‘Koweit [Kuwait]. A report compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General’s Department’ [‎11] (25/66)

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permitted to land any men, and that in the event of his atterant
,ng to do so, such attempt would, if necessary, be prevented by
force, 1 he Turkish gunboat, on tins, withdrew from Koweit
and returned whence she came, to Basrah.
The inference that, this action on the part of the Turks \
was intended to disturb the status quo of Koweit as an in
dependent state, or was even planned in conjunction with
with a view to Mubarak's undoing, is somewhat
strengthened by the fact that, scarcely a month later, Ibn
Rashid himself advanced to within a short distance of the
town of Koweit, raided some camels and even looted certain
outlying houses. He then moved to Safwan, the next stage
on the direct road to Uasrah, about 16 hours' journey from
Koweit; there was considerable alarm in Koweit and Sheikh
Mubarak asked for the presence of additional British ships in
Koweit Bay—a request which was complied with.
It was within a few weeks of this incident that the Nakib
of Basrah visited Koweit and handed to Mubarak a telegram
purporting to have emanated from Constantinople, to the effect
that Mubarak s assertion of his independence was disapproved
by the Sultan, and that punishment must ensue, unless he made
bis submission to the Turkish Government.
To this communication, Mubarak, after consultation with
the Senior Naval Officer, replied to the effect that his relations
with theTurkish Government were the same as they had always
been. Later, on a representation being made by our Ambassador
at Constantinople, this telegram and the action of the Nakib /
of Basrah were disavowed by the Porte.
Early in December, however, the same Nakib again ap- \
peared on the scene, in the Turkish gunboat Zohaf y with a
telegram demanding that Sheikh Mubarak should at once embark
on board the Zohaf, and repair to Constantinople, as a
member of the Council of State, and threatening his forcible
removal from Koweit, in case of non-compliance with this
order.
Mubarak obtained three days' grace in which to consider
his reply, and H.M.S, Sphinx was despatched to Bushire,
to report this latest development, by telegram, to the Foreign
Office. No sooner had the Sphinx left Koweit Bay, however,
than the three days' grace was withdrawn and Mubarak was
peremptorily pressed for an immediate answer. The Sheikh,
under such pressure as this, represented to the Senior Naval
Officer that he felt that he had no option but to comply with
the Turkish demands unless he was assured of British support.
The Senior Naval Officer formally forbade his taking action,
or replying thus under compulsion, until an answer could be
received to the communication sent to Bushire. In order to
strengthen the Sheikh's hands, and to support him in his
refusal to give the immediate answer demanded, a some-