‘Koweit [Kuwait]. A report compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General’s Department’ [‎12] (26/66)

I 2
what thinly veiled threat of bombardment in case of non
compliance with the advice given was hinted at. Mubarak
accordingly declined to comply with the demand for an
immediate answer, until the three days' grace originally agreed
upon had elapsed, and the Turkish officials left Koweit in their
gunboat.
The reply received from the foreign Office a few days later
was to the effect that though it had previously been agreed
that the status quo should be maintained, it now appeared
that Mubarak was being subjected to threats. In these
circumstances Sheikh Mubarak was to be informed that he
would be supported, and that the British Government would
not tolerate any attack being made on him, by land or
sea. The Senior Naval Officer also received instructions to
defend Koweit, by force, if necessary; landing, however, was
deprecated, except under circumstances of the greatest
gravity.
The situation during the last days of 1901 was, therefore,
somewhat critical. Ibn Rashid's presence, with a considerable
force, at Safvvan (the nearest wells to Kovveit on the main road
to Basrah) was serious enough ; still Mubarak professed t^ be
quite able to cope with Ibn Rashid alone. He more than once,
rather quaintly, remarked in my hearing that he could "drink
the Beni Rashid as he would drink water." But the manifest
hostility of the Turks, their anxiety to assume or assert
authority over Koweit, as well as their apparent mala
fides, all led to the inference that they might support Ibn
Rashid in any further operations he might undertake against
Mubarak.
If, as appeared probable, Ibn Rashid was acting in collusion
with the Turkish officials of Basrah, his presence at Safwan
was a grave menace to the security of Koweit. At the same
time, a considerable number of Turkish troops were known to
be echeloned along the river between Baghdad and Basrah,
though no reliable information could be obtained as to their
numbers. Even should the Turks not openly support Ibn
Rashid with regular troops, it seemed possible that they might
do so by putting irregulars" at his disposal, or by aiding
him with supplies, ammunition and the sinews of war
generally.
Meanwhile, Mubarak with his forces, was encamped at
Jehara near the western extremity of Koweit Bay. The bheikh
attaches great importance to this place, which lies some fifteen
miles nearer Basrah than the town of Koweit itself, and is
therefore more open to a sudden attack, or raid, from that
direction. Moreover, owing to the flat shelving shore, Jehara
could not be so effectively supported by naval fire. Mubarak,
therefore, had some cause for anxiety, especially for Jehara.