Ameer asked for what Sir N, Chamber
lain must now be empowered to offer him, a guarantee of
the integrity of his dominions against Russia, coupled with
a large subsidy. The grant of such terms will, of course,
be now made conditional on the occupation by British troops
of certain strategical points in Afghan territory; but the
negotiations should be carried on in a perfectly friendly
manner with the Ameer if he be inclined to listen to
1 reason, and, should ho prove recalcitrant, English troops
should at once occupy his country, without setting up any
pretender.
The Times of India contains the following ;—
"We hear from Simla that the latest advices from Cabul,
dated August 21st, state that the Ameer, after much per
suasion from the Mustaphi, attended durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). again for the
first time. All kinds of rumours are current, as appears
from the following Simla telegram—" Reports are becoming
more positive that Yakoob Khan has escaped to Ghuznee,
where there is said to be some disturbance or rising.
Russian movements in that direction appear to be unknown.
Rumour says we shall force on the Mission whether the
Ameer consents or not. Quiet preparations are be
ing made to this end, and it is understood that
we may move on Herat." With a view to eventualities,
a contemporary makes the following suggestions :—" To
secure a position which would really dominate Cabul, a
for< e should be moved into the valley of the Kuram River
without loss of time. The military advantage of an occu
pation of this po>t is notorious to all acquainted with the
topography of the frontier. The valley is extensive,
fertile, highly cultivated, and capable of supplying a
large force. It is inhabited principally by the Turi
tribe of the Shiah sect, who are extremely well disposed
towards the British, hating their Suni rulers at Cabul.
A station constructed within five or six marches only of our
present frontier would be within eight or n ne marches
of Cabul itse : f, with a good road leading to the capital over
the Shah Gurdun Pass, easy of approach from the Kuram
side, but somewhat long and difficult on the Afghan side.
Our own village of Thul would form a good post in connec
tion with the advance to Kuram, being about 50 miles
I in rear, and Kohat would form a convenient base about
I 60 miles behind Thul. We should like to see this
! position occupied before the Mission to Cabul sets
outj. Its possession would form a very effectual ' ma
terial guarantee' for the honourable reception of the
British Envoy by the Ameer, and would (without
! any hostile demonstration whatever, for the Turis
and Bangush, another tribe in the valley, would rejoice in
our advance) serve to convince the Afghans that civility to
us is their best policy. This important point in our hands,
the Mission, with an esco t considerably larger than that
already named, might advance by the Khyber secure in the
good will of the 1 ass Afridis, who are far more ill-disposed
towards the Ameer than towards ourselves, and secure also
in the far more important matter of the respect ever
accorded to visible and tangible strength and resolution.
This is the method by which only i-.ngland can now exert
her influence in Afghanistan and the States of Central
Asia."
The Simla Correspondent of the same journal,
writing on August 20th, says:—"The chief topic of inte
rest which is discussed here at present is the mission to
Cabul and its members. The news of the Ameer having
received the Russian EmbHSsy, while admission to our
representatives has all along been soiigorously opposed, has
startled, as it well might do, our statesmen, not only here,
but at home. It was thought for some time that the
Ameer's dependence had been purchased by lavish
gifts of money and arms, and that he could be relied on to
form a kind of buffer to Russian conquest in the direction
of our Indian Empire. Circumstances, however, arose which
| tended to expose the fallacy of this idea, and it was with
the view of assertaining the exact state of affairs between
! our Government and that of Cabul that the Peshawur Con-
' ference was held. The Ameer had no objection to re
ceiving lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees of rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. , or hundreds of rifles and thousands
of rounds of ammunition, these being, in his view of
the case, a somewhat negative sign of his vassalage,
but when this Government naturally demanded a certain
quid pro quo in the shape of residents at one or two places
of importance in his territory, the Plenipotentiary discreetly
became suddenly ill, necessiting the closing of the durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). .
Thus it was seen that rather than accept our favours and
renounce his independence the Ameer chose to do his utmost
in keeping the Khyber shut against us. Probably it would
have been better for him had he chosen the former
alternative. Recent events have shown how thoroughly
in earnest the scheming Russ is in his endeavours to
become the paramount power in Central Asia, and (govern
ment is now quite alive to the necessity of a more intimate
acquaintance with what goes on behind the Black Mountain.
The An eer, therefore, will find it s-. mewhat less easy than
before to put otf the overnment demands. It may be a
little flattering to his pride to find both Russia and England
anxious to win him over, but he w ll probably not be pre
pared co find that whether he ikes it or not he will have
no oi portunity of gainsaying what is now. to be demanded
of hire.'