'File 73/7 I (D 19) Status of Kuwait & Baghdad Railway, and Anglo-Turkish negotiations 1911' [‎152r] (337/631)

last jear showed tliat tliose investments hod. gone up m six or seven years to nearly
100,000,0001, as compared with German interests valued at 36,000,000Z. and British
interests of about ^0,000,000/. But out of those 100,000,0007., 60,000,000?. are
invested m ^ State funds ; they are not likely to suffer from the construction of the
Lagdad Ivailway any more than the 4,000,000/. invested in land and real property,
the 3,500,000/. invested in banks and credit institutes, or the 2,500,000/. invested in
mines and industrial enterprises. As far as the railways are concerned (15,000.000/.),
it is a vvell-established fact that since the Bagdad company bought the Aleppo- Birejik
concession in 1903 and (he Mersina—Adana line in i 906, it is not hkely to interfere
with the important French lines which are all located in Syria. Of course, German
interests mav, as a result of the new enterprise, follow in Smyrna a programme of
extension whicli would endanger the prosperity of some French commercial firms. But
this will simply compel some of those houses to change their antiquated methods.
From a purely political point of view, it is equally difficult to justify a policy of
blind opposition on the part of France. Although the pan-Germanists were silly enough
to shout at the top ot their v r oices that Germany was going to swallow the Ottoman
Empire, it seems rather unlikely that the Bagdad company, which is only German as
far as the general management is concerned, which is using nothing but native labour
and has undertaken not to bring a single German colonist to Turkey, which depends
upon the good-will of the Turks as well as upon non-German investors, will do much
more for Germany than other lines have done for France or England. At any rate,
France has very few political interests outside Syria, and cannot be very much afraid of
a line which is only touching Syria's borders. As for the constitution of the company,
it has nothing in itself which should prevent the admission of the Bagdad Railway on
the Paris Bourse : there are indeed a great number of companies which have free access
to the Paris market, in spite of the fact that their French shareholders are not properly
represented on the board of directors.
I nternation al C onsiderations.
The French Government has, therefore, no vital reasons, as far as France herself
is concerned, to insist on the conditions laid down by M. Delcasse. But other
considerations of an equally imperative nature are preventing the French Foreign Office
from settling at once its differences with the Bagdad Railway Company. It is almost
an open secret that M. Delcasse took up the position of 1902 in order to please Russia,
who strongly objected to the building of the new line. Curiously enough the Russian
Press had started a campaign against French participation in the scheme in January,
1902. two months before the famous declarations made in the French Parliament. The
" Novoe Vremya, in an article written by M. Porochine, went as far as to hint that
the continuation of the Franco-Bussian Alliance largely depended upon the attitude
France would adopt in the matter. Russian diplomacy interfered in the same way. In
taking Russia's side in a question which was to her of a greater interest than to France,
M. Delcasse and, after him, M. Pichon, did nothing but their obvious duty. At the
present moment Russia seems, of course, inclined to take another view of the Bagdad
Railway. But even if she ceases to oppose the scheme France is not prepared to follow
in her steps unless she is satisfied that she can do so without hurting English interests.
This is the most important feature of the present situation, and it would be a great pity
if English opinion were not aware that to-day French policy is entirely directed in the
Bagdad question by the Anglo-French understanding. It is, of course, a sad fact that
up to now the co-operation of French and English private interests in Constantinople
has been very imperfect. On the British side the complaint has justly been made that
French financiers have too often chose to increase their personal profits by joining hands
with England's opponents. French financiers retort that the representatives of British
interests have several times acted against France; for instance, when the British
president of the Ottoman Debt supported a campaign instituted against the Societe
des Tabacs ottomans, or when British financiers tried to secure the concession of the
Tripoli line, which had already been promised to France. The last Tuikish loan
episode, when the Ottoman Bank and the ^National Bank stood, for a moment m direct
opposition to each other, is another illustration of a state of things which made some
people say that in Constantinople the entente cordiale was nothing but a name. Buu
the temporary clash between a few individuals interests there are indeed many good
reasons to believe that it is not going to last much longer cannot exert the least
influence on the policy of both Governments. When M. Pichon stated m the rrcncn